State v. Manaf Stas (A-14-11) (068060)
Decided September 12, 2012 To convict a defendant of allowing under N.J.S.A 39:4-50(a), the State must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she had actual or constructive knowledge of the driver s intoxication, that he or she permitted the driver to operate the vehicle, and that the vehicle was under the defendant s custody or control. This appeal centers upon only one statutory element: that defendant allowed an intoxicated person to drive the vehicle.
PATTERSON, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court determines whether, in the quasi-criminal proceedings before the municipal court and the Law Division, the use of defendant s silence as substantive evidence of his guilt and for the purpose of assessing his credibility violated his federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and his state statutory and common law privilege against self-incrimination.
Defendant Manaf Stas and Joseph Putz were involved in an automobile accident in a minivan owned by defendant s sister, minutes after leaving a bar where both had been drinking. When police arrived on the scene, Putz told the investigating officer that he had been driving at the time of the accident. After failing field sobriety tests, Putz was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). Defendant did not comment on Putz s confession to being the driver. Other than to respond to the officers questions about his identity and the vehicle, defendant said nothing. Defendant was given a summons under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) for allowing Putz, while intoxicated, to operate a vehicle over which he had custody and control, sometimes called the allowing offense.
At their joint municipal court trial, defendant and Putz gave an account of events that sharply diverged from the story given by Putz immediately after the accident. Putz testified that defendant had been the driver and that his statement at the scene that he was the driver had been a lie. Defendant corroborated Putz s revised account, testifying that he, not Putz, had been driving. Rejecting this testimony, the municipal court found Putz guilty of DWI and found defendant guilty of allowing. The court relied in part on the fact that defendant had stood by in silence while Putz told police that he was the driver. Defendant and Putz then appealed to the Law Division, which conducted a de novo review. Both defense attorneys argued that in the absence of witnesses who could testify with personal knowledge of the identity of the driver, and in light of defendants testimony that defendant was the driver, the municipal court had erred in convicting defendant and Putz. For the first time, defendant s counsel argued that Putz s statements to the police constituted hearsay that was inadmissible against defendant. Also for the first time, counsel for Putz objected to the use of defendant s silence, and any inferences from that silence, as a violation of both Constitutions, both Federal and State. Defendant s counsel did not join in that objection. The Law Division convicted defendant of allowing, relying upon defendant s silence while Putz was questioned and arrested as an admission on [defendant] s part.
Defendant appealed and an Appellate Division panel affirmed. It rejected defendant s contention that the State s evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for allowing an intoxicated driver to use the minivan under defendant s control in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). It held that Putz s statement to officers that he was driving was admissible against both defendants as a statement against interest. In the panel s view, the record contained sufficient evidence, apart from defendant s silence at the scene, to support his conviction; and even if reliance on his silence was error, it was harmless. The Court granted defendant s petition for certification. 208 N.J. 368 (2011).
HELD: The use of defendant s silence as substantive evidence of his guilt and for the purpose of assessing his credibility violated his federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and his state statutory and common law privilege against self-incrimination. Given the prominent role that defendant s silence played in his conviction, the error was clearly capable of producing an unjust result and warrants a new trial. R. 2:10-2.
1. The Court reviews the factual findings of the Law Division and municipal court under a deferential standard, but no deference is owed with respect to legal determinations or conclusions reached on the basis of the facts. (p. 14)
2. To convict a defendant of allowing under N.J.S.A 39:4-50(a), the State must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she had actual or constructive knowledge of the driver s intoxication, that he or she permitted the driver to operate the vehicle, and that the vehicle was under the defendant s custody or control. This appeal centers upon only one statutory element: that defendant allowed an intoxicated person to drive the vehicle. (pp. 15-16)
3. The Law Division s reliance on defendant s silence in convicting him implicates his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his New Jersey state law statutory and common law privilege against self-incrimination, which are codified in N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 and N.J.R.E. 503. The privilege protects individuals who are tried for DWI-related offenses in quasi-criminal proceedings and is available to a defendant accused of an allowing violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Accordingly, this case is governed by decisions applying self-incrimination principles to settings involving a defendant s pre- and post-arrest silence. (pp. 16-19)
4. Under federal law, the use for any purpose at trial of a defendant s silence after his arrest and the administration of Miranda warnings violates his or her privilege against self-incrimination and his or her right to due process. Under the New Jersey Supreme Court s jurisprudence, even silence that precedes the administration of Miranda warnings -- if it is at or near the time of a defendant s arrest -- cannot be used for any purpose at trial. However, pre-arrest silence that is not at or near the time of arrest, when there is no government compulsion and the objective circumstances demonstrate that a reasonable person in a defendant s position would have acted differently, can be used to impeach that defendant s credibility with an appropriate limiting instruction. It cannot, however, be used as substantive evidence of a defendant s guilt. (pp. 19-27)
5. The Law Division s use of defendant s silence, as substantive evidence of his guilt and for the purpose of assessing his credibility, violated his privilege against self-incrimination. At issue is defendant s silence during a police investigation. As police questioned Putz, defendant stood nearby and was questioned about the fact that the minivan belonged to his sister. It is undisputed that until defendant was questioned and issued a summons, he was not free to leave the scene. His silence occurred at or near his receipt of a summons at the scene for a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, the functional equivalent of an arrest for purposes of this analysis. His silence thus should not have been used for any purpose, and the Law Division s reliance on that silence constituted error. (pp. 27-28)
6. Because defendant did not object to the admission of the evidence of his silence before the Law Division, the Court reviews for plain error. R. 2:10-2. The Law Division s reliance on defendant s silence at the scene of the accident prejudiced a substantial constitutional right and was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. The Law Division could not convict defendant of the allowing offense under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 unless it concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Putz had been the driver, in contravention of both defendants trial testimony. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. The State s evidence on that issue, presented at the municipal court and relied upon in the de novo trial before the Law Division, consisted of two components: Putz s statement to police, recanted at trial, and defendant s silence as he observed the testing, interrogation and arrest of Putz. The Law Division prominently featured defendant s silence in its explanation of the basis for its decision, not only as it affected defendant s credibility but as substantive evidence of his guilt. His silence cannot be isolated from the remaining evidence considered by the court. (pp. 28-30)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED for a new trial.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, and HOENS join in JUSTICE PATTERSON s opinion. JUDGE WEFING (temporarily assigned) did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A- 14 September Term 2011
068060
