Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, P.C.
2053 Woodbridge Avenue - Edison, NJ 08817
(732) 572-0500
www.njlaws.com

Wednesday, April 27, 2016

39:4-130. Failure to report accident Immediate notice of accident; written report

The driver of a vehicle or street car involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person, or damage to property of any one person in excess of $500.00 shall by the quickest means of communication give notice of such accident to the local police department or to the nearest office of the county police of the county or of the State Police, and in addition shall within 10 days after such accident forward a written report of such accident to the division on forms furnished by it. Such written reports shall contain sufficiently detailed information with reference to a motor vehicle accident, including the cause, the conditions then existing, the persons and vehicles involved and such information as may be necessary to enable the director to determine whether the requirements for the deposit of security required by law are inapplicable by reason of the existence of insurance or other circumstances. The director may rely upon the accuracy of the information contained in any such report, unless he has reason to believe that the report is erroneous. The division may require operators involved in accidents to file supplemental reports of accidents upon forms furnished by it when in the opinion of the division, the original report is insufficient. The reports shall be without prejudice, shall be for the information of the division, and shall not be open to public inspection. The fact that the reports have been so made shall be admissible in evidence solely to prove a compliance with this section, but no report or any part thereof or statement contained therein shall be admissible in evidence for any other purpose in any proceeding or action arising out of the accident.
39:4-130 Failure to report accident
fine $30 -$100 plus court costs
Whenever the driver of a vehicle is physically incapable of giving immediate notice or making a written report of an accident as required in this section and there was another occupant in the vehicle at the time of the accident capable of giving notice or making a report, such occupant shall make or cause to be made said notice or report not made by the driver.
Whenever the driver is physically incapable of making a written report of an accident as required by this section and such driver is not the owner of the vehicle, then the owner of the vehicle involved in such accident shall make such report not made by the driver.
A written report of an accident shall not be required by this section if a law enforcement officer submits a written report of the accident to the division pursuant to R.S. 39:4-131.
Any person who knowingly violates this section shall be fined not less than $30 or more than $100.
The director may revoke or suspend the operator's license privilege and registration privilege of a person who violates this section.
For purposes of this section, it shall not be a defense that the operator of the motor vehicle was unaware of the existence or extent of personal injury or property damage caused by the accident as long as the operator was aware that he was involved in an accident.

39:3-10 Unlicensed Drivers

39:3-10. No person shall drive a motor vehicle on a public highway in this State unless the person is under supervision while participating in a behind-the-wheel driving course pursuant to section 6 of P.L.1977, c.25 (C.39:3-13.2a) or is in possession of a validated permit, or a provisional or basic driver's license issued to him in accordance with this article.
No person under 18 years of age shall be issued a basic license to drive motor vehicles, nor shall a person be issued a validated permit, including a validated examination permit, until he has passed a satisfactory examination and other requirements as to his ability as an operator. The examination shall include a test of the applicant's vision, his ability to understand traffic control devices, his knowledge of safe driving practices and of the effects that ingestion of alcohol or drugs has on a person's ability to operate a motor vehicle, his knowledge of such portions of the mechanism of motor vehicles as is necessary to insure the safe operation of a vehicle of the kind or kinds indicated by the applicant and of the laws and ordinary usages of the road. No person shall sit for an examination for any permit without exhibiting photo identification deemed acceptable by the commission, unless that person is a high school student participating in a course of driving education approved by the State Department of Education and conducted in a public, parochial or private school of this State, pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1950, c.127 (C.39:3-13.1). The commission may waive the written law knowledge examination for any person 18 years of age or older possessing a valid driver's license issued by any other state, the District of Columbia or the United States Territories of American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands. The commission shall be required to provide that person with a booklet that highlights those motor vehicle laws unique to New Jersey. A road test shall be required for a provisional license and serve as a demonstration of the applicant's ability to operate a vehicle of the class designated. No person shall sit for a road test unless that person exhibits photo identification deemed acceptable by the commission. A high school student who has completed a course of behind-the-wheel automobile driving education approved by the State Department of Education and conducted in a public, parochial or private school of this State, who has been issued a special learner's permit pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1950, c.127 (C.39:3-13.1) prior to January 1, 2003, shall not be required to exhibit photo identification in order to sit for a road test. The commission may waive the road test for any person 18 years of age or older possessing a valid driver's license issued by any other state, the District of Columbia or the United States Territories of American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands. The road test shall be given on public streets, where practicable and feasible, but may be preceded by an off-street screening process to assess basic skills. The commission shall approve locations for the road test which pose no more than a minimal risk of injury to the applicant, the examiner and other motorists. No new locations for the road test shall be approved unless the test can be given on public streets.
The commission shall issue a basic driver's license to operate a motor vehicle other than a motorcycle to a person over 18 years of age who previously has not been licensed to drive a motor vehicle in this State or another jurisdiction only if that person has: (1) operated a passenger automobile in compliance with the requirements of this title for not less than one year, not including any period of suspension or postponement, from the date of issuance of a provisional license pursuant to section 4 of P.L.1950, c.127 (C.39:3-13.4); (2) not been assessed more than two motor vehicle points; (3) not been convicted in the previous year for a violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), P.L.1992, c.189 (C.39:4-50.14), R.S.39:4-129, N.J.S.2C:11-5, subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:12-1, or any other motor vehicle-related violation the commission determines to be significant and applicable pursuant to regulation; and (4) passed an examination of his ability to operate a motor vehicle pursuant to this section.
The commission shall expand the driver's license examination by 20%. The additional questions to be added shall consist solely of questions developed in conjunction with the State Department of Health and Senior Services concerning the use of alcohol or drugs as related to highway safety. The commission shall develop in conjunction with the State Department of Health and Senior Services supplements to the driver's manual which shall include information necessary to answer any question on the driver's license examination concerning alcohol or drugs as related to highway safety.
Up to 20 questions may be added to the examination on subjects to be determined by the commission that are of particular relevance to youthful drivers, after consultation with the Director of the Office of Highway Traffic Safety.
The commission shall expand the driver's license examination to include a question asking whether the applicant is aware of the provisions of the "Uniform Anatomical Gift Act," P.L.1969, c.161 (C.26:6-57 et seq.) and the procedure for indicating on the driver's license the intention to make a donation of body organs or tissues pursuant to P.L.1978, c.181 (C.39:3-12.2).
Any person applying for a driver's license to operate a motor vehicle or motorized bicycle in this State shall surrender to the commission any current driver's license issued to him by another state or jurisdiction upon his receipt of a driver's license for this State. The commission shall refuse to issue a driver's license if the applicant fails to comply with this provision. An applicant for a permit or license who is less than 18 years of age, and who holds a permit or license for a passenger automobile issued by another state or country that is valid or has expired within a time period designated by the commission, shall be subject to the permit and license requirements and penalties applicable to State permit and license applicants who are of the same age; except that if the other state or country has permit or license standards substantially similar to those of this State, the credentials of the other state or country shall be acceptable.
The commission shall create classified licensing of drivers covering the following classifications:
a.Motorcycles, except that for the purposes of this section, motorcycle shall not include any three-wheeled motor vehicle equipped with a single cab with glazing enclosing the occupant, seats similar to those of a passenger vehicle or truck, seat belts and automotive steering.

39:4-129. Action in case of accident [Leaving the scene]

39:4-129. (a) The driver of any vehicle, knowingly involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene until he has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (c) of this section. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary. Any person who shall violate this subsection shall be fined not less than $500 nor more than $1,000 or be imprisoned for a period of 180 days, or both, for the first offense, and for a subsequent offense shall be fined not less than $1,000 nor more than $2,000, or be imprisoned for a period of 180 days, or both. The term of imprisonment required by this subsection shall be imposed only if the accident resulted in death or injury to a person other than the driver convicted of violating this section.
In addition, any person convicted under this subsection shall forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of one year from the date of his conviction for the first offense and for a subsequent offense shall thereafter permanently forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State.

(b) The driver of any vehicle knowingly involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle, including his own vehicle, or other property which is attended by any person shall immediately stop his vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible, but shall then forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of such accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (c) of this section. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary. Any person who shall violate this subsection shall be fined not less than $200 nor more than $400, or be imprisoned for a period of not more than 30 days, or both, for the first offense, and for a subsequent offense, shall be fined not less than $400 nor more than $600, or be imprisoned for a period of not less than 30 days nor more than 90 days or both.
In addition, a person who violates this subsection shall, for a first offense, forfeit the right to operate a motor vehicle in this State for a period of six months from the date of conviction, and for a period of one year from the date of conviction for any subsequent offense.

(c) The driver of any vehicle knowingly involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to any person or damage to any vehicle or property shall give his name and address and exhibit his operators license and registration certificate of his vehicle to the person injured or whose vehicle or property was damaged and to any police officer or witness of the accident, and to the driver or occupants of the vehicle collided with and render to a person injured in the accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying of that person to a hospital or a physician for medical or surgical treatment, if it is apparent that the treatment is necessary or is requested by the injured person.
In the event that none of the persons specified are in condition to receive the information to which they otherwise would be entitled under this subsection, and no police officer is present, the driver of any vehicle involved in such accident after fulfilling all other requirements of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, insofar as possible on his part to be performed, shall forthwith report such accident to the nearest office of the local police department or of the county police of the county or of the State Police and submit thereto the information specified in this subsection.

(d) The driver of any vehicle which knowingly collides with or is knowingly involved in an accident with any vehicle or other property which is unattended resulting in any damage to such vehicle or other property shall immediately stop and shall then and there locate and notify the operator or owner of such vehicle or other property of the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle striking the unattended vehicle or other property or, in the event an unattended vehicle is struck and the driver or owner thereof cannot be immediately located, shall attach securely in a conspicuous place in or on such vehicle a written notice giving the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle doing the striking or, in the event other property is struck and the owner thereof cannot be immediately located, shall notify the nearest office of the local police department or of the county police of the county or of the State Police and in addition shall notify the owner of the property as soon as the owner can be identified and located. Any person who violates this subsection shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

(e) The driver of any motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to any person or damage in the amount of $250.00 or more to any vehicle or property shall be presumed to have knowledge that he was involved in such accident, and such presumption shall be rebuttable in nature.
For purposes of this section, it shall not be a defense that the operator of the motor vehicle was unaware of the existence or extent of personal injury or property damage caused by the accident as long as the operator was aware that he was involved in an accident.

Amended 1940,c.147; 1967, c.189,s.1; 1977,c.407; 1978,c.180; 1979,c.463,s.1; 1994,c.183,s.1.

39:4-97. Careless driving


   A person who drives a vehicle carelessly, or without due caution and circumspection, in a manner so as to endanger, or be likely to endanger, a person or property, shall be guilty of careless driving.

Amended 1951,c.23,s.54; 1955, c.220,s.2; 1995, c.70,s.3.

39:6B-2 Failure to carry motor vehicle insurance coverage

    The mandatory penalties imposed for driving without insurance is greater than the first offender penalties for drunk driving or possession of marijuana. Mandatory penalties include automatic loss of license for one year, $300.00 fine and a period of community service to be determined by the Municipal Court. N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 The no car insurance statute is one of the few strict liability statutes. Every owner or registered owner of a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state shall maintain motor vehicle coverage, under provisions approved by the Commissioner of Insurance. N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1 There are also court costs and insurance surcharges of $250.00 per year for three years. Failure to produce at the time of trial an insurance card or insurance policy covering the date of the offense creates a rebuttable presumption that the person was uninsured when charged with the offense.

39:6B-2 Failure to carry motor vehicle insurance coverage
First offense: Fine and a period of community service as determined by the court, and suspension of driving privileges for 1 year $300 $1000 plus court costs.
Plus 9 car insurance points and $750 in MVC surcharges per offense

Subsequent offense: Fine and shall be subject to 14 days imprisonment, and 30 days
community service and suspension of driving privileges for 2 years from date of conviction
fine up to $5000 plus court costs.
Plus 9 car insurance points and $750 in MVC surcharges per offense 
       
      In State v. Kopp, 171 NJ Super 528 (Law Div. 1980), the courts established that knowledge of lack of insurance is not a defense. The legislative intent is clear that knowledge of lack of insurance is not an essential element which must be proved in order to sustain a conviction of an owner who operates a car without insurance. However, the section which imposes penalties against an individual who operates a motor vehicle without liability insurance does not apply to a New Jersey resident who is driving an automobile owned by an out-of-state friend who had been in New Jersey for five weeks. State v. Arslanouk, 67 NJ Super 387 (App. Div. 1979)
        The Appellate Division, in the State v. Hochman, 188 NJ Super 382 (App. Div. 1982) examined and reversed a conviction for operating without liability insurance where the State failed to carry its burden of proving that an automobile liability insurance was lawfully canceled. In this fact specific case, defendant was charged with operating a vehicle he owned without insurance. It was stipulated that because of long hours defendant worked, he had asked his wife to look after household matters, including insurance matters, and gave her several thousand dollars each month to pay for them. Defendant Hochmans wife arranged through an insurance broker to have Allstate insure the vehicle. The insurance broker then arranged to finance the insurance premiums through a Lee Finance financial service. The defendants wife then paid the broker and agreed to pay the balance to the financial service in monthly installments of $48.00. Id at 384.
        Thereafter, defendant Hochmans wife made payments to the financial service through October 13, 1979. On October 15, 1979 Allstate informed defendants wife by mail that there was due and owing a premium of $331.00 and payment should be made immediately. The defendants wife notified the broker that she had received a letter from Allstate and reminded the broker that the insurance premiums were being financed through the finance agency pursuant to financing agreement arranged by it and therefore she did not have to pay the balance of the account.
        The insurance broker informed the Defendant Hochmans wife that it would investigate the problem and contact her. In January 1980, because the defendants wife had not heard from the insurance broker, she again contacted the insurance broker and informed him that she had received no further correspondence from Allstate. She inquired into the status of the insurance of the vehicle, the broker informed the defendants wife they were still investigating the problem and would contact her when it had been resolved. It was further stipulated in Court that defendant was never told by his wife of the finance agreement or of the difficulties she had encountered with the insurance. In May 1980, defendant was transferred to another office and needed to use the car to get to work. According to stipulated facts, defendants wife told the defendant that the vehicle could be driven. Defendant, relying upon what his wife had told him and believing that the vehicle was insured, drove the vehicle until July 15, 1980 when he was charged with violating the compulsory insurance provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2.
        The insurance broker, as an agent, had issued an insurance identification card indicating the insurance would remain in effect from the period August 28, 1979 to August 28, 1980. In December 1979 defendant and his wife moved from the residence in Montclair and left a forwarding address. Thereafter in preparing for trial defendant learned that in October and November 1979 Lee Finance had liquidated without informing its clients, including defendants wife.
        Although Allstate claimed it mailed a cancellation notice, it stipulated that it had mailed the cancellation notice to an incorrect address, mailing it to 313 Park Street rather than 314 Park Street. The broker, First City, never informed defendants wife, despite her inquiry, that Allstate had canceled the insurance policy or that the finance agency had liquidated, or that she could reinstate the policy by paying the balance due on the annual premium. The Appellate Division noted that in order to convict a defendant-owner of operating a motor vehicle in violation of the insurance provisions, the State did not have to show a culpable mental state, i.e., that defendant knew his vehicle was uninsured. The State simply had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) defendant owned the vehicle, (2) the vehicle was registered in New Jersey, (3) defendant operated the vehicle or caused it to be operated upon any public road or highway in this State, and (4) the vehicle was without liability insurance coverage required by N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1. Id at 387.
        The Appellate Division held that the first three elements of the offenses were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The pivotal issue was whether the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the fourth element of the defense, that the vehicle was uninsured. The question was thus whether the liability insurance policy had been lawfully and effectively canceled when Defendant Hochman was charged for the offense. The Court found that Allstate had not properly canceled the insurance policy. The Court held;
        A notice of cancellation of a policy of automobile liability insurance is effective in this State only if it is based on one or more statutorily enumerated reasons, including the nonpayment of premiums. N.J.S.A. 17:29C-7(A)(a). Moreover, prior to March 10, 1981, where, as here, the cancellation was for nonpayment of premiums, the notice of cancellation must have been mailed or delivered by the insurance carrier (here Allstate) to the insured (here either defendant or his wife) at least ten days prior to the effective date of cancellation and must have been accompanied by a statement of the reason given for such cancellation. N.J.S.A. 17:29C-8. Proof of mailing of the notice of cancellation to the named insured at the address shown in the policy was deemed sufficient proof of notice. N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10. Under this latter statue, cancellation was effective whether or not the insured actually received notice of cancellation because proof of mailing, not proof of receipt, was the determinative factor. See Weathers v. Hartford Ins. Group, 77 N.J. 228, 234 (1978. Proof of mailing the notice, however, is not conclusive on the issue. The insured may still offer proof that he never received the notice for the purpose of refuting the hypothesis of mailing. Id. at 235. Thus, in Weathers, the Supreme Court held:
        Although the inference of non-mailing provided by evidence of non-receipt might in most cases be outweighed by the inferences of mailing which may be drawn from a certificate of mailing whose reliability has been established, we discern no cogent reason for depriving the trier of fact of such evidence by holding it inadmissible , they are not conclusive of that issue and do not preclude the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in the face of a claim of non-receipt so as to entitle the insurer to judgment as a matter of law. See Sudduth v. Commonwealth County Mutual Ins. Co., 454 S. W. 2d 196 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1970); 9 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) Sec. 2519; cf. Fitzpatrick v. Merchants and Manufacturers Fire Ins. Co., 122 N.J.L. 468 (E. &A. 1939). The contrary holding of Womack v. Fenton, 28 N.J. Super. 345 (App. Div. 1953), on this point is hereby overruled. Permitting the fact finder to consider the addressee-insureds denial of receipt of the notice of cancellation does not improperly add to the insurers statutory burden of proving mailing by requiring it to prove actual receipt of the notice since such testimony is admissible only as the basis for an inference of its non-mailing. The insurer still need only prove constructive notice by adequately establishing that the notice of cancellation was mailed. Hochman at 388-389 Weathers at 235-236
        The court noted that although Allstate claimed that a notice of cancellation was sent to the defendants wife, this did not establish that the notice satisfied the statutory requirement of N.J.S.A. 17:29C-8. There is no proof that the notice mailed to the named insured (assuming that defendants wife was the insured named in the policy) or that it was mailed to the address shown in the policy, or that its contents complied with statutory requirements. The court held thus, we are constrained to hold that the State failed to sustain its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Allstate automobile liability insurance policy covering defendants vehicle was lawfully canceled. The Allstate policy therefore was presumptively in full force and effect... and defendants conviction for violating the compulsory insurance provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 cannot stand. Hochman at 389-390.
        The insurance statutes under Title 19 of the New Jersey laws contain provisions which sometimes provide that all members of a household are covered under a policy issued to one member even if their name is not set forth on the policy. The uninsured defendant who lives with someone who owns an insured car may be included under that persons policy.
        Operation is different in non-insurance matters than in drunk driving cases. A defendant who is seated in the drivers seat, behind the steering wheel of a vehicle that is under tow and was in physical control of the vehicle did not operate the vehicle for the purposes of prohibiting operating the vehicle while suspended, operating uninsured vehicle and operating unregistered vehicle, where the vehicle did not have an engine and incapable of being operated under its own power. Counsel can argue the state must prove the defendant drove the vehicle. State v. Derby, 256 N.J. Super. 702, (Law Div. 1992).
        In a case involving Personal Injury Protection/ No Fault PIP benefits the Appellate Division recently ruled that an insurance company did not properly mail a notice of cancellation, thus the policy was not canceled. In Hodges v. Pennsylvania National Insurance Company, _____ NJ Super. _____ (App. Div. 1992), plaintiff was in a motor vehicle accident operating a vehicle owned by her mother. Plaintiff filed a PIP suit against the insurance company which had refused to pay medical bills and property damage. Defendants insurance company claimed it canceled Alva Hodges policy on December 16, 1988 for failure to remit the premium payment. Defendant submitted two pages of a November 28, 1988 JUA Mailing List, which indicated Alva Hodges as an insured who was scheduled to be sent a notice of cancellation. The mailing list contained two November 28 stamps of the Harrisburg Post Office and two stamps of postage for the numerous letters of $39.00 and $99.75. The two postage stamps together totaled $138.75. The list claimed a total mailing of 640 notices. Plaintiff pointed out that a mailing of 640 notices at $.25 per piece (the 1988 postage stamp price) should have totaled $160.00. Because defendant paid only $138.75, plaintiff contends that all the lists and notices may not have been mailed. The mailing list also contained a signature and certification of one of the defendants employees.
        Plaintiffs counsel in Hodges pointed out that the Post Offices standard proof of mailing procedure differed from defendants use of a preprinted mailing list. Plaintiff pointed out that the US Postal Service utilizes a Certificate of Mailing, PS Form 3817, for the purposes documenting proof of mailing by regular mail. Prior to the stamping of this receipt, the Postal Service employees individually compares the receipt with the item being mailed. These forms are available in advance from the Post Office. (A copy of the first class mailing Certificate of Mailing was included as a footnote to the Courts opinion.) The Hodges Court noted that N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10 specifically enumerates the circumstances on which a notice of cancellation is effective:
        no written notice of cancellation or of intention not to renew sent by an insurer to an insured in accordance with the provisions of an automobile insurance shall be effective unless a. (1) it is sent by certified mail, or (2) at the time of the mailing of said notice by regular mail, the insurer has obtained from the Post Office Department a date stamped proof of mailing showing the name and address of the insured and b. the insurer has retained a duplicate copy of the mailed notice which is certified to be true. Slip op at 6. [Emphasis added by the Court.]
        In order to be effective, notice of cancellation must be set in strict compliance with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10. Citing Lopez v. New Jersey Automobile Full Underwriting Association, 239 NJ Super. 13, 20, (App. Div.), certif. den. 122 N.J. 131 (1990) (absence of proof of personal knowledge of mailing by postal employee or insurer employee renders notice ineffective). The Court questioned whether the stamped proof of payment of money in postage was proof of mailing. The Appellate Division in Hodges noted that our Courts have interpreted the statute to require a precise proof of mailing, usually the official U.S. Postal Service Certificate of Mailing.
        In Celino v. General Accident Insurance, 211 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div. 1986), the Court ruled that this specific postal certificate of mailing satisfied the statutes proof of mailing requirement. Celino at 540-541 (determining that the insurers notice was ineffective because insured failed to retain a duplicate copy of the notice, thereby violating part (b) of the statute). The Appellate Division in Celino determined that defendants proof of payment of postage and the employees certification fell far short of the quality of proof inherent in an official post office certificate. Because the defendants proofs were insufficient to establish compliance with the statute, there existed an unresolved issues of fact. The Appellate Division found that the trial court erred and granting in summary judgment and remanded the question as to notice for further proceedings.
        If there is a question involving improper cancellation or improper notice, we would suggest your attorney prepare a subpoena to the insurance company and also a hand delivered subpoena to your insurance broker. You may discover notice of cancellation was improper or notices mailed to the wrong address. We all know the poor track record by JUA and MTF companies.
        If a husband and wife, or both, are named in the policy, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Carriere 170 N.J. Super. 437, 450 (Law Div. 1979) supports the proposition that both husband and wife named in the policy should receive notice.
        A cancellation notice is invalid if issued before the premium due date. Recently, in Christian v. Ormsby, _____ N.J. Super _____ (Law Div. decided December 18, 1992), the court held under N.J.S.A. 17:29C-8, an automobile insurer may not issue a cancellation notice to the insured for non-payment of premiums before the date on which the premium is due. (This case also dealt with the incompetent JUA.) The Christian notices of cancellation and a reminder notice were mailed by Liberty Mutual. However, the court found that the notice was ineffective to cancel the policy before the accident Plaintiff Christian was involved in. The court found that although the notice issued by Liberty Mutual to the Christians on October 21, 1987 stated its reason for cancellation as non-payment of premium, the court found that, on the date the notice was mailed, the Christians premium to the JUA was not past due and the Christians were not yet in default.
        The court also rejected the JUAs argument that the cancellation notice could have been mailed at any time after the premium notice, so long as it did not become effective until after the due date. The court interpreted the statutory language requires 15 days notice of cancellation in a language referring to non-payment of premium together to imply a legislative intent to provide with a 15-day grace period after default in the payment of an automobile insurance policy premium before the insurer is able to effectively cancel the policy. The purpose is to allow defaulting policyholders an opportunity during that grace period to pay their premiums and to keep the policy in force. Consequently, any cancellation notice issued before such default is premature and invalid.
        A bad check will permit insurer to cancel insurance policy. In Abdel-Rahman v. Ludas, _____ NJ Super _____ (App. Div. decided July 7, 1993), an insurers acceptance of a check in payment of a premium is conditioned upon payment by the drawee institution. An insureds failure to pay the premium, which occurs when the check is dishonored, entitles the insurer to cancel the policy. On August 13, 1990, Ohio Casualty issued a three-month, short-term reinstatement of policy. Included in the reinstatement letter to the insured was a notice advising the reinstatement would be considered void from its inception if the check accepted in payment of the reinstatement was dishonored when presented to the drawee bank.
        On August 22, Ohio Casualty learned that the check was dishonored by the insureds bank. Having a policy of presenting a check twice for payment, Ohio Casualty redeposited the check that same date. The check was again returned for insufficient funds on August 24. On both occasions the bank mailed notices of the dishonoring to the insured. The insureds bank statement also indicated that the checks had been dishonored.
        Ohio Casualty canceled insured Ludas policy on September 6, 1990. On September 12, 1990, the company informed Ludas of the cancellation, which was retroactively effective July 29, 1990. The insured did no dispute the facts but claimed that the family made a mistake and deposited the money into the wrong account. Both the motion judge and the Appellate Division found that mere delivery of the check, a worthless piece of paper, to the insurer was not enough to keep the policy in effect.
        The non-insurance NJSBA 39:6B-2 statute provides there is a rebuttable presumption of no insurance if no card or policy produced. Remember, however, that a presumption does not equal guilty.
        The charge of simple operation without insurance by the non-owner presents additional viable defenses to the charge of no insurance. There is not a strict liability provision involving mere operators. The State must prove the operator knew or should have known from the attendant circumstances that the motor vehicle was without motor vehicle liability coverage. Such facts can be gathered from the relationship between the parties, whether or not the vehicle had a valid inspection sticker and testimony by the owner who often is also issued an uninsured motorist charge.
        In Matlad v. US Services, 174 NJ Super. 499 417 A. 2d 46 (App. Div. 1980), where husband canceled policy without telling wife, deletion was void as against public policy and coverage continued for wife. The defendant/owner must operate or cause the car to be operated. If a driver took the car without permission that day, the owner did not cause the vehicle to be operated.
        The State is still required to provide discovery. Occasionally a case is dismissed because the State failed to provide discovery. The bottom line is never let your insurance expire. Mandatory penalties are automatic loss of license for one year, $300.00 fine and a period of community service to be determined by the Municipal Court. If you dont have insurance, dont drive.
        No insurance penalties increased 2002

39:3-4 Registration of automobiles and motorcycles, application, registration certificates; expiration; issuance; violations; notification

39:3-4. Except as hereinafter provided, every resident of this State and every nonresident whose automobile or motorcycle shall be driven in this State shall, before using such vehicle on the public highways, register the same, and no automobile or motorcycle shall be driven unless so registered.
Such registration shall be made in the following manner: An application in writing, signed by the applicant or by an agent or officer, in case the applicant is a corporation, shall be made to the chief administrator or the chief administrator's agent, on forms prepared and supplied by the chief administrator, containing the name, street address of the residence or the business of the owner, mailing address, if different from the street address of the owner's residence or business, and age of the owner, together with a description of the character of the automobile or motorcycle, including the name of the maker and the vehicle identification number, or the manufacturer's number or the number assigned by the chief administrator if the vehicle does not have a vehicle identification number, and any other statement that may be required by the chief administrator. A post office box shall appear on the application only as part of a mailing address that is submitted by the owner, agent or officer, as the case may be, in addition to the street address of the applicant's residence or business; provided, however, the chief administrator, upon application, shall permit a person who was a victim of a violation of N.J.S. 2C:12-10, N.J.S. 2C:14-2, or N.J.S. 2C:25-17 et seq., or who the chief administrator otherwise determines to have good cause, to use as a mailing address a post office box, an address other than the applicant's address or other contact point. An owner whose last address appears on the records of the division as a post office box shall change his address on his application for renewal to the street address of his residence or business and, if different from his street address, his mailing address unless the chief administrator has determined, pursuant to this section, that the owner may use a post office box, an address other than the owner's address or other contact point as a mailing address. The application shall contain the name of the insurer of the vehicle and the policy number. If the vehicle is a leased motor vehicle, the application shall make note of that fact and shall include along with the name and street address of the lessor the name, street address and driver license number of the lessee.
Thereupon the chief administrator shall have the power to grant a registration certificate to the owner of any motor vehicle, if over 17 years of age, application for the registration having been properly made and the fee therefor paid, and the vehicle being of a type that complies with the requirements of this title. The form and contents of the registration certificate to be issued shall be determined by the chief administrator.
If the vehicle is a leased motor vehicle, the registration certificate shall, in addition to containing the name and street address of the lessor, identify the vehicle as a leased motor vehicle.
The chief administrator shall maintain a record of all registration certificates issued, and of the contents thereof.
Every registration shall expire and the registration certificate thereof become void on the last day of the twelfth calendar month following the calendar month in which the certificate was issued; provided, however, that the chief administrator may, at his discretion, require registrations which shall expire, and issue certificates thereof which shall become void, on a date fixed by him, which date shall not be sooner than three months nor later than 26 months after the date of issuance of such certificates, and the fees for such registrations, including any other fees or charges collected in connection with the registration fee, shall be fixed by the chief administrator in amounts proportionately less or greater than the fees established by law. The chief administrator may fix the expiration date for registration certificates at a date other than 12 months if the chief administrator determines that the change is necessary, appropriate or convenient in order to aid in implementing the vehicle inspection requirements of chapter 8 of Title 39 or for other good cause. The chief administrator may, for good cause extend a registration beyond the expiration date that appears upon the registration certificate for periods not to exceed 12 additional months. The chief administrator may extend the expiration date of a registration without payment of a proportionate fee when the chief administrator determines that such extension is necessary for good cause. If any registration is so extended, the owner shall pay upon renewal the full registration fee for the period fixed by the chief administrator as if no extension had been granted.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, every registration for new passenger automobiles shall expire and the registration certificate shall become void on the last day of the 48th calendar month following the calendar month in which the certificate was initially issued. On and after February 1, 2005, the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to new passenger automobiles purchased by a rental company for use as rental passenger automobiles. As used in this paragraph, "rental company" means a person engaged in the business of renting motor vehicles; and "rental passenger automobile" means a passenger automobile that is rented without a driver and used in the transportation of persons or property other than commercial freight.
If the new passenger automobile being registered is a leased passenger automobile, the registration shall expire in accordance with the term of the lease. If the term of the lease extends beyond one or more 12-month periods by one or more months, the registration period shall be based upon the full year into which one or more of the months extend; provided, however, the registration period for a leased automobile shall not exceed 48-months.
Following the 48-month period of the initial registration of a new passenger automobile, the subsequent registration shall expire, and the registration certificate shall become void, on the last day of the 12th calendar month following the calendar month in which the certificate was next issued.
All motorcycles for which registrations have been issued prior to the effective date of P.L. 1989, c.167 and which are scheduled to expire between November 1 and March 31 shall, upon renewal, be issued registrations by the chief administrator which shall expire on a date fixed by him, but in no case shall that expiration date be earlier than April 30 nor later than October 31. The fees for the renewal of the motorcycle registrations authorized under this paragraph shall be fixed by the chief administrator in an amount proportionately less or greater than the fee established by R.S. 39:3-21.
Application forms for all renewals of registrations for passenger automobiles shall be sent to the last addresses of owners of motor vehicles and motorcycles, as they appear on the records of the division.
No person owning or having control over any unregistered vehicle shall permit the same to be parked or to stand on a public highway.
Any police officer is authorized to remove any unregistered vehicle from the public highway to a storage space or garage, and the expense involved in such removal and storing of the vehicle shall be borne by the owner of the vehicle, except that the expense shall be borne by the lessee of a leased vehicle.
Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be subject to a fine not exceeding $100, except that for the misstatement of any fact in the application required to be made to the chief administrator, the person making such statement or omitting the statement that the motor vehicle is to be used as a leased motor vehicle when that is the case shall be subject to the penalties provided in R.S. 39:3-37.
The chief administrator may extend the expiration date of a registration certificate without payment of a proportionate fee when the chief administrator determines that such extension is necessary, appropriate or convenient to the implementation of vehicle inspection requirements. If any registration certificate is so extended, the owner shall pay upon renewal the full registration fee for the period fixed by the chief administrator as if no extension had been granted.
The New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission shall make a reasonable effort to notify any lessor whose name and address is on file with the commission, or any other lessor the commission may determine it is necessary to notify, of the requirements of this amendatory act.
A lessor doing business in this State shall notify in writing the lessee of a motor vehicle registered pursuant to this Title of any change in its policies or procedures affecting the registration of the motor vehicle.
Amended in 2004

39:3-40 Driving on a Suspended License in New Jersey

Thousands of motorists in New Jersey are stopped for routine traffic violations then are surprised to be informed their license is suspended. Where the minimum costs would be over $1,261 in fines, surcharge and costs, motorists should be certain not to allow their license to become suspended. If charged, motorists may need an attorney with knowledge and skill in handling driving while suspended matters.
The violation of Driving While Suspended is set forth at NJSA 39:3-40. This section states, no person to whom a drivers license has been refused or whose drivers license or reciprocity privilege has been suspended or revoked or who has been prohibited from obtaining a drivers license, shall personally operate a motor vehicle during the period of refusal suspension, revocation or prohibition. The statute also prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle whose registration has been revoked.
PENALTIES
Conviction under this statute brings the following penalties. Upon conviction of the first offense of fine of $500.00. The defendant will also be surcharged a mandatory $250.00 per year for 3 years in every DWS by the DMV. Upon conviction for the second offense a fine of $750.00 and imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 5 days. Upon conviction for the third offense a fine of $1000.00 and imprisonment in the county jail for 10 days. Additionally, the statute states, upon the conviction the court shall impose or extend a period of suspension not to exceed 6 months. Also, upon conviction the court shall impose a period of imprisonment for not less than 45 days, if while operating a vehicle in violation of this section a person is involved in an accident resulting in personal injury to another person.
If an individual violates this section while under suspension issued pursuant to 39:4-50, driving while under the influence of liquor or drugs and is convicted, they shall be fined $500.00 extra? and have their license suspended for an additional period not less than one year nor more than two years and may be in the county jail for not more than 90 days. The defendant will also be surcharged a mandatory $250.00 per year for 3 years.
Although most municipal court matters are considered minor by many citizens it is obvious from the possible penalties involved that this is a serious offense carrying the possibility of both stiff fines and incarceration.
There are two types of license suspension :
1. Court imposed suspension
2. Administrative / Division of Motor Vehicles suspension
The most common scenario reflects where that the driver, through a motor vehicle violation, failure to pay surcharge or a accumulated points has been placed on a suspended list maintained by the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles (Division of Motor Vehicles), thereby making them ineligible to operate a motor vehicle for a prescribed period of time in this state.
If the driver is aware that they are on the suspended list and acknowledged they were suspended to the police officer there is little room for defense However, more often than not the driver claims that they were unaware of their placement on the suspension list.
The scenario that will often be presented by the driver is that he/she was stopped by police for an unrelated motor vehicle violation. In the process of the police encounter they were informed by the officer that their license has been suspended and they were issued an additional summons for Driving While Suspended. Over the past decade several New Jersey cases have crafted the current position on the driving while suspended issue that often confronts many municipal courts throughout the state.
THE STATE MUST SHOW DUE PROCESS AND ADEQUATE NOTICE
The first and foremost is that of adequate notice of the suspension. In Parsekian v. Cresse, 75 N.J. Super. 405 (App Div. 1962), the court ruled that it was incumbent upon the Director of the State Division of Motor Vehicles to provide fair and adequate notice to the licensed driver of the proposed suspension of their license. The court recognized that the Director could not arbitrarily suspend the license of a driver without providing both notice and enunciating specific reasons as to why the license was being suspended.
A later case, State v. Wenof, 102 N.J. Super. (Law Div. 1968), both reinforced and advanced the earlier Parsekian decision. Wenof represents the substantive foundation upon which all subsequent cases involving the notice issue have been based. In Wenof, the court again recognized the importance of adequate notice of suspension. The court related, there is always a risk that notice may not reach the intended person, but this is not the test for legal sufficiency. The test is rather, whether the notice was reasonably calculated to reach the intended parties. Id at 375. In Wenof, the Division of Motor Vehicles sent to a written notice of proposed suspension (for failure to satisfy a summons) by regular mail. The Division of Motor Vehicles thereafter sent an order of suspension by ordinary mail. The notices were mailed to the defendants last address. By failing to leave a forwarding address informing the Division of Motor Vehicles where he could be reached by mail, the court stated he should not be heard to complain of lack of due process He had it. The court found the defendant guilty.
In State v. Hammond 116 N.J. Super. 244 (Cty. Ct. 1971) a notice of scheduled suspension and order of suspension for failure to appear for motor vehicle violations was mailed to defendant, but was returned undelivered to Division of Motor Vehicles by postal authorities. The defendant was charged with misstatement of fact in an application for registration of a motor vehicle (39:3-37) and application for a registration certificate during suspension (39:3-34). The defendant thereafter applied for and obtained a New Jersey registration certificate for vehicle.
While in State v. Wenof supra the defendant was found guilty that case was distinguished in Ha mmond. In Hammond there was insufficient evidence of any notice to Hammond of a possible revocation of his registration certificate. Therefore, there is no adequate proof to indicate that due process was satisfied in this case. Hammond, 116 N.J. Super. at 248.
NOTICE BY IN-COURT SUSPENSION
If the driver is on the suspension list because he was suspended in a Courtroom for a prior violation, grounds to defend are very limited. The most common violations which carry mandatory suspensions on first offense by the Municipal Courts are for driving while intoxicated (first offense 6-12 months), driving while suspended (up to 6 months), driving without insurance (1 year), possession of Marijuana or paraphernalia (6 months-2 years). A Municipal Court also has the power to suspend a drivers license for driving while suspended, reckless driving, excessive speeding, leaving the scene of an accident or even where the judge finds a person guilty of such a willful violation of the subtitle as shall in the courts discretion, justify such revocation (39:5-31).
If the drivers license was suspended by a court, the state in a subsequent Driving While Suspended needs to introduce into evidence only a certified abstract from the Division of Motor Vehicles. It is not necessary for the state to demonstrate that notice was received by the defendant. The defense may still challenge the suspension by introducing evidence that the prior in-court suspension was improper. Examples include defendant not notified to be in court and the court then acting without the defendant being present. Possibly, the prior suspension could be attached in the original court as being illegal and/or unconstitutional. This is permitted under State v. Laurick. 120 NJ 1 (1990)
NOTICE BY Division of Motor Vehicles
Where the driver was suspended by the Division of Motor Vehicles, the state must introduce

  1. Notice of scheduled suspension.
  2. Proof of mailing notice.
  3. Order of suspension.
  4. Proof of mailing order.
  5. Certified motor vehicle abstract.
A certified abstract alone is not sufficient to convict if the defendant was suspended only by the Division of Motor Vehicles.
If the order of suspension was mailed on December 1, 1991 and the Driving While Suspended offense took place December 2, 1991, a good defense is that the Order did not reach his house until after the ticket for Driving While Suspended.
Many suspensions today are because people forgot to pay an insurance surcharge. Every insurance surcharge bill serves as a notice of suspension. Indigency is not a defense for failure to pay a surcharge.
DEFENSES
A valid suspension of a drivers license cannot be effectuated in the absence of a written notice to the license at his last known address, reciting the fact that the suspension will take place and the date of commencement of the suspension. State v. Kindler 191 N.J. Super. 358,360 (Law Div 1983). Failure to appear for a summons is not a substitute for the written notice required by the statute, Id at 361. The court also noted that its research does not statutory revealing authority for the Municipal Judge to suspend driving privileges. Id at 362
Motorists suspended for any reason remains suspended until they pay a $50.00 Division of Motor Vehicles restoration fee. According to the harsh decision in State v. Zalta 217 N.J. Super. 142 (Law Div. 1987) even if a prior court imposed suspension is over 6 months on DWI, the suspension continues until actual restoration of the license.
Plea bargaining is permitted in Driving While Suspended matters. Many court adhere to the language of State v. Somma 215 N.J. Super. 142 (Law Div 1986) where the court determined that the failure to pay the $50.00 fee for restoration of the suspended drivers license does not extend the period of suspension. Many times individuals are told by a court their license is suspended for a certain number of months, but they are usually not told they must pay a restoration fee to actually get their license back. Individuals who pay a surcharge late will have their licenses suspended initially for the failure to pay. Even after the surcharge is paid they remain suspended until the $30.00 restoration fee is paid. Often, plea bargaining or alternative dispositions can be worked out to avoid the harsh consequences of Driving While Suspended and the equitable rationale of State v. Somma is followed.
Few courts inform a driver charged with Driving While Suspended that the penalty is anything more than a $500.00 fine plus up to six months loss of license. Most courts do not warn a defendant if he pleads guilty he will have to pay Division of Motor Vehicles insurance surcharges or face other new penalties.
Few drivers are aware of the new provisions of NJAC 11:3-34, operative date April 1, 1991, which allows insurance companies to charge additional surcharge to drivers. These new insurance company surcharges are in a addition to Division of Motor Vehicles surcharges and fines. Several non MTF insurance companies have already received approval to charge between $37.00 and $218.00 for each point a driver accumulates. For Driving While Suspended pursuant to 2C N.J.R. 576 a driver is given 9 Automobile Eligibility Points.
Hundreds of drivers in 1992 with be in for a rude awakening when they discover they were dropped by their personal carrier, sent to the MTF and have to pay substantial additional carrier surcharges on top of Division of Motor Vehicles surcharges.
Given the difficult economic times and high cost of insurance, many drivers simply cant afford to both drive to work and pay for insurance. These drivers will often get caught driving without insurance. The mandatory suspension for this violation will be putting hundreds of drivers on the ever increasing suspension list.
PARKING ADJUDICATION ACT OFFENDER
Scofflaws who took their parking tickets and threw them away or forgot to pay tickets will now have these licenses eventually suspended under the Parking Offense Adjudication Act. (NJSA 39:4-139.2). If a person fails to appear or pay for a ticket, the court may give notice to the vehicle owner that the failure to appear or pay will result in suspension of drivers license. Pursuant to NJSA 39:4-139.10(b) the judge or the Division of Motor Vehicles may now suspend the drivers license of on owner license or operator who has not answered or appeared in response to a failure to appear notice or has not paid or otherwise satisfied outstanding parking from penalties.
CONTESTING PROPOSED ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSIONS
The DMV, prior to suspending a license, or taking specific actionagainst a driver must mail a notice to the driver informing them of the proposed suspension or other action. The proposed action to be taken against any licensee by the DMV becomes effective on the date set forth on the notice except when otherwise specified, unless the licenses or his/her attorney shall make a request, in writing, for a hearing within 25 days from the date of notice. New Jersey Administrative Code (NJAC)13:19-1.2.
NJAC 13:19-1.2 requires the request for a hearing to set forth all disputed facts, legal issues and arguments. Under NJAC 13:19-1.2, the DMV may either deny the request for a hearing, require a prehearing conference with a DMV employee, or transmit of the matter to the Office of Administrative Law for a hearing pursuant to NJAC 1:1.
The DMV employee who conducts the prehearing is referred to as a driver improvement specialist. Often a resolution of the proposed administrative action is reached between the DMV and the licensee (ie- reduce suspension period -ex 180 days to 100 days).
If the license except the resolution of the proposed administrative action, the license is to have abandoned any further opportunity to be heard
NJAC 13:19-1.8(c).
If the parties cannot reach a resolution, the matter should be submitted to the office of Administrative Law for a hearing NJAC 13:19-1.8(d)
ENHANCED PENALTIES
As set forth previously, the Driving While Suspended calls for mandatory enhanced penalties on conviction second and third offense. What counts as an offense? Both the Division of Motor Vehicles and a court can suspend a driver for driving while suspended.
In State vs. Conte, 245 NJ Super. 629 (Law Div. 1990) the court examined a case where a defendant driver had two prior administrative suspensions by the DMV pursuant to NJSA 39:5-30 and NJAC 13:19-10.8. The driver had no prior court imposed convictions.
NJSA 39:3-40 provides for penalties upon conviction. In a well reasoned opinion by Judge Robert Longhi, on trial de novo, the court stated:
The word conviction is not defined in the statute. Blacks Law Dictionary defines conviction as the final judgment in a verdict or finding of guilty... Blacks Law Dictionary (6 ed. 1990) at 333. NJSA 2C:44-4(a) defines prior conviction of an offense as an adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant committed an offense constitutes a prior conviction, Emphasis supplied. Conviction has also been defined as the confession of the accused in open court or the verdict returned by the jury which ascertains and publishes the fact of guilt. Tucker vs. Tucker, 101 NJ Eq. 72, 73, 137 A. 40 (Ch. 1927).
The motor vehicle statute, NJSA 39:3-40, is quasi-criminal and penal in nature and must be strictly construed against the State. State vs. Churchdale-Leasing Inc., 115 N.J. 83, 102, 557 A. 2d 277 (1989). The word conviction, as it is used in NJSA 39:3-40, refers only to a plea or a finding of guilty in a court of competent jurisdiction and not an order of suspension entered by the DMV as the result of an administrative proceeding. The two prior suspensions are not convictions and defendant must be viewed as a first offender under the statute.
State vs. Conte, 245 N.J. Super. at 631
The sentence imposed was reversed and the matter remanded for sentencing as a first offender.
Updated statute in 2002:
NJSA 39:3-40 Penalties for driving while license suspended, etc.
     39:3-40. No person to whom a drivers license has been refused or whose drivers license or reciprocity privilege has been suspended or revoked, or who has been prohibited from obtaining a drivers license, shall personally operate a motor vehicle during the period of refusal, suspension, revocation, or prohibition.
     No person whose motor vehicle registration has been revoked shall operate or permit the operation of such motor vehicle during the period of such revocation.
     Except as provided in subsection i. of this section, a person violating this section shall be subject to the following penalties:
     a.Upon conviction for a first offense, a fine of $500.00 and, if that offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violators drivers license is suspended for a violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), revocation of the violators motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);
     b.Upon conviction for a second offense, a fine of $750.00, imprisonment in the county jail for not more than five days and, if the second offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violators drivers license is suspended and that second offense occurs within five years of a conviction for that same offense, revocation of the violators motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);
     c.Upon conviction for a third offense or subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000.00, imprisonment in the county jail for 10 days and, if the third offense involves the operation of a motor vehicle during a period when the violators drivers license is suspended and that third offense occurs within five years of a conviction for the same offense, revocation of the violators motor vehicle registration privilege in accordance with the provisions of sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5);
     d.Upon conviction, the court shall impose or extend a period of suspension not to exceed six months;
     e.Upon conviction, the court shall impose a period of imprisonment for not less than 45 days or more than 180 days, if while operating a vehicle in violation of this section a person is involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury to another person;
     f. (1) Notwithstanding subsections a. through e., any person violating this section while under suspension issued pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1972, c.197 (C.39:6B-2), upon conviction, shall be fined $500.00, shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year nor more than two years, and may be imprisoned in the county jail for not more than 90 days.
     (2)Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section and paragraph (1) of this subsection, any person violating this section under suspension issued pursuant to R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) or P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), shall be fined $500, shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year or more than two years, and shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than 10 days or more than 90 days.
     (3)Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections a. through e. of this section and paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, a person shall have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for an additional period of not less than one year or more than two years, which period shall commence upon the completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person, shall be fined $500 and shall be imprisoned for a period of 60 to 90 days for a first offense, imprisoned for a period of 120 to 150 days for a second offense, and imprisoned for 180 days for a third or subsequent offense, for operating a motor vehicle while in violation of paragraph (2) of this subsection while:
     (a)on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;
     (b)driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or
     (c)driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.
     A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.
     It shall not be relevant to the imposition of sentence pursuant to subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be relevant to the imposition of sentence that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session;
     g.In addition to the other applicable penalties provided under this section, a person violating this section whose license has been suspended pursuant to section 6 of P.L.1983, c.65 (C.17:29A-35) or the regulations adopted thereunder, shall be fined $3,000. The court shall waive the fine upon proof that the person has paid the total surcharge imposed pursuant to section 6 of P.L.1983, c.65 (C.17:29A-35) or the regulations adopted thereunder. Notwithstanding the provisions of R.S.39:5-41, the fine imposed pursuant to this subsection shall be collected by the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to section 6 of P.L.1983, c.65 (C.17:29A-35), and distributed as provided in that section, and the court shall file a copy of the judgment of conviction with the director and with the Clerk of the Superior Court who shall enter the following information upon the record of docketed judgments: the name of the person as judgment debtor; the Division of Motor Vehicles as judgment creditor; the amount of the fine; and the date of the order. These entries shall have the same force and effect as any civil judgment docketed in the Superior Court;
     h.A person who owns or leases a motor vehicle and permits another to operate the motor vehicle commits a violation and is subject to suspension of his license to operate a motor vehicle and to revocation of registration pursuant to sections 2 through 6 of P.L.1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1 through C.39:3-40.5) if the person:
     (1)Knows that the operators license to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended for a violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a); or
     (2)Knows that the operators license to operate a motor vehicle is suspended and that the operator has been convicted, within the past five years, of operating a vehicle while the persons license was suspended or revoked;
     i.If the violators drivers license to operate a motor vehicle has been suspended pursuant to section 9 of P.L.1985, c.14 (C.39:4-139.10), the violator shall be subject to a maximum fine of $100 upon proof that the violator has satisfied the parking ticket or tickets that were the subject of the Order of Suspension.
     Amended 1941, c.344; 1945, c.222, s.2; 1947, c.25; 1964, c.9; 1968, c.323, s.10; 1981, c.38, s.1; 1982, c.45, s.2; 1983, c.90, s.1; 1986, c.38; 1992, c.203; 1994, c.64, s.2; 1995, c.286, s.1; 1999, c.185, s.3; 1999, c.423, s.3; 2001, c.213, s.1.

Sunday, April 24, 2016

ABA Criminal Law Committee Spring Report 2016

ABA Criminal Law Committee Spring Report 2016

ABA SOLO, SMALL FIRM AND GENERAL PRACTICE DIVISION

COUNCIL AGENDA REPORT FORM – SPRING MEETING 2016


Division Name and Number: Division: 3 – Practice Specialty                                                                         

Division Director Name: Christine Albano  calbano@albanolaw.com

Group Name: Litigation Group  

Reporting Board or Committee: ABA Criminal Law Committee Report
Completed By: Kenneth Vercammen Co-Chair, Edison, NJ

1.     What has your committee or board done since its last report (e.g., conference call, meetings, publications, use of discussion lists, planning for CLE programs, publications and articles, collaboration with other committees, boards or sections, etc.)?

-Email to member

-Solosez notices
-Help sales & Publicize ABA “Criminal Law Forms” Book to generate revenue for Solo Division
The ABAS’ CRIMINAL LAW FORMS book
New book from the American Bar Association
Solo & Small Firm Division Author: Kenneth Vercammen
 Use Criminal Law Forms to help represent persons charged with criminal and traffic offenses. Detailed instruction and valuable insight is offered beginning with the initial contact with the client, to walking into the courthouse, and managing the steps that follow. Two hundred and ten modifiable forms help make criminal lawyers more efficient and productive, while also reducing the chance for mistakes. GP SOLO Member Price $129.95 To order contact ABA Customer Care, 1-800-285-2221 321 N. Clark Street, Chicago, IL 60653 or fax to 312-988-6030 (PC: 5150457)   ISBN:   978-1-61438-879-1
http://apps.americanbar.org/abastore/index.cfm?section=main&fm=Product.AddToCart&pid=5150457
  -Also posted some forms and materials from the recent NJ State Bar seminar Handling Drug, DWI and Serious Traffic Cases on the web for use by ABA members

2.     What is the status of your committee or board’s business plan for the year (e.g., participation of committee board members, goals achieved, new goals, etc.)?
Excellent. Ken V will be Spring Key West meeting and available to discuss issues with all GP solo members.

3.     Does your committee or board need any assistance from your Director, Staff, Division Officers, or Council?  If yes, please explain: Help market the Criminal law Forms book which generate revenue for the Division


4.   Report on anything else:  Ken V wishes to be re-appointed for 2016-17
5.    
6.     Are you submitting an action item to be presented to Council?  If so, please describe:  no


Saved at