Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, P.C.
2053 Woodbridge Avenue - Edison, NJ 08817
(732) 572-0500
www.njlaws.com

Friday, February 20, 2015

Careless Driving

Careless driving 39:4-97. A person who drives a vehicle carelessly, or without due caution and circumspection, in a manner so as to endanger, or be likely to endanger, a person or property, shall be guilty of careless driving.
Our office represents persons charged with Traffic offenses. Criminal and Motor vehicle violations are expensive. If convicted, you will have to pay high fines in court, face probation, and other serious penalties that may effect future employment.

You should consider hiring a Trial Attorney To Represent You If Charged With a Criminal Or Serious Motor Vehicle Matter. Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal, drug offenses, and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey.

When your job or driver's license is in jeopardy or you are facing thousands of dollars in fines you need excellent legal representation. The least expensive attorney is not always the answer. Schedule a free in-office consultation if you need experienced legal representation in a traffic/municipal court matter.

Our website www.njlaws.com provides details on jail terms for criminal offenses and other traffic matters. Call the Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen at 732-572-0500 to schedule a free in-office consultation to hire a trial attorney for Criminal/ DWI/ Municipal Court Traffic/ Drug offenses. Please call us to schedule an appointment if you need experienced legal representation in a criminal matter. Save this letter for future reference.
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500
(Fax) 732-572-0030

Saturday, February 14, 2015

MVC can suspend if moving violation while on MV probation MARK N. BAMFO, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION

MVC can suspend if moving violation while on MV probation MARK N. BAMFO, Appellant,
v. 
NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION, Respondent.
DOCKET NO. A-1110-13T2
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
Submitted December 17, 2014
January 8, 2015
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fuentes and Ashrafi.
On appeal from the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission.
Mark N. Bamfo, appellant pro se.
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Keith P. Ronan, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
        Mark N. Bamfo appeals from a final decision of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC) suspending his driver's license for thirty days because he was convicted of a moving
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violation while his license was on probationary status as a result of prior violations. We affirm.
        Bamfo's driver's abstract shows that he had three speeding violations and one conviction for improper operation of a motor vehicle during the period from June 3, 2011, to February 16, 2013. He was placed in the probationary driver program on April 1, 2013, and was warned personally and in writing that his license would be suspended pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.10 if he were to be convicted of another violation of the traffic laws within the next year.
        Less than three months later, on June 28, 2013, Bamfo was involved in a minor motor vehicle accident while driving for his job. He received a summons by mail charging unsafe operation of his motor vehicle in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2. Our record on this appeal does not include a transcript or other record of the municipal court proceedings regarding the summons, but the driver's abstract indicates Bamfo's conviction on that charge as of November 1, 2013.
        The MVC had earlier sent Bamfo a notice that his driver's license would be suspended for ninety days as of August 17, 2013, because the unsafe driving violation was committed within six months of his being placed in the probationary driver program. SeeN.J.S.A. 39:5-30.10; N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.6(a)(1).
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        Bamfo filed an administrative appeal of the proposed suspension and requested a hearing, but he did not provide any factual or legal basis for his challenge to the suspension. By letter-notice dated October 2, 2013, the MVC denied a hearing and ordered a reduced thirty-day license suspension effective as of October 29, 2013. Bamfo filed a notice of appeal before this court. On November 4, 2013, the MVC stayed the suspension pending resolution of the appeal.
        Before us, Bamfo argues only that the suspension will cause him a hardship because his job requires that he drive. He contends he may lose his job and also alleges vaguely that the motor vehicle accident of June 28, 2013, was not his fault. However, he does not dispute that he was convicted of the unsafe driving violation.
        We exercise a limited scope of review over the decision of an administrative agency, such as the MVC. In re Herrmann, 192 N.J.19, 27 (2007). An appellate court must uphold an administrative agency's quasi-judicial decision "unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." Id. at 27-28 (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)). We do not substitute our own judgment for that of
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the agency charged with enforcing the law. In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007).
        Here, the MVC applied the applicable statutes and regulations in determining that a suspension was required because of Bamfo's record of moving violations, and also that the reduced thirty-day period of suspension was an appropriate accommodation of his hardship request. Bamfo has provided no ground for this court to disagree with the MVC's decision.
        Affirmed. Remanded to the MVC to dissolve the stay of the license suspension. We do not retain jurisdiction.

DWI reserved and remanded where judge made improper credibility determinations State v BARILLARI

DWI reserved  and remanded where judge made improper credibility determinations State v BARILLARI
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v. 
DEVIN BARILLARI, Defendant-Appellant.
DOCKET NO. A-5311-12T2
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
Argued March 26, 2014
January 30, 2015
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Nugent and Accurso.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Municipal Appeal No. 2012-062.
Brian W. Mason argued the cause for appellant (Nuzzi & Mason, LLC, attorneys; Vincent J. Nuzzi, of counsel; Mr. Mason, on the brief).
Stephen A. Pogany, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Pogany, of counsel and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
NUGENT, J.A.D.
        Defendant Devin Barillari appeals his convictions following a trial de novo of Driving While Intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, and Careless Driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97. He contends
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the Law Division judge found him guilty of driving while intoxicated based on unsound and legally inadequate evidence, and that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offense of careless driving. Having considered the record in light of defendant's arguments and controlling law, we reverse defendant's DWI conviction and remand this matter to the trial court for a trial de novo on the record. We affirm defendant's careless driving conviction.
        On December 19, 2009, defendant was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated and careless driving. Following motion practice that spanned nearly two years, the case was tried in municipal court on non-consecutive days over three months. The State developed the following proofs at the municipal court trial.
        While on routine patrol during a snowy night, veteran Fairfield police officer Christopher Nicholas drove through a rear restaurant parking lot where he observed defendant doing "fishtails" in a Jeep. As the officer watched, defendant lost control of the Jeep, striking a snow bank and nearly missing a fire hydrant. Defendant reversed the Jeep, accelerated forward, and nearly struck a snow plow. Defendant then drove to a parking spot in front of the restaurant where Nicholas approached him.
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        As Nicholas approached the Jeep, defendant opened the door, and Nicholas asked why he was operating the vehicle in such a manner. The officer smelled alcohol on defendant's breath and observed that defendant's eyes were bloodshot and watery and his face was flushed. He asked defendant if he had anything to drink. Defendant said he had two beers. Based on his observations as well as his training and experience, Nicholas believed defendant was intoxicated.
        The officer's experience was considerable. He had attended courses for breathalyzer operation and DWI detection, each course lasting one week, and he had also received training in standardized field sobriety testing. In addition, the officer had undergone two weeks of classroom and field training to qualify as a drug recognition expert. He had twice been certified to administer the Alcotest and had made between 200 and 300 arrests of people who were driving while intoxicated.
        Believing that defendant was under the influence of alcohol, Nicholas administered field sobriety tests after first confirming that defendant had no medical problems or conditions that would prevent him from performing the tests. The officer had defendant perform the tests next to his Jeep, in a flat, well-lit area, free of debris. Nicholas first testified that he
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picked the area because there was no snow on the ground but then corrected himself and said there was a light coating of snow.
        The officer had defendant undergo the following field sobriety tests: Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN); alphabet; walk-and-turn; and one-legged stand. The HGN test, consisting of an officer holding a stimulus in front of a suspect's eyes and moving it from side-to-side, is used to detect nystagmus, which is "defined as the involuntary jerking of the eye." State v. Doriguzzi, 334 N.J. Super. 530, 534 (App. Div. 2000). "[I]t is generally understood that alcohol use, among other things, will cause nystagmus." Ibid. The remaining tests required defendant to follow instructions and perform physical movements: reciting the alphabet from the letter C to the letter Z; walking nine steps heel-to-toe while keeping his hands down at his side and looking at his feet, stopping, turning, and returning to the starting point; and, standing stationary, lifting one foot approximately six inches off the ground while staring at his toe and keeping his hands at his side.
        According to the officer, defendant's performance on the tests evidenced that he was under the influence of alcohol. Nicholas observed defendant's eyes involuntarily jerk during the HGN test. With respect to the walk-and-turn test, Nicholas testified that "[t]here was no line in the parking lot,
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obviously, due to . . . snow covered parking lot . . . and in the position where I was, I don't believe there was a line." Because there was no line, Nicholas asked defendant to follow an imaginary line on the pavement. While performing the test, defendant stopped several times to balance himself, both on the first nine steps going and the second nine steps returning. Defendant also "did not touch heel-to-toe." Additionally, defendant raised his arms for balance during the entire test. With respect to the one-legged stand test, defendant "swayed right to left for the entire test[,]" and he used his arms for balance by raising them more than six inches or greater. During the last few seconds of the test, defendant put his foot down, swayed, and raised his arms for balance.
        Based on his observations of defendant, Nicholas concluded that defendant had been driving while under the influence of alcohol. The officer placed defendant under arrest.
        Defendant was transported to police headquarters where Nicholas read him Miranda1 warnings, asked him the questions on a drinking and driving questionnaire, and read "the DMV standard statement form regarding the Alcotest." In response to a question on the drinking driving questionnaire, defendant said
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that he had four beers that evening between seven o'clock and nine-thirty, with approximately one-half hour between each drink, at the restaurant where he was arrested. According to the Alcotest results, defendant had a blood-alcohol concentration of .09 percent.
        To establish a reasonable doubt as to the prosecutor's proofs, defendant presented the testimony of four lay witnesses and an expert. One of the witnesses, defendant's friend Rory, had gone to defendant's house in the afternoon to work on a truck and was with defendant until his arrest in the restaurant parking lot. Defendant's friend Shawn picked up defendant and Rory at approximately five-thirty to go to the restaurant for dinner. Rory was not clear about precisely what defendant had to drink before Shawn picked them up to go to the restaurant. During cross-examination, Rory acknowledged his testimony at a probable cause hearing that defendant had one twelve or sixteen ounce beer.
        In any event, Rory, Shawn and defendant went to the restaurant and sat down to eat dinner. While they ate, it snowed outside. According to Rory, the restaurant manager, Aaron, who was also their friend and lived with defendant, said he would comp their meal if they would shovel snow from the front restaurant sidewalk. Rory, Shawn and defendant went
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outside, took approximately twenty to twenty-five minutes to shovel approximately eight inches of snow from the sidewalk, and then returned. When they returned to the restaurant, Shawn left but Rory and defendant remained. Aaron said he would drive them home. When Aaron decided to close the restaurant around nine o'clock due to the snow, defendant went out to warm up Aaron's Jeep. That led to the events that culminated in defendant's arrest.
        Rory went to the rear parking lot and got into the front passenger seat of the Jeep. The lot was snow-covered. After waiting fifteen or twenty minutes, they drove the Jeep to the front of the restaurant, believing that Aaron might be at the front door. Aaron was not there, and they did not stop because a snow plow was beginning to plow the front parking lot. They circled the parking lot twice. The Jeep did slide in the snow in the rear parking lot but it never fishtailed because the four-wheel drive was engaged.
        According to Rory, the front parking lot was snow-covered; the plow had only plowed a small part of the driveway. The second time they circled in front of the restaurant, Rory got out of the Jeep to see what was keeping Aaron. When Rory returned, he saw the police cars and he saw the police arrest defendant. He did not see the police make defendant do any
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tests. The parking lot was covered by approximately six inches of snow. Rory had observed no signs that defendant was visibly intoxicated at any time throughout the day and night.
        Defendant's three other lay witnesses, to the extent they observed defendant during the sequence of events described by Rory, corroborated his testimony. Shawn was with Rory and defendant from five-thirty in the afternoon to eight-thirty that night. When Shawn left the restaurant, it was snowing heavily and four or five inches of snow had accumulated. The restaurant parking lot had not been plowed. Shawn had seen defendant drink two twelve-ounce bottles of beer but defendant appeared to be fine and showed no signs of intoxication.
        The restaurant's bartender testified that after defendant shoveled the restaurant's sidewalk, he came back in and sat at the bar for "[a]bout an hour, maybe an hour and a half," during which time he drank one beer. When the bartender left the restaurant, defendant was in the rear parking lot in a Jeep. The bartender recalled there being eight inches of snow on the ground. None of the parking spaces had been plowed. She testified that she had been trained to observe signs of intoxication, such as slurred speech, flushed face, frequent trips to the bathroom, swaying, bloodshot eyes, sleepiness, and rowdiness. She had spoken with defendant while he was at the
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bar and he had displayed none of these signs. Had she observed any, she would have notified the manager. Unlike defendant, Rory was intoxicated.
        Like the bartender, the restaurant's manager, Aaron, was trained to observe signs of intoxication. He had seen defendant display no signs of being under the influence of alcohol.
        Plaintiff's expert, Joseph Tafuni, is the president and founder of Pinnacle DWI Consulting Group. A former State Trooper who retired after twenty-eight years, Tafuni spent twenty years as a breath coordinator and instructor in the New Jersey State Police Alcohol and Drug Testing Unit. He had become certified by the manufacturers of several breathalyzers and later the Alcotest. Tafuni was also qualified to train police officers to become certified breath test operators. He had trained thousands of New Jersey based police officers to properly process DWI suspects and conduct breathalyzer and Alcotest testing. In fact, Nicholas had been his student. Additionally, Tafuni had trained thousands of police officers to properly administer, document, and interpret the results of standardized field sobriety testing.
        Tafuni was critical of nearly every aspect of Nicholas's DWI investigation of defendant, including the field sobriety tests, the Alcotest, and Nicholas's preparation of his reports.
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Although witnesses had testified that a significant amount of snow had accumulated on the restaurant parking lot where the police arrested defendant, Nicholas's report did not document those conditions, an omission that contravened protocol in a DWI investigation. Tafuni explained that weather conditions play a critical role in the administration of standardized field sobriety tests. Defense witnesses had testified that when they left the restaurant there were no parking spaces in the parking lot that were not covered by snow. Nicholas documented neither the weather conditions nor the parking lot's conditions.
        Tafuni said Nicholas administered the alphabet test correctly but did not properly document defendant's mistakes and therefore did not follow protocol. Tafuni also surmised that dyslexia could affect the test. As to the HGN test, Tafuni explained Nicholas did not check for "resting nystagmus" to determine whether defendant had a medical condition that might affect his performance. Tafuni also said Nicholas held the stimulus too close to defendant's face. Additionally, Tafuni explained that inclement weather could affect the HGN test.
        According to Tafuni, Nicholas should not have performed the walk-and-turn test on a slippery surface such as snow or ice and did not properly document defendant's performance. Tafuni held the same opinion concerning the one-legged stand test.
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According to Tafuni, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) standards are violated when field sobriety tests are performed on a slippery surface.
        Tafuni also criticized Nicholas for not activating the overhead lights on his patrol car and stopping the Jeep as soon as he observed it fishtailing. Lastly, Tafuni criticized Nicholas for not observing defendant for a sufficient amount of time at police headquarters before having defendant give a breath sample for the Alcotest.
        The municipal court judge found defendant guilty of DWI and careless driving. The judge declined to consider the HGN test and, with respect to the other field tests, found that the weather conditions - including a slight coating of snow in the area where they were performed - affected them. The judge did not, however, totally ignore the tests; rather, he found they were relevant to defendant's ability to understand and follow instructions.
        The judge found credible the testimony of Nicholas as well as the testimony of defendant's witnesses. He accepted, however, Nicholas's observations of the Jeep fishtailing. The judge also found credible that the officer smelled alcohol when he first spoke with defendant, observed defendant's flushed face and bloodshot eyes, and learned from defendant that he had been
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drinking beer. The judge gave great weight to the officer's opinion that defendant was operating his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The judge concluded:
When viewing the facts in their entirety, and in a totality of the circumstances, I find the following: There was clearly erratic operation of this motor vehicle. Clearly, the defendant was operating the motor vehicle in a public area. Defendant's admission of ingesting two beers, then later admitting to four beers, the officer's observations, the officer's training, based upon all those factors, I must enter a finding of guilty based upon observations alone.
        The judge further found that there were no procedural violations concerning the Alcotest, and he therefore accepted the results. Based on his credibility determinations and findings of fact, the judge found defendant guilty of DWI based on his .09 percent blood alcohol concentration. The judge also found defendant guilty of careless driving but merged that charge with the DWI.
        The judge fined defendant $256, suspended his driving privileges for three months, ordered him to spend twelve hours in an intoxicated driver resource center, and imposed appropriate costs and assessments. Defendant appealed to the Law Division.
        Unlike the municipal court judge, the Law Division judge concluded that the Alcotest results were unreliable and
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inadmissible to establish defendant's guilt, thereby finding, implicitly, a reasonable doubt as to the Alcotest results. Nevertheless, the judge found defendant guilty based on the combination of Nicholas's observations of defendant's demeanor and the conclusions the officer derived from defendant's performance on the field sobriety tests. In doing so, the court made a significant credibility determination that was contrary to that of the municipal court judge concerning the reliability of the field sobriety tests.
        In determining that Nicholas had probable cause to make an arrest, the Law Division judge relied heavily upon defendant's poor performance of the field sobriety tests. In its written opinion, the court detailed both the manner in which Nicholas administered the test and the manner in which defendant performed them, or more accurately, failed to perform them. The court then explained:
[Defendant] insists the results of the field sobriety tests are unreliable because the ground was covered with several inches of snow. However, Officer Nicholas testified to only a "dusting" or a "slice of paper" worth of snow. As to the suitability of the testing environment, this court defers to the credibility findings of the municipal court . . . . The municipal court found Officer Nicholas's testimony "to be credible and believable" and his "version of the facts to be true and correct." Here, Officer Nicholas testified the amount of
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snow on the ground was "insignificant" and "did not [affect] the test."

[(emphasis added).]
        Although the court stated that it was deferring to the credibility findings of the municipal court judge concerning the suitability of the testing environment, the municipal court judge had discounted the field sobriety tests after finding that the "testing environment" may have affected the results:
In regard to the officer's testimony in regard to the field sobriety tests, taking his testimony along with the expert's testimony and along with the testimony of the parties as to the location, . . . I do find that the conditions in that location were not ideal conditions. And that the tests were impacted by the conditions in that area.

I do believe the officer, in accordance with his testimony, picked an area with little snow. It wasn't being done . . . in drifts. And there was, as he testified, a slight coating of snow. And I'm satisfied that those conditions would impact testing such as this in regard to weather, snow, and other elements.
        Thus, though stating that it was deferring to the municipal court judge as to the suitability of the testing environment, the court on trial de novo overlooked the municipal court's finding, based on its assessment of the testimony of Nicholas, defendant's expert, and the other witnesses, that the field sobriety tests were performed in a location with less than ideal
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conditions and that the conditions, whether snow and other elements, would impact the testing.
        In determining defendant was guilty of DWI, the Law Division judge stated:
At trial, Officer Nicholas recalled his observations of appellant on the night in question as well as the outcome of the various field sobriety tests. This testimony was consistent with that adduced at the probable cause hearing, and, in the interest of brevity, this court will not reiterate it here.
        With respect to the testimony of defendant's expert, Tafuni, the court acknowledged that he "testified 'the results of the field sobriety tests . . . were compromised due to the improper administration of the testing and also the weather conditions.'" The court rejected, however, Tafuni's reliance on NHTSA standards for conducting sobriety testing, concluding that there was no legal requirement that police officers administer sobriety tests in accordance with the NHTSA. The court further found that "by Mr. Tafuni's own admission, field sobriety tests are not entirely nullified by inclement weather or administration inconsistent with NHTSA procedure." The court then determined that the field sobriety tests were admissible. After reiterating the details of defendant's performance on the tests, the court stated:
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Though he acknowledged eight to ten inches of snow on the grass and "some spots of the parking lot," Officer Nicholas consistently maintained the area on which the tests occurred was "fairly flat and . . . free of debris," and not substantially obscured by snow accumulation:

Officer: [E]ither it was a vehicle that was parked [in the area] that recently moved or the plow just recently went over it. I don't recall . . . But the area was clear.
        The court convicted defendant of DWI. Although the court's opinion does not address the penalties, the parties apparently do not dispute that defendant's sentence was the same imposed by the municipal court judge.
        Defendant raises the following points on this appeal:
POINT ONE

IN FINDING THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED, THE LAW DIVISION RELIED ON UNSOUND AND LEGALLY INADEQUATE EVIDENCE

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

B. FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS

1. The Law Division Erred when It Ruled, as a Matter of Law, that It Would Not Consider Whether the Field Sobriety Tests Below Were Conducted in Contravention of NHTSA Testing Standards.

2. The Law Division Failed to Consider the Municipal Trial Court's Finding that the Weather Impacted the Field Sobriety Tests.
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3. The Law Division Erred in Accepting the Inherently Unsound Opinion that Ice Is a Suitable Surface for Testing Balance.

4. The Law Division Erred in Relying on Nicholas's Testimony Regarding the HGN Tests.

5. Nicholas's Testimony Regarding the Field Sobriety Test Results Was Improperly Bolstered by Statistical Studies. (Plain Error).

6. The Law Division Failed to Make Independent Credibility Findings after Rejecting the Municipal Court Assessment of Nicholas's Alcotest Testimony.

C. OBSERVATION EVIDENCE

POINT TWO

THE RECORD BELOW DOES NOT ESTABLISH BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF CARELESS DRIVING.
        When a defendant appeals a conviction of violating a motor vehicle law following a trial de novo, the scope of our review is both narrow and deferential. State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 48-49 (2012). Our function as a reviewing court is to determine whether the factual findings of the Law Division "could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964). When we conclude the findings and conclusions of the Law Division meet that criterion, our "task is complete," and we "should not disturb the result" even if we "might have reached a different conclusion" or if the result was a close one.
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Ibid. We "defer to trial courts' credibility findings that are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999) (citations omitted). "Under the two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error." Ibid. (citing Midler v. Heinowitz, 10 N.J. 123, 128—29 (1952).
        In his first point, defendant argues that the field sobriety tests were unreliable and that the Law Division judge erred by ruling to the contrary. We agree with that part of defendant's argument that the Law Division judge overlooked the municipal court's finding, based on its credibility determinations, that the weather conditions affected the field sobriety tests and therefore the results were partially unreliable.
        As previously explained, the Law Division judge appeared to defer to the municipal court findings with respect to the suitability of the "testing environment." The judge did not explain, however, the inconsistency between the statement about deferring to the credibility findings of the municipal court as
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to suitability of the testing environment but disregarding the finding, "that the conditions in that location were not ideal conditions . . . [a]nd that the tests were impacted by the conditions in that area."
        The Law Division judge also appeared to overlook the inadmissibility of HGN test results "as an element of proof to permit the factfinder to conclude that failure of the HGN test, in combination with the failure of coordination tests, sufficiently proves defendant's guilt of driving under the influence of alcohol." Doriguzzisupra, 334 N.J. Super. at 546. In finding defendant guilty of DWI, the court specifically noted that "appellant displayed involuntary jerking of the eyes during the HGN test."
        The discrepancy between the Law Division judge's purported deferral to the municipal court judge as to the suitability of the testing conditions, and the subsequent overlooking of the municipal court's findings, is troubling for another reason. There was undisputed evidence by an expert who once instructed officers on how to perform field sobriety tests that the tests should be performed on a non-slippery surface. The prosecutor produced no foundational evidence that the tests were valid if performed on a snow-covered surface, even if the snow was simply a "light dusting" or "paper thin." This is particularly
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pertinent to tests such as the walk-and-turn and one-legged-stand that may be difficult for some individuals to perform even on dry, unobstructed surfaces. Thus, even if the Law Division judge correctly concluded that there is no requirement that officers administer field sobriety tests in accordance with the NHTSA, the question remains whether the tests are valid if not conducted on non-slippery, unobstructed surfaces. Such evidence was not presented in this case.
        The State argues that "the weather conditions on the night in question [cannot] possibly negate the other observations of drunkenness that the officer testified credibly about and that both the municipal court and Law Division relied upon to find the State had satisfied its burden." As an example, the State points out that the officer observed defendant's eyes to be bloodshot, his face flushed, and an odor of alcohol emanating from his breath. The State also points to defendant's inconsistent statements about whether he drank two beers, three beers, or four beers.
        Clearly, the municipal court judge made an explicit finding that those observations, coupled with the officer's experience, were sufficient to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, on appeal from a trial de novo, we "consider only the action of the Law Division and not that of
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the municipal court." State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244, 251 (App. Div. 2001). We are unable to discern from the Law Division opinion whether the judge found sufficient evidence to convict defendant in the absence of the defendant's physical performance of the field sobriety tests. Our standard of review does not permit us to speculate that the Law Division judge would have found defendant guilty of DWI beyond a reasonable doubt even in the absence of the field sobriety tests. See Doriguzzisupra, 334 N.J. Super. at 534-35, 547 (requiring a new trial where the municipal court judge and Law Division judge improperly relied on HGN tests in finding defendant guilty of DWI even though the arresting officer had smelled alcohol emanating from defendant's car, defendant's eyes were watery and bloodshot, defendant admitted drinking a couple of beers, and defendant had also failed to properly perform on walk-and-turn and one-legged stand tests).
        Defendant's argument that the prosecution did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offense of careless driving is without sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Nicholas' observations of defendant's operation of the Jeep, observations which the Law Division judge found credible, are amply supported by credible evidence in the record.
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        For the foregoing reasons, we reverse defendant's DWI conviction and remand this matter to the Law Division for a trial de novo on the record. We affirm defendant's careless driving conviction.
        Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Footnotes:

Friday, February 13, 2015

Reckless Driving


39:4-96.     Reckless driving; punishment

    39:4-96.  A person who drives a vehicle heedlessly, in willful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, in a manner so as to endanger, or be likely to endanger, a person or property, shall be guilty of reckless driving and be punished by imprisonment in
the county or municipal jail for a period of not more than 60 days, or by a fine of not less than $50.00 or more than $200.00, or both.
   On a second or subsequent conviction he shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three months, or by a fine of not less than $100 or more than $500, or both.
Our office represents persons charged with Traffic offenses.  Criminal and Motor vehicle violations are expensive.  If convicted, you will have to pay high fines in court, face probation, and other serious penalties that may effect future employment.

You should consider hiring a Trial Attorney To Represent You If Charged With a Criminal Or Serious Motor Vehicle Matter. Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal, drug offenses, and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey.

When your job or driver's license is in jeopardy or you are facing thousands of dollars in fines you need excellent legal representation. The least expensive attorney is not always the answer. Schedule a free in-office consultation if you need experienced legal representation in a traffic/municipal court matter.

Our website www.njlaws.com provides details on jail terms for criminal offenses and other traffic matters.  Call the Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen at 732-572-0500 to schedule a free in-office consultation to hire a trial attorney for Criminal/ DWI/ Municipal Court Traffic/ Drug offenses.  Please call us to schedule an appointment if you need experienced legal representation in a criminal matter. Save this letter for future reference.
KENNETH  VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500
 (Fax)    732-572-0030

Fraudulent Inspection Sticker Enforcement; violations, penalties

39:8-9 Fraudulent Inspection Sticker Enforcement; violations, penalties a. The enforcement of this chapter shall be vested in the director and the police or peace officers of any municipality, any county or the State. b. An owner or lessee who: (1) Fails or refuses to have a motor vehicle examined within the time period prescribed by the director; or (2) After having had it examined, fails or refuses to place or display a certificate of approval, rejection sticker or waiver certificate upon the windshield or other location on the vehicle as may be prescribed by the director; or (3) Fails or refuses to place the motor vehicle in proper condition after having had the same examined; or (4) In any manner, fails to conform to the provisions of this chapter or the regulations adopted by the director pursuant thereto, shall be guilty of violating the provisions of this chapter, and shall be subject to a fine of not less than $100 or more than $200 or to imprisonment for not more than 30 days, or to both such fine and imprisonment. c. A person who fraudulently obtains a certificate of approval, rejection sticker or waiver certificate, or displays or has in his possession a fictitious, altered, or stolen certificate of approval, rejection sticker or waiver certificate shall be subject to a fine of $500 for each such certificate or sticker. d. The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced and all penalties for the violation thereof shall be recovered in accordance with the provisions of "the penalty enforcement law" (N.J.S.2A:58-1 et seq.), and in addition to the provisions and remedies therein contained, the following provisions and remedies shall be applicable in any proceeding brought for a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter: (1) The several municipal courts shall have jurisdiction of such proceeding, in addition to the courts prescribed in "the penalty enforcement law"; (2) The complaint in any such proceeding may be made on information and belief by the director, or any police or peace officer of any municipality, any county or the State; (3) A warrant may issue in lieu of summons; (4) Any police or peace officer shall be empowered to serve and execute process in any such proceeding; (5) The hearing in any such proceeding shall be without a jury; (6) Any such proceeding may be brought in the name of the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles in the Department of Law and Public Safety or in the name of the State of New Jersey; (7) Any sums received in payment of any fines imposed in any such proceeding shall be paid to the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles and shall be paid by him to the State Treasurer, who shall deposit one-half of such sums in the "Motor Vehicle Inspection Fund" established pursuant to subsection j. of R.S.39:8-2, and who shall pay the remaining one-half of such sums to the county or municipality initiating the complaint or summons or, if initiated by State law enforcement personnel, to the State Treasury; (8) The director or judge before whom any hearing under this chapter is had may revoke the registration certificate of any motor vehicle owned or leased by any person, when such person shall have been found to be in violation of any of the provisions of this chapter as shall in the discretion of the director or judge justify such revocation. e. The director may order the suspension of the registration or reciprocity privilege of any motor vehicle found to be in violation of any of the provisions of this chapter. If the owner or lessee fails to surrender the license plates for that vehicle to the division within 45 days of the mailing of an order requiring their surrender, the director may order the confiscation of the license plates of the vehicle that is in violation. An order of license plate confiscation issued by the director shall include an order imposing a civil penalty of $200 on the owner or lessee of the vehicle. This civil penalty shall be paid to the State Treasurer, who shall deposit one-half of the amount in the "Motor Vehicle Inspection Fund" established pursuant to subsection j. of R.S.39:8-2 and pay the remaining one-half to any municipality or county whose law enforcement, police or peace officers confiscated the plates in accordance with the order of the director, or if the plates were confiscated by State law enforcement personnel, to the State Treasury. A civil penalty imposed pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to any other penalty provided by this chapter.
Our office represents persons charged with Traffic offenses. Criminal and Motor vehicle violations are expensive. Call the Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen at 732-572-0500 to schedule a free in-office consultation
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500

Thursday, February 05, 2015

NJ Senate approves change to DWI Law and require interlock machine on car but permit DWI defendants to drive after having the machine installed.

      NJ Senate approves change to DWI Law and require interlock machine on car but permit DWI defendants to drive after having the machine installed.
  +  NJ Senate on February 5 voted 29-4 to change the DWI Law to require a car interlock device

   SENATE Bill No. 385 is now being submitted to the Governor for signature. The Assembly approved the bill in June, 2014.

This bill revises the penalty provisions for various drunk driving offenses, particularly making changes concerning the use of, and applicable time periods covering, driver’s license suspensions and installations of ignition interlock devices on motor vehicles owned or operated by these drivers.
      Drunk Driving
      Concerning the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (R.S.39:50-4), the bill revises the relevant penalty provisions as follows:
      For a first offense, if that offense involved a person’s blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or higher but less than 0.10%, or otherwise operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the court would order a 10-day license suspension, during which the person would have to install an ignition interlock device in one motor vehicle owned, leased, or principally operated by the person, whichever the person most often operates, for three months, unless the court was clearly convinced, based on a series of aggravating factors outweighing mitigating ones as set forth in the bill, to instead order a license suspension of three months (the three month suspension would also apply instead of device installation if the person did not own or lease a motor vehicle and there was no motor vehicle the person principally operated).  Under current law, the license suspension is mandatory and motorists have no way to get to work or school.
An ignition interlock device or breath alcohol ignition interlock device (IID and BAIID) is a mechanism, like a breathalyzer, installed on a motor vehicle's dashboard. Before the vehicle's motor can be started, the driver first must exhale into the device; if the resultant breath-alcohol concentration analyzed result is greater than the programmed blood alcohol concentration (which varies between countries), the device prevents the engine from being started. The NJ ignition interlock device to prevent a vehicle from starting if the BAC exceeds 0.05%.

      The aggravating and mitigating factors for consideration by the court to order a license suspension instead of device installation would include, but not be limited to: the nature and circumstances of the person’s conduct, including whether such conduct posed a high risk of danger to the public; the person’s driving record; whether the character and attitude of the person indicate that the person would be likely or unlikely to commit another violation; and the need for personal or general deterrence.
     Under the proposed law, if the court did order the installation of the ignition interlock device, the person’s driver’s license would only be reinstated within the 10-day suspension/device installation period by the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission upon showing proof of such installation, and the commission would imprint a notation concerning driving with the device on the person’s driver’s license.
      Additionally, for a person with an ignition interlock device installed, the three-month installation period would be subject to possible extension for an additional period equal to one-third of the originally designated period, for attempting to operate the affected motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or higher during the last one-third of the installation period, or for failing to present the affected vehicle for device servicing at any time during the installation period.  This extension would occur without need of further court order, following notification of the event to the court by the Chief Administrator of the Motor Vehicle Commission, which notification would be supported by a certification from the ignition interlock device manufacturer, installer, or other party set forth in regulation responsible for the servicing or monitoring of the device.
      If the first offense involved a person’s blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or higher but less than 0.15%, the court would order a 10-day license suspension, during which the person would have to install an ignition interlock device in one motor vehicle owned, leased, or principally operated by the person, whichever the person most often operates, for not less than seven months or more than one year, unless the court was clearly convinced, based on the series of aggravating factors outweighing the mitigating ones as described above, to instead order a license suspension of not less than seven months or more than one year (the seven month to one year suspension would also apply instead of device installation if the person did not own or lease a motor vehicle and there was no motor vehicle the person principally operated). Ubnder the current law, an ignition interlock device is already required. f the person was ordered to install an ignition interlock device, the person could only reinstate the person’s driver’s license through the Motor Vehicle Commission upon showing proof of such installation, and could have the installation period extended by an additional period equal to one-third of the originally designated period in the same manner as previously described.
      If the first offense involved a person’s blood alcohol concentration of 0.15% or higher, the court would order a 10-day license suspension, during which the person would have to install an ignition interlock device in one motor vehicle owned, leased, or principally operated by the person, whichever the person most often operates, and maintain installation of the device during a period of license suspension of not less than seven months or more than one year and after license suspension for an additional period of not less than seven months or more than one year, unless there was no such vehicle, in which case the person would receive an initial period of suspension plus an additional period of suspension equal to the total period the person would have had an ignition interlock device installed.
      With respect to the license suspension of a person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15% or higher, the person would have the opportunity, beginning 90 days after the start of the suspension, to petition the court to reinstate the person’s driving privileges for the duration of the initially ordered suspension period, subject to the person maintaining the installation of the ignition interlock device in the person’s motor vehicle both for the remainder of the initially ordered suspension period and afterward for the additional seven-month to one-year period.  Additionally, a person whose driving privileges were suspended for an additional period because the person does not own or lease a motor vehicle and there is no motor vehicle the person principally operates, may petition the court that established the forfeiture period, upon proof of owning, leasing, or principally operating a motor vehicle, to reinstate the person’s driving privileges for the duration of the initial and additional suspension period, subject to the person maintaining the installation of an ignition interlock device in that vehicle.  As above, a person ordered to install an ignition interlock device could only reinstate a driver’s license through the Motor Vehicle Commission upon showing proof of such installation, and could have the installation period extended by an additional period equal to one-third of the originally designated period in the same manner as previously described. 
      If the offense involved a “drugged” driver (i.e., operating a motor vehicle under the influence of a narcotic, hallucinogenic, or habit-producing drug), the court would order a license suspension of not less than seven months or more than one year, with no option to instead operate a motor vehicle with an ignition interlock device installed.
      For any such first offense of drunk or “drugged” driving occurring on or near a school property or crossing, the bill would eliminate any enhanced penalties currently available under the law and instead treat such an offense the same as all other first offenses.
      For a second offense, the bill increases, for all drunk and “drugged” drivers, the period of license suspension from the current law’s two years to instead a period of not less than two years or more than four years.  The court would order a 10-day license suspension, during which the person would have to install an ignition interlock device in each motor vehicle owned, leased, or operated by the person to be maintained during the two to four year suspension period, and to remain installed afterward for a period of not less than one year or more than three years, unless there was no such vehicle, in which case the person would receive an initial period of suspension plus an additional period of suspension equal to the total period the person would have had an ignition interlock device installed.
      With respect to a second offender’s license suspension, a person who does not own or lease a motor vehicle or have a motor vehicle the person operates may petition the court that established the forfeiture period, upon proof of owning, leasing, or operating a motor vehicle, to reinstate the person’s driving privileges for the duration of the additional one to three year suspension period (not the initial two to four year period), subject to the person maintaining the installation of an ignition interlock device in that vehicle. 
      As above for any first offender, a person who is a second offender ordered to install an ignition interlock device could only reinstate a driver’s license through the Motor Vehicle Commission upon showing proof of such installation, and could have the installation period extended by an additional period equal to one-third of the originally designated period in the same manner as previously described for a first offender.     
      For a second offense occurring on or near a school property or crossing, the bill would eliminate any enhanced penalties currently available under the law and instead treat such an offense the same as all other second offenses.
      For a third or subsequent offense, the bill increases, for all drunk and “drugged” drivers, the period of license suspension from the current law’s 10 years to instead a period of not less than 10 years or more than 20 years.  The court would order a 10-day license suspension, during which the person would have to install an ignition interlock device in each motor vehicle owned, leased, or operated by the person to be maintained during the 10 to 20 year suspension period, and to remain installed afterwards for a period of not less than one year or more than three years, unless there was no such vehicle, in which case the person would receive an initial period of suspension plus an additional period of suspension equal to the total period the person would have had an ignition interlock device installed.
      With respect to a third or subsequent offender’s license suspension, a person who does not own or lease a motor vehicle or have a motor vehicle the person operates may petition the court that established the forfeiture period, upon proof of owning, leasing, or operating a motor vehicle, to reinstate the person’s driving privileges for the duration of the additional one to three year suspension period (not the initial 10 to 20 year period), subject to the person maintaining the installation of an ignition interlock device in that vehicle. 
      As above for both first and second offenders, a person who is a third or subsequent offender ordered to install an ignition interlock device could only reinstate a driver’s license through the Motor Vehicle Commission upon showing proof of such installation, and could have the installation period extended by an additional period equal to one-third of the originally designated period in the same manner as previously described for first and second offenders.
      For a third or subsequent offense occurring on or near a school property or crossing, the bill would eliminate any enhanced penalties currently available under the law and instead treat such an offense the same as all other third or subsequent offenses.
      Refusing a Breath Test
      Concerning the offense of refusing to submit to a breath test (section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a)), the bill revises the relevant penalty provisions as follows:
      For a first offense, the court would order a 10-day license suspension, during which the person would have to install an ignition interlock device in one motor vehicle owned, leased, or principally operated by the person, whichever the person most often operates, for not less than seven months or more than one year, unless the court was clearly convinced, based on the series of aggravating factors outweighing the mitigating ones as described above for drunk driving offenses, to instead order a license suspension of not less than seven months or more than one year (the seven month to one year suspension would also apply instead of device installation if the person did not own or lease a motor vehicle and there was no motor vehicle the person principally operated). As above with respect to drunk driving offenses, if the person was ordered to install an ignition interlock device, the person could only reinstate the person’s driver’s license through the Motor Vehicle Commission upon showing proof of such installation, and could have the installation period extended by an additional period equal to one-third of the originally designated period in the same manner as previously described.
      For any first offense of refusing a breath test occurring on or near a school property or crossing, the bill would eliminate any enhanced penalties currently available under the law and instead treat such an offense the same as all other first offenses.
      For a second offense, the bill increases the period of license suspension from the current two years to instead a period of not less than two years or more than four years.  The court would order a 10-day license suspension, during which the person would have to install an ignition interlock device in each motor vehicle owned, leased, or operated by the person to be maintained during the two to four year suspension period and remain installed afterward for a period of not less than one year or more than three years, unless there was no such vehicle, in which case the person would receive an initial period of suspension plus an additional period of suspension equal to the total period the person would have had an ignition interlock device installed.  
      A person who does not own or lease a motor vehicle or have a motor vehicle the person operates may petition the court that established the forfeiture period, upon proof of owning, leasing, or operating a motor vehicle, to reinstate the person’s driving privileges for the duration of the additional one to three year suspension period (not the initial two to four year period), subject to the person maintaining the installation of an ignition interlock device in that vehicle.  
      As above with respect to any drunk driving offense, a person who is a second offender ordered to install an ignition interlock device could only reinstate a driver’s license through the Motor Vehicle Commission upon showing proof of such installation, and could have the installation period extended by an additional period equal to one-third of the originally designated period in the same manner as previously described for a drunk driving offense.     
      For a second offense of refusing a breath test occurring on or near a school property or crossing, the bill would eliminate any enhanced penalties currently available under the law and instead treat such an offense the same as all other second offenses.
      For a third or subsequent offense, the bill increases the period of license suspension from the current 10 years to instead a period of not less than 10 years or more than 20 years.  The court would order a 10-day license suspension, during which the person would have to install an ignition interlock device in each motor vehicle owned, leased, or operated by the person to be maintained during the 10 to 20 year suspension period, and to remain installed afterwards for a period of not less than one year or more than three years, unless there was no such vehicle, in which case the person would receive an initial period of suspension plus an additional period of suspension equal to the total period the person would have had an ignition interlock device installed.
      A third or subsequent offender who does not own or lease a motor vehicle or have a motor vehicle the person operates may petition the court that established the forfeiture period, upon proof of owning, leasing, or operating a motor vehicle, to reinstate the person’s driving privileges for the duration of the additional one to three year suspension period (not the initial 10 to 20 year period), subject to the person maintaining the installation of an ignition interlock device in that vehicle.  
      As above with respect to any drunk driving offense, a person who is a third or subsequent offender ordered to install an ignition interlock device could only reinstate a driver’s license through the Motor Vehicle Commission upon showing proof of such installation, and could have the installation period extended by an additional period equal to one-third of the originally designated period in the same manner as previously described for a drunk driving offense.
      For a third or subsequent offense of refusing a breath test occurring on or near a school property or crossing, the bill would eliminate any enhanced penalties currently available under the law and instead treat such an offense the same as all other third or subsequent offenses.
      Ignition Interlock Device Installation – License Reinstatement
      With respect to all cases for which a person has been ordered to install one or more ignition interlock devices, the court would notify the Chief Administrator of the Motor Vehicle Commission.  The commission would thereafter require that the one or more devices be installed before the reinstatement of the person’s driver’s license, whether after a 10-day suspension period or some longer period as applicable to the specific offense.  The commission would imprint a notation on the reinstated driver’s license stating that the person could not operate a motor vehicle unless it is equipped with an ignition interlock device, and would enter this requirement in the person's driving record.
      Ignition Interlock Device – Failure to Install, Tampering
      Lastly, a person who fails to install an ignition interlock device as ordered by a court, or who drives a device-equipped vehicle after being started by means other than the person blowing into the device, or who drives an unequipped vehicle, would be guilty of a disorderly persons offense.  A disorderly persons offense is ordinarily punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to six months, a fine of up to $1,000, or both.  Furthermore, the court would suspend the person’s driver’s license for the period of time associated with a drunk driving offense under R.S.39:4-50, except that the applicable period applied by the court would be the period for a second offense (not less than two years or more than four years) if the underlying act was committed by a first offender drunk driver/breath test refusal, and would be the period for a third or subsequent offense (not less than 10 years or more than 20 years) if the underlying act was committed by a second offender drunk driver/breath test refusal; the suspension period for a third or subsequent offender drunk driver/breath test refusal would not be enhanced (remaining not less than 10 years or more than 20 years).

Other proposed changes:      - provide, for all of the relevant drunk driving and breath test refusal offenses described above, a 10-day license suspension period, during which an offender would have to install an ignition interlock device in the one or more motor vehicles required by the bill’s provisions;
      - clarify the device installation requirements for repeat offenders, so that an ignition interlock device would have to be installed in all motor vehicles operated by such offenders (along with all vehicles owned or leased), not just those vehicles “principally” operated by such offenders;
      - add provisions to further explain the available penalties for offenders who are required to install ignition interlock devices versus those offenders who face license suspension because they do not have a motor vehicle in which a device would be installed, as detailed above; 
      - update the existing law concerning the procedure to be followed by drunk driving and breath test refusal offenders who are seeking the reinstatement of their driver’s licenses through the Motor Vehicle Commission;
      - update provisions of the relevant drunk driving statute, R.S.39:4-50, to account for the enactment of P.L.2014, c.54 on September 10, 2014, providing a $25 increase to the surcharge assessed against drunk driving violators ($100 to $125) in order to, in part, help fund the installation of mobile video recording systems on municipal police vehicles as required by that act;
      - reinsert provisions concerning the currently operating supervised visitation program for convicted offenders, providing visits to hospitals which receive drunk driving victims, facilities caring for advanced alcoholics or drug abusers, and public morgues or county medical examiner offices holding deceased victims; the provisions were inadvertently marked for deletion by the underlying bill (see R.S.39:4-50, subsection (h)); and
      - reinsert the penalty provisions for offenders who fail to install ignition interlock devices, tamper with devices, or operate unequipped vehicles, as detailed above, which were included in the bill as introduced but inadvertently left out of the underlying bill. 

FISCAL IMPACT:
      The Office of Legislative Services expects the State to incur certain additional but indeterminable costs as a result of this bill.  These costs are related to the possible redesign and associated processing of a license that is capable of accommodating a notation on a reinstated driver’s license that indicates a person is not authorized to operate a motor vehicle unless it is equipped with an ignition interlock device.  The costs are also related to the court time that may be necessary to process these cases and to adjudicate additional cases that may arise from the failure to install or maintain, or from tampering with, ignition interlock devices that have been ordered to be installed by the court.

KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500
(Fax)    732-572-0030

website: www.njlaws.com