Friday, November 27, 2009

Hina K. Patel v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (A-86-08)

Hina K. Patel v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (A-86-08) Entire case.....

Argued September 15, 2009 -- Decided November 10, 2009
LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
This appeal involves the assessment of motor vehicle penalty points for a third or subsequent offense in
violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2, driving in an unsafe manner likely to endanger a person or property. The issue is
whether, based on the timing of her offenses, plaintiff is entitled to relief under N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(e), which
provides that an offense that occurs more than five years after “the prior offense” shall not be considered a
“subsequent offense” for the purpose of assessing points.
Plaintiff Hina K. Patel is a repeat violator of the unsafe driving statute. In March 2002, she committed a
driving offense and pled guilty to unsafe driving in May 2002. She committed another offense in August 2002, and
pled guilty to unsafe driving on September 17, 2002. She pled guilty to a third unsafe driving violation in June
2006, for an offense that occurred in April 2006. Then, on September 5, 2007, she received citations for speeding
and failing to have her vehicle timely inspected, for which she entered a guilty plea to unsafe driving in November
2007.
Patel was assessed fines for each of her violations and four penalty points for her third offense. When she
was assessed four additional points for her fourth conviction in 2007, Patel wrote to the New Jersey Motor Vehicle
Commission (MVC), objecting because her fourth conviction had occurred more than five years after both her first
and second offenses. Because only her third offense had occurred within five years of the 2007 offense, Patel
argued that the 2007 offense must be treated as a “second offense,” for which points are not authorized. The MVC
informed her that “a third and subsequent violation” of the unsafe driving statute “within a five year period will be
issued 4 points,” and because this was her fourth violation since 2002, her “Driver History record will remain the
same.”
Patel appealed. The Appellate Division upheld the MVC’s determination to assess points for her fourth
unsafe driving conviction. Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 403 N.J. Super. 373 (App. Div. 2008). The panel
observed that N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(e) exempts an individual from points when more than five years have elapsed
between a subsequent offense and the prior offense. The panel concluded that the assessment of points on Patel’s
“subsequent” fourth conviction was proper because her third offense had occurred within five years of her fourth.
The panel discerned a legislative intent to apply the exemption from points when the “subsequent” offense occurs
more than five years after “the prior offense,” that is, the most recent prior offense, not “any prior offense.” In
Patel’s case, “the prior offense” was her third offense, which was within five years of her fourth offense.
The Supreme Court granted Patel’s petition for certification. 198 N.J. 474 (2009).
HELD: Under N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(e), the exemption provision for assessing motor vehicle penalty points for an
unsafe driving offense that occurs more than five years after “the prior offense,” “the prior offense” refers only to
the most recent preceding offense based on both a plain reading of the statute and a review of the legislative history.
Thus, the MVC correctly imposed motor vehicle points on Patel for having a fourth unsafe driving conviction in
2007, only one year after the date of her prior, third, unsafe driving offense.
1. When interpreting a statute, courts start with the plain language and apply the generally accepted meaning of the
words used. If the plain language leads to a clear result, the interpretive process is over. If there is ambiguity that
leads to more than one plausible interpretation, a court may turn to extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history, for
assistance with its interpretive task. (pp. 5-6)
2
2. The unsafe driving statute provides that for first and second offenses, motor vehicle penalty points shall not be
assessed. Subsection d. states that a person convicted of “a third or subsequent offense” shall be assessed points.
Subsection e. states that an offense “that occurs more than five years after the prior offense shall not be considered a
subsequent offense for the purpose of assessing motor vehicle penalty points under subsection d.” The MVC
interpreted the statute to require that Patel’s fourth violation subjected her to the imposition of points. It explained
that points are assessed if the third “and” subsequent offense occurred during a five-year period; that is, points must
be assessed if five or fewer years had elapsed between her third and her subsequent fourth offense. (pp. 6-7)
3. Generally, courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it is charged with enforcing. Here, the MVC
committed no grievous error in interpreting the unsafe driving statute, and the Appellate Division was entirely
correct in affirming the MVC’s action in Patel’s points challenge. (p. 8)
4. A plain reading of subsection e. supports the construction that “the prior offense” refers only to the most recent
preceding offense. “The” when used before a noun generally emphasizes one of a group as the most prominent.
Thus, “the” indicates that the Legislature was contemplating only one prior offense, not each or any prior offense.
The “prior offense” contemplates only one offense. Use of “the” signifies that the noun to which it attaches is the
most prominent, and the natural assumption from the plain language is that the Legislature contemplated the most
recent prior offense. However, because that is not explicitly stated, the meaning of “the prior offense” could
arguably be found to contain some ambiguity. Accordingly, the Court examines the legislative history. (pp. 9-10)
5. Before enactment, the unsafe driving statute underwent several revisions. The precursor to the present subsection
d. allowed for the discretionary assessment of points for third and subsequent convictions. A substitute bill made it
mandatory to assess points for third and subsequent convictions and also created the five-year exception now found
in subsection e. As the Assembly Judiciary Committee explained, an offense “which occurs more than five years
after the prior offense would not be considered a subsequent offense” for the purpose of assessing points. On
signing the bill, the Governor issued a news release explaining that a “person convicted of a third or subsequent
offense” may be assessed points “if the offense occurs within five years of the prior offense.” (pp. 10-12)
6. Based on that history, the Court concludes that the Legislature meant the words “the prior offense” in subsection
e. to refer to the offense immediately preceding a “subsequent” offense. The statutory scheme demonstrates a
legislative desire to impose increasing penalties for repetitive violations, and to show leniency by including an
exemption from points for violations that occur after more than a five-year hiatus in unsafe driving violations.
Those legislative policies are harmonized by applying the phrase “the prior offense” to fourth offenders exactly as
did the MVC in Patel’s case, by looking at the date of her immediately preceding third offense and, because it was
not more than five years before her fourth offense in 2007, imposing points for her fourth violation. The MVC’s
interpretation is a reasonable construction of the language used by the Legislature, gives meaning to every word
used, and advances the overall legislative intent to punish drivers with motor vehicle points for multiple unsafe
driving offenses that are close in time. The MVC correctly imposed motor vehicle points on Patel for having a
fourth unsafe driving conviction in 2007, only one year after the date of her prior, third, unsafe driving offense. (pp.
13-16)
7. Although not necessary to the disposition of the appeal, the Appellate Division further expressed approval of the
MVC’s interpretation that the five-year exception did not apply to “third” offenses, but only to a “subsequent”
offense; that is, the five-year exception applied only to fourth and further offenses. Absent a more explicit direction
from the Legislature, the Court rejects the suggestion that the exemption is denied to third offenders. (pp. 16-17)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LONG, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and
HOENS join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-86 September Term 2008
HINA K. PATEL,
Appellant-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE
COMMISSION,
Respondent-Respondent.
Argued September 15, 2009 – Decided November 10, 2009
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is
reported at 403 N.J. Super. 373 (2008).
Michelle M. Tullio argued the cause for
appellant (Lanfrit and Tullio, attorneys;
Darren D. Dapas on the brief).
Nicole T. Minutoli, Deputy Attorney
General, argued the cause for respondent
(Anne Milgram, Attorney General of
New Jersey, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
Mala Narayanan, Deputy Attorney General,
on the brief).
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2 makes it unlawful for any person to
drive a motor vehicle in an unsafe manner likely to endanger a
person or property. The law imposes only fines for the first
two violations, but it authorizes the New Jersey Motor Vehicle
2
Commission (MVC) to assess motor vehicle penalty points, in
addition to fines, for “a third or subsequent offense.”
N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(d). An assessment of points may be avoided,
however, based on the timing of one’s offenses. Subsection e.
provides that
[a]n offense committed under this section
that occurs more than five years after the
prior offense shall not be considered a
subsequent offense for the purpose of
assessing motor vehicle penalty points under
subsection d. of this section.
[N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(e).]
This appeal requires us to construe that exemption provision.
Appellant, Hina Patel, is a repeat violator of the unsafe
driving statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2. Based on the timing of her
violations she contested the MVC’s determination to assess motor
vehicle penalty points for her fourth offense. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm the MVC’s imposition of points for
Patel’s fourth unsafe driving violation.
I.
Patel’s relevant driving history may be summarized as
follows. On March 12, 2002, she committed a driving offense and
pled guilty to unsafe driving on May 3, 2002. She committed
another offense on August 7, 2002, and on September 17, 2002,
again pled guilty to unsafe driving. On April 4, 2006, Patel
received a citation for unsafe lane changing, for which she pled
3
to a third unsafe driving violation on June 9, 2006. Then, on
September 5, 2007, she received citations for speeding and
failing to have her vehicle timely inspected, in exchange for
which she entered a guilty plea to unsafe driving on November
19, 2007.
Patel was fined in accordance with the statute’s
progressive fine structure for each of her four unsafe driving
convictions. She also was assessed four motor vehicle penalty
points for her third offense. The instant controversy arose
over the assessment of four additional motor vehicle points for
her fourth unsafe driving conviction in 2007. Patel wrote to
the Chief Administrator of the MVC, objecting because her fourth
conviction had occurred more than five years after both her
first and second offenses. Because only her third offense had
occurred within five years of the 2007 offense (the fourth
unsafe driving conviction), Patel argued that the 2007 offense
must be treated as a “second offense” under the statute.
According to Patel, because N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(c) does not
authorize points for second offenses, she should not be
subjected to motor vehicle penalty points for the 2007
violation.
4
Patel received a response1 informing her that “a third and
subsequent violation for [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-97.2 (Unsafe Operation
Of A Motor Vehicle) within a five year period will be issued 4
points. Our records indicate this is your . . . 4th violation
since March 12, 2002. Therefore your . . . Driver History
record will remain the same.”
Patel appealed from that final determination of the MVC,
see R. 2:2-3(a)(2), and asserted the same arguments that she had
presented to the MVC. The Appellate Division’s decision upheld
the MVC’s interpretation of the statute and its application to
Patel that resulted in the points assessment for her fourth
unsafe driving conviction. Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n,
403 N.J. Super. 373, 378 (App. Div. 2008). The panel observed
that subsection e. of the statute exempts an individual from
points when more than five years have elapsed between a
subsequent offense and the prior offense. Id. at 377. The
panel concluded that the assessment of points on Patel’s
“subsequent” fourth conviction was proper because her third
offense had occurred within five years of her fourth. Ibid.
Relying on the Legislature’s language in subsection e., the
panel discerned a legislative intent to apply the exemption from
1 The Chief Administrator of the MVC referred Patel’s
correspondence to the Driver Management Bureau, a subdivision of
the MVC, for response. We refer to the MVC and the Bureau
collectively as MVC.
5
points when the “subsequent” offense occurs more than five years
after “the prior offense,” not “any prior offense.” Ibid. The
panel regarded the statutory reference to “the prior offense” in
subsection e. as meaning the most recent prior offense. Ibid.
In Patel’s case, “the prior offense” was her third conviction,
which was within five years of her fourth conviction. Ibid.
II.
As this appeal involves the interpretation of a statute,
“our goal is to discern and effectuate the Legislature’s
intent.” State v. Brannon, 178 N.J. 500, 505 (2004). The plain
language of the statute is our starting point. See State v.
Lewis, 185 N.J. 363, 369 (2005) (citing State v. Ivory, 124 N.J.
582, 585 (1991)). We apply to the statutory terms the generally
accepted meaning of the words used by the Legislature, see
D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192 N.J. 110, 119
(2007) (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)),
and strive “to give effect to every word.” Med. Soc’y of N.J.
v. N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 120 N.J. 18, 26 (1990).
Because we do not assume that the Legislature used any
unnecessary or meaningless language, see id. at 26-27, we read a
statute in its entirety and construe “each part or section . . .
in connection with every other part or section to provide a
harmonious whole.” Bedford v. Riello, 195 N.J. 210, 224 (2008)
6
(citing In re Distrib. of Liquid Assets, 168 N.J. 1, 17-18
(2001); State v. Brown, 22 N.J. 405, 415-16 (1956)).
With those general principles in mind we turn to the
statute in issue. As the panel below appropriately noted,
“‘[i]f the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous
result, then our interpretive process is over.’” Patel, supra,
403 N.J. Super. at 376 (quoting Richardson v. Bd. of Trs.,
Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 195 (2007)). However
“if there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to
more than one plausible interpretation, we may turn to extrinsic
evidence, including legislative history, committee reports, and
contemporaneous construction,” for further assistance in our
interpretative task. DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492-93
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
III.
A.
The unsafe driving statute provides as follows:
a. Notwithstanding any other provision of
law to the contrary, it shall be unlawful
for any person to drive or operate a motor
vehicle in an unsafe manner likely to
endanger a person or property.
b. A person convicted of a first offense
under subsection a. shall be subject to a
fine of not less than $50.00 or more than
$150.00 and shall not be assessed any motor
vehicle penalty points pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
39:5-30.5].
7
c. A person convicted of a second offense
under subsection a. shall be subject to a
fine of not less than $100.00 or more than
$250.00 and shall not be assessed any motor
vehicle penalty points pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
39:5-30.5].
d. A person convicted of a third or
subsequent offense under subsection a. shall
be subject to a fine of not less than
$200.00 or more than $500.00 and shall be
assessed motor vehicle penalty points
pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.5].
e. An offense committed under this section
that occurs more than five years after the
prior offense shall not be considered a
subsequent offense for the purpose of
assessing motor vehicle penalty points under
subsection d. of this section.
f. In addition to any fine, fee or other
charge imposed pursuant to law, the court
shall assess a person convicted of an
offense under subsection a. of this section
a surcharge of $250 which shall be collected
by the court and distributed to the Division
of Revenue in the Department of the Treasury
as a New Jersey Merit Rating Plan surcharge
pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)(2)(a)].
[N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2.]
The MVC interpreted the statute to require that Patel’s
fourth violation subjected her to the imposition of motor
vehicle penalty points under subsection d. Its letter
disposition of Patel’s points challenge explained that points
are assessed if the third “and” the subsequent offense occurred
during a five-year period. In other words, the MVC found that
8
points must be assessed if five or fewer years had elapsed
between Patel’s third and her subsequent fourth offense.
“Generally, courts afford substantial deference to an
agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged
with enforcing.” Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 196 (citing R&R
Mktg., L.L.C. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 158 N.J. 170, 175 (1999)).
However, we are not bound by an agency’s construction of a
statute just as we are not bound by its other, strictly legal
determinations. Ibid. An agency’s determination must be
reversed if “it is ‘plainly unreasonable.’" T.H. v. Div. of
Development Disabilities, 189 N.J. 478, 490 (2007) (quoting In
re N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun.
Employees, 150 N.J. 331, 351 (1997)). An agency’s final
decision is plainly unreasonable and violates express or implied
legislative direction if it gives “a statute any greater effect
than is permitted by the statutory language[,] . . . alter[s]
the terms of a legislative enactment[,] . . . frustrate[s] the
policy embodied in the statute . . . [or] is plainly at odds
with the statute.” Id. at 491 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Here it is clear to us that the MVC committed
no such grievous error in respect of its interpretation of the
unsafe driving statute that led to Patel’s points assessment;
the Appellate Division was entirely correct in affirming the
MVC’s action in Patel’s points challenge.
9
B.
A plain-language reading of subsection e. of the unsafe
driving statute supports the construction that “the prior
offense” refers only to the most recent preceding offense.
“The” when used “before a noun, and generally stressed,
emphasiz[es] one of a group or type as the most outstanding or
prominent.” Webster’s II New College Dictionary 1143 (rev. ed.
1999). Consequently, “the” indicates that the Legislature was
contemplating only one prior offense, not each or any prior
offense. See Villa v. Short, 195 N.J. 15, 26 (2008) (quoting
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stamp, 588 A.2d 363, 365 (N.H. 1991)
(noting, in interpreting insurance policy with multiple
insureds, that “‘the indefinite article ‘an,’ rather than the
definite ‘the,’ before ‘insured’ is a clear reference to any
insured’”)).
In our view, the phrase “prior offense” in subsection e.
contemplates only one offense. Moreover, the use of the article
“the” signifies that the noun to which it attaches is the one
most prominent and, in light of the absence of an explicit
reference to a specific offense, the natural assumption to be
made from the plain language is that the Legislature
contemplated the most recent prior offense. However, because
that is not explicitly stated, the meaning of “the prior
offense” could arguably be found to contain some ambiguity.
10
Accordingly, we may examine whether extrinsic aids are of any
assistance in our effort to discern the legislative intent. See
DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492-93. In this instance, such
assistance can be found in the legislative history of the unsafe
driving statute.
C.
Before enactment, the unsafe driving statute underwent
several revisions and substitutions. A bill first was
introduced in the Senate and, although the substantive offense
was the same, the punishment scheme was substantially different
from the statute eventually enacted. A first offense carried
the penalty of a fine between $50 and $200 and/or no more than
fifteen days of imprisonment. S. 1236, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000).
However, no points were to be assessed for the first offense.
Ibid. For a second or subsequent offense, a fine between $100
and $500 was required and/or imprisonment for no more than
thirty days. Ibid. Additionally, the assessment of motor
vehicle points was optional. Ibid. That bill substantially
mirrored the reckless driving statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96, which
imposes similar but more severe penalties and requires a
reckless mental state.
Senate Bill 1236 was replaced by identical bills introduced
in both houses of the Legislature (Senate Bill 1410 and Assembly
Bill 2465). The new bills removed the penalty of imprisonment.
11
See S. 1410, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000); Assemb. 2465, 209th Leg.
(N.J. 2000). The maximum fees to be imposed for a first and
second offense were reduced to $150 and $250 respectively and
points could no longer be assessed for a second offense. S.
1410, supra; Assemb. 2465, supra. Importantly, a new section
was added, the precursor to the present subsection d. It
allowed for the discretionary assessment of motor vehicle points
for third and subsequent convictions. S. 1410, supra; Assemb.
2465, supra. Also, the fee for a third and subsequent offense
was set between $200 and $500. S. 1410, supra; Assemb. 2465,
supra. Eventually, the substantive provisions from another
pending bill, Assembly Bill 2466, were incorporated, clarifying
a prosecutor’s authority to accept a plea to unsafe driving for
any other offense even if it was not a lesser-included offense.2
See Assemb. 2466, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000).
The Assembly Judiciary Committee made further substantive
revisions. The substitute bill rendered mandatory the
assessment of points for third and subsequent convictions.
Assemb. Judiciary Comm. Statement to Assemb. Comm. Substitute
for Assemb. Nos. 2465 and 2466, 209th Leg. 1 (N.J. 2000). The
substitute bill also created the five-year exception now found
in subsection e. Ibid. As the Assembly Judiciary Committee
2 The substantive provisions of Assembly Bill 2466 eventually
amended N.J.S.A. 2B:25-1 to -12.
12
explained, “an offense committed under [this statutory]
provision[] which occurs more than five years after the prior
offense would not be considered a subsequent offense within the
meaning of subsection d. of section 1 of the substitute for the
purpose of assessing motor vehicle penalty points.” Ibid. The
Senate adopted the changes made by the Assembly. S. Comm.
Substitute for S. 1236, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000). On signing the
bill, then-Governor Christine Todd Whitman issued a news release
that is noteworthy for its description of subsections d. and e.,
and their interplay in the assessment of points and the fiveyear
exception. News Release, Office of the Governor (July 24,
2000). Governor Whitman’s news release explained that a “person
convicted of a third or subsequent offense would be subject to a
fine of not less than $200.00 or more than $500.00 and may be
assessed motor vehicle penalty points, if the offense occurs
within five years of the prior offense.” Ibid. The unsafe
driving statute took effect on July 24, 2000. L. 2000, c. 75, §
1.3
3 In 2004, it was amended together with the laws governing the
imposition of surcharges on motor vehicle violators as part of a
plan to boost revenue. L. 2004, c. 69, § 1. An early bill
proposed that, in addition to the fines already imposed under
the unsafe driving statute, an unsafe driving conviction also
would subject the driver to a surcharge “in an amount of $200.00
for a first offense, $350.00 for a second offense occurring
within a ten-year period, and $500.00 for a third offense
occurring within a ten-year period of a prior unsafe driving
conviction.” Assemb. 3114, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004); S. 1714,
13
Our review of that legislative history leads us to the
conclusion that the Legislature meant the words “the prior
offense” in subsection e. to refer to the offense immediately
preceding a “subsequent” offense such as Patel committed in
2007. The Governor’s news release pointedly gives the statute’s
wording such an interpretation. Moreover, that interpretation
is consistent with the apparent policy goals of the Legislature
when enacting this new penalty scheme.
The statute plainly intended to punish those who drive “in
an unsafe manner likely to endanger a person or property,”
without reference to the driver’s mental state. N.J.S.A. 39:4-
97.2(a). The statute was created notwithstanding the existence
211th Leg. (N.J. 2004). That proposed amendment was abandoned
in favor of a flat $250 surcharge on all unsafe driving
convictions as the statute currently requires. As the Committee
explained,
[t]he “unsafe driving” offense . . .
provided for fines, but specified that no
motor vehicle points were to be assessed
until a driver committed his third offense.
This new infraction is being used by a
number of motorists to avoid points and
surcharges. A total of 233,000 motorists
did so in calendar year 2003. This bill
sets the Merit Rating Plan Surcharge for
this offense at $250.
[S. Budget & Appropriations Comm. Statement
to S. Comm. Substitute for S. 1714, 211th
Leg. 1 (N.J. 2004).]
The new surcharge framework was estimated to provide the General
Treasury with “$58 million in additional annual revenue.” Ibid.
14
of a reckless driving statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96, as well as a
careless driving statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97. Absent the fiveyear
exception, the scheme demonstrates a legislative desire to
impose increasing penalties for repetitive violations by unsafe
drivers. That scheme operates on the basis of the number of
violations and the amount of time between each violation. The
leavening in that scheme is the Legislature’s evident desire to
show leniency to certain drivers who commit unsafe driving
offenses. That leniency is demonstrated through the inclusion
of the exemption from points for violations that occur after
more than a five-year hiatus in unsafe driving violations. The
legislative history to Bills 2466 and 2465 also reveals the
policy choice to permit prosecutors to use the unsafe driving
statute as a plea device for avoiding the imposition of points,
while still advancing a fiscal plan to increase the State’s
revenue through surcharges assessed on each and every unsafe
driving offense.
We find that the policies of the Legislature are harmonized
and best advanced by applying the phrase “the prior offense” in
subsection e. to fourth offenders exactly as did the MVC in
Patel’s case, namely by looking at the date of her immediately
preceding third offense and, on finding that it was not more
than five years before her fourth offense in 2007, imposing
points for her fourth violation. The agency’s interpretation is
15
a reasonable construction of the exact language used by the
Legislature and gives meaning to each and every word employed in
the statute. It advances the clearly perceptible, overall
legislative intent to punish drivers with motor vehicle points
for multiple unsafe driving offenses that are close in time
(that is, within five years of each other). And, that policy is
given reasonable effect if subsection e.’s reference to “the
prior offense” refers to the immediately preceding offense.
We find additional support for that interpretation from
examination of the differences in the phrasing and punishment
schemes of other statutes, which suggest that the phrase “the
prior offense” in subsection e. should be interpreted to refer
to the most recent preceding offense. Both the surcharge
statute, N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35, and the 2004 proposed amendments to
the unsafe driving statute, supra note 3, exemplify how the
unsafe driving statute could have been phrased if the
Legislature meant for the phrase, “the prior offense,” to
necessarily encompass all prior offenses within a five-year
period.4 Although the phrasing of the surcharge statute and the
2004 proposed amendments is not dispositive, it is persuasive.
4 If the unsafe driving statute had employed phrasing referring
to a five-year “period,” as the Legislature did in the surcharge
statute and as was advanced in the initial 2004 bills proposed
to amend the unsafe driving statute, Patel’s position might be
more persuasive.
16
In conclusion, the Legislature chose to focus the exemption
by referring to an offense that occurs five years or more after
the prior offense. We hold that the MVC correctly imposed motor
vehicle points on Patel for having a fourth unsafe driving
conviction in 2007, only one year after the date of her prior,
third, unsafe driving offense. She was not entitled to the
exemption from points provided by operation of subsection e. of
the statute.
D.
Although not necessary to the disposition of this appeal
from the imposition of points for Patel’s fourth violation, the
Appellate Division opinion further expressed approval of the
MVC’s interpretation that the statute’s five-year exception was
inapplicable to “third” offenses, and that it may only apply to
a “subsequent” offense, which the panel treated as a term of art
in subsection e. Patel, supra, 403 N.J. Super. at 377-78.
According to the panel, because subsection e. referred to only
“a subsequent offense” and not a “third” offense, the five-year
exception applied only to fourth and further offenses. Ibid.
We see no basis for treating the term “subsequent offense” in
subsection e. as a term of art addressing fourth or later
offenses, but excluding third offenses for purposes of the
imposition of points under subsection d. Although technical
terms or terms of art “‘having a special or accepted meaning in
17
the law, shall be construed in accordance with [that] . . .
meaning,’” Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251, 269
(2008) (alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 1:1-1), we see
no evidence in the plain language, structure, or legislative
history of the unsafe driving statute to support a conclusion
that the Legislature intended any such specialized, restrictive
meaning by its use of the word “subsequent.”
An equally sound, if not better understanding of the
Legislature’s use of “subsequent” in subsection e. is that it is
descriptive and, thus, would apply to both a third and any
ensuing offense that required examination of “the prior offense”
for purposes of determining eligibility for the points
exemption. At best, an argument might be advanced that the
language contained a shadow of ambiguity. But even if we were
to agree with such a proposition, and we do not, application of
the rule of lenity, see, e.g., State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475,
482 (2008), directs us to a different conclusion, one that
favors a driver’s eligibility for the points exemption. Absent
a more explicit direction from the Legislature to outright deny
subsection e.’s exemption to third offenders,5 we reject the
Appellate Division’s contrary suggestion.
5 Indeed, pending in the Legislature is a bill, sponsored by an
original sponsor of the unsafe driving statute, that clarifies
that it is the legislative intent to require that a third
offense occur within five years of a second offense in order for
18
IV.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LONG, ALBIN, WALLACE,
RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.
motor vehicle points to attach to the third offense. See S.
2439, 213th Leg. (N.J. 2008).
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. A-86 SEPTEMBER TERM 2008
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
HINA K. PATEL,
Appellant-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE
COMMISSION,
Respondent-Respondent.
DECIDED November 10, 2009
Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
CHECKLIST AFFIRM
CHIEF JUSTICE
RABNER X
JUSTICE LONG X
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X
JUSTICE ALBIN X
JUSTICE WALLACE X
JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO X
JUSTICE HOENS X
TOTALS 7

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

POLICE CHIEFS / PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTORS MIDDLESEX COUNTY 2009

POLICE CHIEFS / PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTORS MIDDLESEX COUNTY 2009

POLICE Dept. Chief or Director PHONE FAX
Carteret Chief John Pieczyski 732-541-4181 732-541-3867

Cranbury Chief Ed Kahler 609-395-0031 609-395-9216

East Brunswick Director Barry Roberson 732-390-6900 732-390-6970

Edison Chief Thomas Bryan 732-248-7400 732-287-0268

Highland Park Chief Stephen Rizco 732-572-3800 732-572-0258
Jamesburg Chief Martin Horvath 732-521-0011 x205 732-521-1927
Metuchen Chief James Keane 732-632-8500 732-632-8573
Middlesex Boro James Benson 732-356-1900 x222 732-356-7218
Milltown Chief Raymond Geipel 732-828-1100 732-249-5695

Monroe Chief John Kraivec 732-521-0222 732-521-2980

New Brunswick Director Anthony Caputo 732-745-5200 732-565-3602

North Brunswick Director Kenneth McCormick 732-545-3200 732-249-2892

Old Bridge Chief Thomas Collow 732-679-3400 732-607-7937

Perth Amboy Director _____ 732-442-4400 732-442-4492

Piscataway __ 732-562-1100 732-562-2312

Plainsboro Director Richard Furda 609-799-2333 609-275-5987

Sayreville Chief Edward Szkodny 732-727-4444 732-727-5189
South Amboy Chief James Wallis 732-525-5945 732-721-1504
South Brunswick Chief Raymond Hayducka 732-329-4000 732-329-4604

South Plainfield Chief John Ferrero 908-755-0700 908-755-0320

South River Chief Wesley Bomba 732-238-1000 732-613-6103

Spotswood Chief Karl Martin 732-251-2121 732-251-5910

Woodbridge Chief William Trenery 732-634-7700 732-602-7366

Nearby:
Franklin Chief Craig Novick 732-873-2300 732-873-8489

[Police Chief phone & fax numbers Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. Past Chair
Municipal Court Section, NJSBA Non Client G3 [revised 10/14/2009]

11-16-09 STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ECKERT

11-16-09 STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOSEPH ECKERT
A-0216-08T4

A conviction for refusal to submit to a breath examination cannot be merged with a DWI conviction. Such a plea agreement
violated applicable merger principles as well as the Court's Guidelines for Operation of Plea Agreements in the Municipal Courts of New Jersey.



Assistant Editor: Umair Hussain

Saturday, November 14, 2009

KENNETH VERCAMMEN – resume and community involvement

KENNETH VERCAMMEN – resume and community involvement
Attorney at Law
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
732-572-0500
www.njlaws.com
Kenneth Vercammen is an Edison, Middlesex County, NJ trial attorney who has published 125 articles in national and New Jersey publications on probate, estate planning, criminal and litigation topics. He often lectures to trial lawyers of the American Bar Association, New Jersey State Bar Association and Middlesex County Bar Association.
Kenneth Vercammen was the NJ State Bar Municipal Court Attorney of the Year and past president of the Middlesex County Municipal Prosecutor's Association.

 He is the past chair of the NJ State Bar Association Municipal Court Section. He is the Deputy chair of the ABA Criminal Law committee, GP Division. Kenneth Vercammen was selected one of only three attorneys as a Super Lawyer 2009 in NJ Monthly in the Criminal - DWI.
He is a highly regarded lecturer on litigation issues for the American Bar Association, ICLE, New Jersey State Bar Association and Middlesex County Bar Association. His articles have been published by New Jersey Law Journal, ABA Law Practice Management Magazine, and New Jersey Lawyer. He is the Editor in Chief of the New Jersey Municipal Court Law Review. Mr. Vercammen is a recipient of the NJSBA- YLD Service to the Bar Award. He has successfully handled over One thousand Municipal Court and Superior Court matters in the past 18 years.


Since 1985, his primary concentration has been on litigation matters. Mr. Vercammen gained other legal experiences as the Confidential Law Clerk to the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Supreme Court),with the Delaware County, PA District Attorney Office handling Probable Cause Hearings, Middlesex County Probation Dept as a Probation Officer, and an Executive Assistant to Scranton District Magistrate, Thomas Hart, in Scranton, PA. He started his career as a trial attorney for Drazin & Warshaw in Hazlet and Red Bank, NJ, and Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl in North Brunswick.


ADMISSIONS: Admitted In NJ, NY, PA, US Supreme Court and Federal District Court

MANAGING ATTORNEY Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, PC March 1990-Present
Full service Law practice with offices in Edison and Cranbury.

PROSECUTOR Township of Cranbury, Middlesex County, NJ 1991-1999
Municipal Prosecutor for criminal and traffic cases involving Township and State Police
-Acting Assoc. Prosecutor: Carteret Municipal Court, Middlesex County, NJ 2000

EDITOR- NJ MUNICIPAL COURT LAW REVIEW 1993- present

Middlesex County Bar Association 2008 Municipal Court Attorney of the Year

NJ State Bar Association- 2005-2006 Municipal Court Attorney of the Year Award

New Jersey Super Lawyers selection 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006

Who's Who in America 2004

NJ State Bar Association- 2002 General Practitioner of the Year Award

1993 AWARD WINNER "Service to the Bar Award"- New Jersey State Bar Association YLD

RELEVANT LITIGATION SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS:
-Criminal, DWI and Drug Cases- NJ State Bar Annual Meeting 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 01, 00, 99
-Civil Trial Practice- Middlesex Bar 2004
-Personal Injury Litigation- NJ Institute for Continuing Legal Education/ NJ State Bar
2001, 2000,1999,1998,1997,1996,1995,1994,1993,1991
-Municipal Court Handling Serious Cases ICLE/NJSBA-2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002,2001,2000,1998,1997,1995,1994
-NJ Association of Municipal Court Administrators 2002
-Edison Police Auxiliary- Search and Seizure 2002
-New Jersey Network TV- Due Process TV show 2000
-Cablevision TV- Law on the Line 2003, 2001
-Elder Law and Probate NJSBA/ ICLE 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 03,02,01,99,98,97,96

PUBLICATIONS:
Published 150 separate Law Review and Legal Periodical articles in legal journals such as New Jersey Law Journal, American Bar Association Barrister, New Jersey Lawyer, ABA Law Practice Management, and New Jersey State Bar Association's Dictum. Listed on www.njlaws.com.

KENNETH VERCAMMEN, ESQ.

RECENT SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS ON WILLS, ELDER LAW, AND PROBATE
East Brunswick Adult School 2009, 2008
Middlesex County Police Chiefs 2009- Living Wills
Middlesex County College- Wills & Probate 2007
Edison Adult School -Wills, Elder Law & Probate- 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002 [inc Edison TV], 2001, 2000,1999,1998,1997
- Nuts & Bolts of Elder Law - NJ Institute for Continuing Legal Education/ NJ State Bar ICLE/NJSBA 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2000, 1999, 1996
-Elder Law and Estate Planning- American Bar Association New York City 2008, Miami 2007
South Plainfield Seniors- New Probate Law 2005, East Brunswick Seniors- New Probate Law 2005
Old Bridge AARP 2002; Guardian Angeles/ Edison 2002; St. Cecilia/ Woodbridge Seniors 2002;
East Brunswick/ Hall's Corner 2002;
-Linden AARP 2002
-Woodbridge Adult School -Wills and Estate Administration -2001, 2000,1999,1998,1997,1996
Woodbridge Housing 2001; Metuchen Seniors & Metuchen TV 2001; Frigidare/ Local 401 Edison 2001; Chelsea/ East Brunswick 2001, Village Court/ Edison 2001; Old Bridge Rotary 2001; Sacred Heart/ South Amboy 2001; Livingston Manor/ New Brunswick 2001; Sunrise East Brunswick 2001; Strawberry Hill/ Woodbridge 2001;
-Wills and Elder Law - Metuchen Adult School 1999,1997,1996,1995,1994,1993
-Clara Barton Senior Citizens- Wills & Elder Law-Edison 2002, 1995
-AARP Participating Attorney in Legal Plan for NJ AARP members 1999-2005
-Senior Legal Points University of Medicine & Dentistry UMDNJ & St. Peter's-2000, 1999,1998
-East Brunswick AARP Wills 2001; -Iselin/ Woodbridge AARP Wills 2000
-Metuchen Reformed Church; Franklin/ Somerset/ Quailbrook Seniors 2001
-North Brunswick Senior Day 2001
-Wills, Elder Law and Probate-South Brunswick Adult School & Channel 28 TV 1999, 1997,1993
-Wills and Estate Planning-Old Bridge Adult School 1998,1997,1995
-Senior Citizen Law-Perth Amboy YMHA 1995; Temple Beth Or 2002;
-Wills, Living Wills and Probate-Spotswood Community School 1995,1994,1993
-Wills and Probate-Sayreville Adult School 1997, 1996,1995,1994
-Living Wills-New Jersey State Bar Foundation and St. Demetrius, Carteret 1994
-Wills and Estate Planning-Edison Elks and Senior Citizens January 1994
-"Legal Questions Clinic" Metuchen Adult School March 1995,1994,1993
-Estate Planning to Protect Families-Metuchen Chamber of Commerce April 1993

SPECIAL ACTING PROSECUTOR: Woodbridge, East Brunswick, Metuchen, South Brunswick, Perth Amboy, Cranbury, South Plainfield, Clark, South River, Hightstown, Carteret, Jamesburg, Berkeley Heights on conflict matters. Past President- Middlesex Municipal Prosecutor's Association. Previous experience with the Delaware County, Pennsylvania District Attorney Office, Middlesex County Probation Department and Scranton District Magistrate Office.

Metuchen Public Defender 2001- present Edison Public Defender 1990-1991

KENNETH VERCAMMEN- Community Service

NON- PROFIT: -Edison Elks-Presiding Justice 1993- Present
-Y.B. CHOI TAE KWON DO (Korean Karate)- 4th degree Black Belt awarded 2008 3rd degree 2004 ; 2nd degree December 1993, 1st degree Black Belt December 2001
-Raritan Valley Road Runners- Comeback of the Year Award 2002 and ranked Master Distance Runner; state champion 20,000 meter team 2005

New Jersey State Age Group Champion Garden State Games 5,000 meter run 1993
-Bishop Ahr/St. Thomas Aquinas H.S. Alumni Society
Elected Vice-President 1989-1990; Class of 1977- 25 year Reunion Chair
-Edison 14th District Committeeman Elected 1988-1994
-St. Francis Cathedral- Church Lector 1990-1994
-University of Scranton, North Jersey Alumni Chapter Co-Chair, Fall Social 1988
-Knights of Columbus-Fourth Degree Knight, Edison Council
Edison NJ Essay Contest Chair 1992,1993
Metuchen Chamber of Commerce, Past member Edison Chamber of Commerce;
RUNNING:
Raritan Valley Road Runners RVRR Rumson HashHouse Harriers
Central Jersey Road Runners CJRR Jersey Shore Triathlon Club JSTC
Freehold Area Running Club FARC Scranton Area Organization Runners SOAR
Jersey Shore Running Club JSRC USATF- US Athletic Track & Field
Sandy Hook Triathlon Club First Place- Bergen Bar 5k Law Day Run May 2001 South Brunswick Running Group- President First Place- CJRR Summer 5K 2002
First Place: Cocoa Beach 2 mile 2008, 2007; Cranford Run for Lupus 4 mile 2006, JSRC Twilight run 2006. Indian Trials Middletown 3m 2005,2004; Stroudsburg 5k 2005, 2004; Wildwood 5k, Ocean Winter 4 mile, Edison Lannie 5k, 2004; Washington DC Run for Justice 5K 2002
CJRR Age group champ 2005,2004, 2002, 1996, 1995
New York Marathon top 100 NJ Finisher

ACTIVITIES: Married 1989, one son born 1991, daughter born 1994
Weekend Road Running Races, Triathlons, Soccer
Tae Kwon Do Karate

SOUTH BRUNSWICK AREA
Summer Blast/Ireland Brook Neighborhood Sponsor
So. Brunswick Soccer Asst. Coach Travel 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999, 98
So. Brunswick Athletic Assoc.-Team Sponsor and helper with son's team
So. Brunswick Viking 5k- volunteer
South Brunswick 5K running Race volunteer
So. Brunswick Bicentennial Volunteer
Neighborhood Picnic Sponsor 1998-2009
So. Brunswick 50 Mile Bike Volunteer and 50 mile Finisher
Holt for Congress Volunteer

CHARITABLE: American Cancer Society-Chairman
Annual Summer Fundraiser Picnic- 1987,88,89,90,91,92
Chairman, Annual Christmas Fundraiser- 1987,88,89,90,911,92
Recipient-Young Professionals Award-Sept. 1988, Sept. 1989
Board of Manager's - 1989-1994 Founder and Chair-Young Professionals Group

KENNETH VERCAMMEN, ESQ. Education & Awards

LEGAL EDUCATION: The Widener/ Delaware Law School, J.D., May 1985
Class Rank: Top Ten Percent
Awards: Honor Grades: Federal Income Tax, Business Organization, Criminal Law, Advanced Advocacy, Family Law, New Jersey Practice, Unfair Trade Practices, Professional Liability.
Outstanding Service Award Recipient in Graduation Ceremony
Delaware Merit Scholarship - 1983, 1984
Provincial Winner - Phi Delta Phi Legal Honor Fraternity Graduate of the Year Award
Who's Who in American Law Schools

ACTIVITIES:
Law Review- Senior Staff-Member
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Senior Editor 1984-1985
Winner - Sixth Annual Trial Advocacy Competition
First Prize - Delaware Law School/ATLA Environmental Law Essay Contest
Delaware Law Forum, Casenote Editor

Working Scholar- Hon. Philip Gruccio, Assignment Judge of Atlantic, Cumberland, Cape May, Salem Counties
Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Delaware Chapter Treasurer
Law School Running Club - President
Research Assistant - Dean Arthur Weeks
Publications- Published in Law Review and wrote more articles than 75% of law faculty members

PRELEGAL EDUCATION: University of Scranton B.S., January 1981
Major: Political Science: Graduated Cum Laude in 3-1/2 years
Honors:
- Cited in Who's Who in American Colleges and Universities;
- Dean's List; Pi Gamma Mu Honor Society; Pi Sigma Alpha Honor Society.
- Varsity Cross- Country - Team Captain and Record Holder of Indoor Half-Mile
- District Magistrate Thomas Hart- Paid Law Clerk/ Executive Assistant
- Pre-Law Society Public Relations Director
- Voter Registration Drive Coordinator
- Internship with Pa. Representative Hon. Fred Belardi
- School Newspaper Staff and Sportswriter
- WYRE radio station sports caster
- 3rd Place Wrestling Tournament
- Campus Bowl Intellectual Competition (Team Captain)
- Trustee Day Volunteer, Red Cross Blood Drive Volunteer
- Senior Class - Hard Rockers Social Committee Chair
-Alumni Society-Estate Planning Council 1997-Present
- Class of 1981 20 year Reunion Executive Committee member 2001 -25 Year Reunion Co-chair


KENNETH VERCAMMEN
Attorney at Law
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
732-572-0500
The American Bar Association is the largest voluntary professional organization in the world with more than 400,000 members

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION - National Appointments:

General Practice Solo & Small Firm Division
-Estate Planning, Probate & Trust Committee- Chair 2008-2009, 2006-2007
-Elder Law Committee Chair 2005- present, Vice Chair 1996-1999
- Criminal Law Committee Deputy Chair 2006-present
- Tort, Personal Injury and Insurance Committee Chair 2005- 2006
-Deputy Chair and Newsletter Editor-GP Marketing Legal Services Committee 1993 -1996
- Probate & Estate Planning Committee- Newsletter Editor & Vice Chair 1997-1999, Vice Chair 2005
-Litigation Committee Member 1993 - present

BUSINESS AND AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS:
-Elder Law, Estate and Probate ABA Chicago Annual Meeting
-Elder Law and Probate New York City 2008 Annual Meeting
- Improving Your Elder Law & Estate Practice San Francisco, CA 2007
-Elder Law and Estate Planning- ABA Miami 2007
-Elder Law Practice, New Ethical Ideas to Improve Your Practice for Clients ABA Hawaii 2006
-Marketing Success Stories ABA Toronto 1998
-Opening a Business-Sayreville Adult School 1997,1996,1995
-Olympians of Marketing- ABA Annual Meeting-Orlando, Florida 1996
-Unique Marketing Techniques & Client Relations III ABA Annual Meeting-Chicago 1995
-Starting a Business-Brooklyn Bar Association 1995,1994
-Personal Marketing & Relations - 1995 Miami ABA meeting LPM Personal Marketing Skills IG
co-sponsored by four Major National Bar Sections and committees
-How to Start a Practice-1994 New Orleans ABA Annual Meeting LPM primary sponsor
-1993 New York Annual Meeting "Marketing for Small Firms"

LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT SECTION ABA- LPM
-Co-Chair with Jay Foonberg-ABA LPM Personal Marketing Skills Group 1998,1997,1996,1995,1994
-Speaker at many ABA Annual Meetings
-National Liaison and ex-officio member of Law Practice Management Section Council 1993 - 1995
-National Chair - Law Practice Management Committee YLD 1992-1993
-Chair and Newsletter Editor-Marketing Legal Services Committee 1996-1997,1999-2000
ABA Attendance at Leadership Conferences and participation at following Annual and Sectional meetings: Chicago 2009, New York 2008, Philadelphia GP 2007, San Francisco 2007, Washington GP 2007, Miami 2007, Hawaii 2006, Philadelphia LPM 2005; Washington DC 2002; Philadelphia 2002; London 2000, New York 2000, Atlanta 1999, Beverly Hills 1999, Cancun LPM 1998, Naples-LPM 1997; Captiva 1996, Orlando 1996, Coronado LPM 1995, Chicago 1995, Miami 1995, Washington D.C. GP 1995, Vancouver LPM 1995, New Orleans 1995, Napa, CA LPM 1994, Colorado LPM 1993, New York 1993, Boston 1993, San Francisco 1992, Cleveland GP 1992, Scottsdale AZ 1991, Los Angeles 1990, Hawaii 1989, Philadelphia 1988, Toronto 1988, New York City 1986, Washington DC 1985


KENNETH VERCAMMEN
Attorney at Law
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
732-572-0500
New Jersey State Bar Association- Municipal Court Section Chair 2003-2004, Vice Chair 1999-2002; Chair of Municipal Court Education Committee 1996-Present
Middlesex County Bar Association Chair Municipal Court Practice Committee 1997-2008
County Bar Board of Trustees 2000- 2006

New Jersey State Bar Association -General Practice Section-Board of Directors 1995- Present

ADJUNCT PROFESSOR Middlesex County College
Edison, NJ February, 2001-April, 2001; Jan. 1990-May, 1991
Instructor of "Criminal Law and Procedure" and Business Law. Taught college students the elements of crime and the criminal procedure system. Explained the incidents before and after trial and analyzed the impact of the Constitution on crimes and criminal procedures.

New Jersey Superior Court - Certified Mediator 1997-

New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Municipal Courts 2000-2005

Other Speaking
-Update of Municipal Court-NJSBA Annual Meeting Atlantic City 1999,1997, 95, 94
- Cranbury Twp Municipal Alliance Against Substance Abuse 2004, 2002
-ATLA-NJ - New Jersey Courts 1991
-Intoxicated Driver Resource Center/IDRC - DUI Law 1999, 1991
-Preventing the Impaired Driver-Coalition Against Impaired Drivers 1992
-Winning Lawsuit Threshold Cases NJSBA 1992
-WCTC Radio Mid-Day Legal Advisor - Criminal and Traffic Laws 1991 and 1990
-Computers in Litigation-NJSBA Law Office Management 1994
-Self Defense Law in New Jersey - Cranbury Police Dept. 1997,1993,1992

Self Defense and Home Protection - Speaker - New Brunswick Crime Watch - 1989
-Wills and Power of Attorney 1991 Edison Democratic Association
Defending Speeding Cases - New Jersey State Bar Association/NJSBA - 1989
-Family Law & Domestic Violence Trial Practice NJ State Bar Association 1995,1994,1993
-Automobile Insurance - Middlesex County College - 1990
-Criminal & Juvenile Courts Piscataway Vo Tech – 1990
-Living Wills-Dean Witter and Nordstroms, Menlo Park Mall October 1992; Trusts and Living Wills-Dean Witter, Metro Park, June 1992; Estate Planning-North Brunswick Republican Club May 1992;

Make a Wish Foundation- Co Chair 19th Annual Summer Blast 1994 in Belmar, NJ
Co Chair Christmas Fundraiser 1993
Jersey Shore Medical Center Chair-18th Annual Summer Blast to Benefit the Jersey Shore Regional
Trauma Center at Bar Anticipation, Belmar 1993
American Red Cross Elected to Board of Directors 1988-1991

Wednesday, November 11, 2009

11-10-09 Hina K. Patel v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission

11-10-09 Hina K. Patel v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission
(A-86-08)

Under N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(e), the exemption provision
for assessing motor vehicle penalty points for an
unsafe driving offense that occurs more than five
years after “the prior offense,” “the prior offense”
refers only to the most recent preceding offense
based on both a plain reading of the statute and a
review of the legislative history. Thus, the Motor
Vehicle Commission correctly imposed motor vehicle
points on Patel for having a fourth unsafe driving
conviction in 2007, only one year after the date of
her prior, third, unsafe driving offense.


Assistant Editor: Umair Hussain

Wednesday, October 28, 2009

"Drunk Driving Victim's Bill of Rights."

This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Drunk Driving Victim's Bill of Rights."

L. 1985, c. 442, s. 1.

39:4-50.10. "Victim" defined
As used in this act, "victim" means, unless otherwise indicated, a person who suffers personal physical or psychological injury or death or incurs loss of or injury to personal or real property as a result of a motor vehicle accident involving another person's driving while under the influence of drugs or alcohoL. In the event of a death, "victim" means the surviving spouse, a child or the next of kin.

L. 1985, c. 442, s. 2.

39:4-50.11. Victims' rights
Victims shall have the right to:

a. Make statements to law enforcement officers regarding the facts of the motor vehicle accident and to reasonable use of a telephone;

b. Receive medical assistance for injuries resulting from the accident;

c. Contact the investigating officer and see copies of the accident reports and, in the case of a surviving spouse, child or next of kin, the autopsy reports;

d. Be provided by the court adjudicating the offense, upon the request of the victim in writing, with:

(1) Information about their role in the court process;

(2) Timely advance notice of the date, time and place of the defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer, submission to the court of any plea agreement, the trial and sentencing;

(3) Timely notification of the case disposition, including the trial and sentencing;

(4) Prompt notification of any decision or action in the case which results in the defendant's provisional or final release from custody; and

(5) Information about the status of the case at any time from the commission of the offense to final disposition or release of the defendant;

e. Receive, when requested from any law enforcement agency involved with the offense, assistance in obtaining employer cooperation in minimizing loss of pay and other benefits resulting from their participation in the court process;

f. A secure waiting area, after the motor vehicle accident, during investigations, and prior to a court appearance;

g. Submit to the court adjudicating the offense a written or oral statement to be considered in deciding upon sentencing and probation terms. This statement may include the nature and extent of any physical harm or psychological or emotional harm or trauma suffered by the victim, the extent of any loss of earnings or ability to work suffered by the victim and the effect of the offense upon the victim's family.

When a need is demonstrated, the information in this section shall be provided in the Spanish as well as the English language.

L. 1985, c. 442, s. 3.

39:4-50.12. Consultation with prosecutor
A victim shall be provided with an opportunity to consult with the prosecutor prior to dismissal of the case or the filing of a proposed plea negotiation with the court, if the victim sustained bodily injury or serious bodily injury as defined in N.J.S. 2C:11-1.

Nothing contained herein shall be construed to alter or limit the authority or discretion of the prosecutor to enter into any plea agreement which the prosecutor deems appropriate.

L. 1985, c. 442, s. 4.

39:4-50.13. Tort Claims Act rights
Nothing contained in the act shall mitigate any right which the victim may have pursuant to the "New Jersey Tort Claims Act" (N.J.S. 59:1-1 et seq.).

L. 1985, c. 442, s. 5.

12:7-82 Revocation, suspension of privilege to operate power vessel; conditions.

12:7-82 Revocation, suspension of privilege to operate power vessel; conditions.

13. a. A court may revoke or suspend the privilege of a person to operate a power vessel if that person has been convicted of homicide in connection with the operation of a motor vehicle or of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit producing drug.

b.A court may revoke or suspend the privilege of a person to operate a power vessel if that person has been charged with a homicide in connection with the operation of a motor vehicle or of operating a vessel or motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit producing drug, pending disposition of that charge, or for any other violation of any of the provisions of chapter 7 of Title 12 of the Revised Statutes or of any rule or regulation prescribed thereunder by the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission or the commission.

c.A court shall revoke or suspend the privilege of a person to operate a power vessel if that person has been charged with or convicted of homicide in connection with the operation of a vessel.

d.When a person's privilege to operate a power vessel is revoked or suspended, that person shall have an opportunity to be heard. Attendance of witnesses to such hearing may be compelled by subpoena.

e.Failure of the licensee or any other person possessing the license card to deliver the same to the suspending or revoking court, or the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission if so ordered, shall constitute a violation. A court that suspends or revokes a license shall promptly place the license card in the custody of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission, except when the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission shall otherwise direct.

f.The New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission shall have the exclusive power to restore a person's privilege to operate a power vessel and may restore that privilege after the person pays to the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission a $100 restoration fee. Unless otherwise specified, whenever a license is revoked pursuant to this section a new license shall not be issued to the person whose license is revoked for at least six months after the date of such revocation, as determined by the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission.

g.The court may revoke or suspend the privilege of a person to operate a power vessel if that person has been found to have violated section 3 of P.L.1975, c.369 (C.12:7C-9) or subsection b. of section 10 of P.L.1975, c.369 (C.12:7C-16), and all outstanding charges for vessel removal, storage, and destruction costs have not been satisfied.

L.1995, c.401, s.13; amended 2008, c.52, s.3.

12:7-83.Violations, penalties
14. a. A person whose privilege, including any license or numbering, to operate a power vessel or a vessel that is 12 feet or greater in length has been suspended, revoked or prohibited shall not operate such a vessel on the waters of this State.

b.A person violating subsection a. of this section shall be subject to the following penalties:

(1)upon conviction for a first offense, a fine of $500;

(2)upon conviction for a second offense, a fine of $750 and a term of imprisonment not to exceed five days;

(3)upon conviction for a third offense and each subsequent offense, a fine of $1,000 and a term of imprisonment not to exceed 10 days.

c. In addition to the penalties prescribed in subsection b. of this section, a court shall suspend or extend the suspension of the operating privileges, for a period not to exceed six months, of a person who violates subsection a. of this section.

d. In addition to the penalties prescribed in subsections b. and c. of this section, a court may impose a term of imprisonment not to exceed 45 days, if while operating a vessel in violation of subsection a. of this section a person causes an accident resulting in personal injury to another person.

e.In addition to the penalties prescribed in subsections b., c. and d. of this section, any person violating subsection a. of this section while under a suspension issued pursuant to section 3 of P.L.1952, c.157 (C.12:7-46) upon conviction shall be fined $500, shall have his privilege to operate a vessel suspended for an additional period of not less than one year nor more than two years, and may be imprisoned for a term not to exceed 90 days.

f.Any period of suspension imposed by a court under this section that would continue beyond September 30 of any calendar year shall be interrupted on that date and shall be completed after April 30 of the following year.

L.1995,c.401,s.14.

12:7-84.Payment of fines
15.All fines imposed under chapter 7 of Title 12 of the Revised Statutes shall be paid to the court imposing the fines. Within 30 days after receipt, the court shall then transmit such fines to the Treasurer of the State of New Jersey for deposit into the State General Fund.

39:4-203. General penalty for violations of chapter TRAFFIC TICKETS

39:4-203. General penalty for violations of chapter
For a violation of a provision of this chapter or any supplement thereto for which no specific penalty is provided, the offender shall be liable to a penalty of not more than $50.00 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 15 days, or both; except that for a violation of a section of article 11, 13, 14 or 17 of this chapter or any supplement thereto for which no specific penalty is provided, the offender shall be liable to a penalty of not less than $50.00 or more than $200.00 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 15 days, or both.

NJAC 13:19-10.7 Court ruling

NJAC 13:19-10.7 Court ruling


The provisions of this subchapter shall not be affected by any revocation or suspension judicially imposed, except that no lesser period of revocation or suspension shall be imposed than that directed by the court.

Chapter Notes

NJAC 13:19-10.6 Restoration; official warning; completion of Driver Improvement or Probationary Driver Program

§ 13:19-10.6 Restoration; official warning; completion of Driver Improvement or Probationary Driver Program


(a) Persons whose licenses are restored after a suspension imposed under 13:19-10.2 or after a suspension imposed under this section, persons who are officially warned after an administrative hearing, and persons who successfully complete a Commission Driver Improvement Program or Probationary Driver Program may retain their licenses upon the express condition and understanding that any subsequent violation of the Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law of the State of New Jersey committed within one year of the restoration, official warning, or warning following successful completion of a Driver Improvement or Probationary Driver Program shall, except for good cause, result in suspension of driving privileges for the following periods:

1. When the subsequent violation occurs within six months of the date of the restoration, official warning or warning following completion of a Driver Improvement or Probationary Driver Program--90 days;

2. When the subsequent violation occurs more than six months but less than nine months after the restoration, official warning or warning following completion of a Driver Improvement or Probationary Driver Program--60 days;

3. When the subsequent violation occurs more than nine months but less than one year after the restoration, official warning or warning following completion of a Driver Improvement or Probationary Driver Program--45 days.

(b) A second violation of the Motor Vehicle Laws committed within one year of the restoration, official warning or warning following successful completion of a Driver Improvement or Probationary Driver Program shall, except for good cause, result in suspension of driving privileges for the following periods:

1. When the second violation occurs within six months of the date of the restoration, official warning or warning following completion of a Driver Improvement or Probationary Driver Program--180 days.

2. When the second violation occurs more than six months but less than nine months after the restoration, official warning or warning following completion of a Driver Improvement or Probationary Driver Program--120 days.

3. When the second violation occurs more than nine months but less than one year after the restoration, official warning or warning following completion of a Driver Improvement or Probationary Driver Program--90 days.

(c) Persons licensed on a probationary basis in accordance with N.J.S.A. 39:3-10b who have been subject to a license suspension action under (a) or (b) above may be required to successfully complete additional programs of driver rehabilitation within the discretion of the Chief Administrator.


HISTORY:

As amended, R.1983 d.360, effective September 6, 1983.

See: 15 New Jersey Register 1004(a), 15 New Jersey Register 1481(b).

Added new (b) and recodified old (b) as (c).

Amended by R.1994 d.468, effective September 19, 1994.

See: 26 New Jersey Register 2738(a), 26 New Jersey Register 3873(a).

Amended by R.2005 d.47, effective February 7, 2005.

See: 36 New Jersey Register 4005(a), 37 New Jersey Register 505(a).

In (a), substituted "Commission" for "Division" and inserted "and Traffic" following "Motor Vehicle" in the introductory paragraph; in (c), substituted "Chief Administrator" for "Director".

Chapter Notes

NJAC 13:19-10.5 Reductions of point accumulation

§ 13:19-10.5 Reductions of point accumulation


Points recorded against the licensee shall be reduced in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.9.


HISTORY:

As amended, R.1983 d.360, effective September 6, 1983.

See: 15 New Jersey Register 1004(a), 15 New Jersey Register 1481(b).

Deleted old text and added new text.

Chapter Notes

NJAC 13:19-10.4 Advisory notice

§ 13:19-10.4 Advisory notice


(a) Whenever a person accumulates six or more points, the Commission shall send an official notice advising the motorist of such status.

(b) Whenever a person who is licensed on a probationary basis in accordance with N.J.S.A. 39:3-10b is first convicted of a motor vehicle violation requiring the assessment of points against the individual's driving record under 13:19-10.1, the Commission shall send an official notice advising the motorist of the status of the driving record.


HISTORY:

As amended, R.1983 d.360, effective September 6, 1983.

See: 15 New Jersey Register 1004(a), 15 New Jersey Register 1481(b).

Amended by R.2005 d.47, effective February 7, 2005.

See: 36 New Jersey Register 4005(a), 37 New Jersey Register 505(a).

In (b), deleted "(Point assessment)" following the N.J.A.C. reference; substituted "Commission" for "Division" throughout.

Chapter Notes

NJAC 13:19-10.3 Driver improvement program attendance

§ 13:19-10.3 Driver improvement program attendance


(a) A person who is permitted to attend a driver improvement program of the Motor Vehicle Commission in total or partial satisfaction of suspension or revocation shall agree to attend each session of the assigned driver improvement program and to comply with all rules governing attendance, conduct, instruction, and examinations. A person who fails to comply with the foregoing requirements or who otherwise fails to successfully complete the assigned driver improvement program shall be subject to a driver license suspension for the period contained in the notice of proposed suspension. A person who successfully completes the assigned driver improvement program shall be officially warned with respect to future driving.

(b) A person whose driver license has been suspended, pursuant to 13:19-10.2 may be required to attend and successfully complete a driver improvement program of the Motor Vehicle Commission as a condition for restoration of the driver license.

(c) The fee for attendance at a Motor Vehicle Commission driver improvement program shall be $ 150.00.

(d) The Chief Administrator is authorized to exercise discretionary authority to require any person who is licensed on a probationary basis in accordance with N.J.S.A. 39:3-10b to attend a Probationary Driver Program whenever said person accumulates two or more violations of the motor vehicle law which result in the assessment of four or more points under 13:19-10.1.

(e) A person who is required to attend a Probationary Driver Program shall agree to attend each session of the program and to comply with all rules governing attendance, conduct, instruction, and examinations. A person who fails to comply with the foregoing requirements or who otherwise fails to successfully complete the Probationary Driver Program shall be subject to a driver license suspension for the period contained in the notice of proposed suspension. A person who successfully completes the Probationary Driver Program shall be officially warned with respect to future driving.

(f) The fee for attendance at a Motor Vehicle Commission probationary driver program shall be $ 150.00.


HISTORY:

As amended, R.1983 d.360, effective September 6, 1983.

See: 15 N.J.R. 1004(a), 15 N.J.R. 1481(b).

Increased driver improvement program fee from $ 20.00 to $ 40.00.

Amended by R.1994 d.468, effective September 19, 1994.

See: 26 N.J.R. 2738(a), 26 N.J.R. 3873(a).

Amended by R.1995 d.365, effective July 3, 1995.

See: 27 N.J.R. 1521(b), 27 N.J.R. 2592(b).

Increased the fees for attendance at the driver improvement program and probationary driver program from "$ 40.00" to "$ 100.00".

Amended by R.2005 d.47, effective February 7, 2005.

See: 36 N.J.R. 4005(a), 37 N.J.R. 505(a).

In (b), deleted "(Point accumulation; periods of suspension)" following the N.J.A.C. reference; in (d), substituted "Chief Administrator" for "Director" and deleted "(Point assessment)" following the N.J.A.C. reference; substituted "Motor Vehicle Commission" for "Division of Motor Vehicles" throughout.

Amended by R.2009 d.219, effective July 6, 2009.

See: 41 N.J.R. 862(a), 41 N.J.R. 2681(a).

In (c) and (f), updated the fee amounts.

Chapter Notes

NJAC 13:19-10.2 Point accumulation; period of suspension

§ 13:19-10.2 Point accumulation; period of suspension


(a) The Chief Administrator shall, except for good cause, suspend a person's license to operate a motor vehicle and/or motorized bicycle in accordance with the following schedule:

Points Accumulated Period of Suspension


1. 12 to 15 points in a period of two years
30 days
or less
2. 16 to 18 points in a period of two years
60 days
or less
3. 19 to 21 points in a period of two years
90 days
or less
4. 22 to 24 points in a period of two years
120 days
or less
5. 25 to 27 points in a period of two years
150 days
or less
6. 28 or more points in a period of two
not less than 180 days
years or less
7. 15 to 18 points in a period greater than
30 days
two years
8. 19 to 22 points in a period greater than
60 days
two years
9. 23 to 26 points in a period greater than
90 days
two years
10. 27 to 30 points in a period greater than
120 days
two years
11. 31 to 35 points in a period greater than
150 days
two years
12. 36 points in a period greater than two
not less than 180 days
years
13. 12 to 14 points in a period greater than
30 days
two years


(b) For good cause shown, the Chief Administrator may in his or her discretion permit a person to attend a driver improvement program of the Motor Vehicle Commission in total or partial satisfaction of a period of suspension imposed under (a) above. In exercising his or her discretion, the Chief Administrator shall consider the person's driving record, prior warnings or driver improvement program attendance, maturity and any other aggravating or mitigating factor.


HISTORY:

As amended, R.1983 d.360, effective September 6, 1983.

See: 15 New Jersey Register 1004(a), 15 New Jersey Register 1481(b).

Deleted old text and added new text.

Amended by R.2005 d.47, effective February 7, 2005.

See: 36 New Jersey Register 4005(a), 37 New Jersey Register 505(a).

In (a), substituted "Chief Administrator" for "Director" in the introductory paragraph; rewrote (b).

Chapter Notes

§ 13:19-10.1 Point assessment

§ 13:19-10.1 Point assessment


Any person who is convicted of any of the following offenses, including offenses committed while operating a motorized bicycle, shall be assessed points for each conviction in accordance with the following schedule:

Section Number Offense Points



1. N.J.S.A. 27:23-29 Moving against traffic--New Jersey
2
Turnpike, Garden State Parkway, and
Atlantic City Expressway
2. N.J.S.A. 27:23-29 Improper passing--New Jersey
4
Turnpike, Garden State Parkway, and
Atlantic City Expressway
3. N.J.S.A. 27:23-29 Unlawful use of median strip--New
2
Jersey Turnpike, Garden State
Parkway, and Atlantic City Expressway
4. N.J.S.A. 39:3-20 Operating constructor vehicle in
3
excess of 45 mph
5. N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.3 Operating motorized bicycle on a
2
restricted highway
6. N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.3d More than one person on a motorized
2
bicycle
7. N.J.S.A. 39:4-35 Failure to yield to pedestrian in
2
crosswalk
8. N.J.S.A. 39:4-36 Failure to yield to pedestrian in
2
crosswalk; Passing a vehicle
yielding to pedestrian in crosswalk
9. N.J.S.A. 39:4-41 Driving through safety zone
2
10. N.J.S.A. 39:4-52 and 39:5C-1 Racing on highway
5
11. N.J.S.A. 39:4-55 Improper action or omission on
2
grades and curves
12. N.J.S.A. 39:4-57 Failure to observe direction of
2
officer
13. N.J.S.A. 39:4-66 Failure to stop vehicle before
2
crossing sidewalk
14. N.J.S.A. 39:4-66.1 Failure to yield to pedestrians or
2
vehicles while entering or leaving
highway
15. N.J.S.A. 39:4-66.2 Operating a motor vehicle on public
2
or private property to avoid a
traffic control signal or sign
16. N.J.S.A. 39:4-71 Operating a motor vehicle on a
2
sidewalk
17. N.J.S.A. 39:4-80 Failure to obey direction of officer
2
18. N.J.S.A. 39:4-81 Failure to observe traffic signals
2
19. N.J.S.A. 39:4-82 Failure to keep right
2
20. N.J.S.A. 39:4-82.1 Improper operating of vehicle on
2
divided highway or divider
21. N.J.S.A. 39:4-83 Failure to keep right at intersection
2
22. N.J.S.A. 39:4-84 Failure to pass right of vehicle
5
proceeding in opposite direction
23. N.J.S.A. 39:4-85 Improper passing on right or off
4
roadway
24. N.J.S.A. 39:4-85.1 Wrong way on a one-way street
2
25. N.J.S.A. 39:4-86 Improper passing in no passing zone
4
26. N.J.S.A. 39:4-87 Failure to yield to overtaking
2
vehicle
27. N.J.S.A. 39:4-88 Failure to observe traffic lanes
2
28. N.J.S.A. 39:4-89 Tailgating
5
29. N.J.S.A. 39:4-90 Failure to yield at intersection
2
30. N.J.S.A. 39:4-90.1 Failure to use proper entrances to
2
limited access highways
31. N.J.S.A. 39:4-91 and 39:4-92 Failure to yield to emergency
2
vehicles
32. N.J.S.A. 39:4-96 Reckless driving
5
33. N.J.S.A. 39:4-97 Careless driving
2
34. N.J.S.A. 39:4-97a Destruction of agricultural or
2
recreational property
35. N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.1 Slow speed blocking traffic
2
36. N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2 Driving in an unsafe manner (points
4
only assessed for the third or
subsequent violation(s) within a
five year period)
37. N.J.S.A. 39:4-98 and 39:4-99 Exceeding maximum speed 1-14 mph
2
over limit
Exceeding maximum speed 15-29 mph
4
over limit
Exceeding maximum speed 30 mph or
5
more over limit
38. N.J.S.A. 39:4-105 Failure to stop for traffic light
2
39. N.J.S.A. 39:4-115 Improper turn at traffic light
3
40. N.J.S.A. 39:4-119 Failure to stop at flashing red
2
signal
41. N.J.S.A. 39:4-122 Failure to stop for police whistle
2
42. N.J.S.A. 39:4-123 Improper right or left turn
3
43. N.J.S.A. 39:4-124 Improper turn from approved turning
3
course
44. N.J.S.A. 39:4-125 Improper "U" turn
3
45. N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 Failure to give proper signal
2
46. N.J.S.A. 39:4-127 Improper backing or turning in street
2
47. N.J.S.A. 39:4-127.1 Improper crossing of railroad grade
2
crossing
48. N.J.S.A. 39:4-127.2 Improper crossing of bridge
2
49. N.J.S.A. 39:4-128 Improper crossing of railroad grade
2
crossing by certain vehicles
50. N.J.S.A. 39:4-128.1 Improper passing of school bus
5
51. N.J.S.A. 39:4-128.4 Improper passing of a frozen dessert
4
truck
52. N.J.S.A. 39:4-129 Leaving the scene of an accident
No personal injury
2
Personal injury
8
53. N.J.S.A. 39:4-144 Failure to observe "stop" or "yield"
2
signs
54. N.J.S.A. 39:5D-4 Moving violation Out-of-State
2



HISTORY:

As amended, R.1983 d.360, effective September 6, 1983.

See: 15 New Jersey Register 1004(a), 15 New Jersey Register 1481(b).

Old point assessment list deleted and new list added.

Amended by R.1985 d.599, effective November 18, 1985.

See: 17 New Jersey Register 2231(a), 17 New Jersey Register 2780(a).

Added new 34. Renumbered old 34 through 52 to 35 through 53.

Amended by R.1993 d.486, effective October 4, 1993.

See: 25 New Jersey Register 2646(a), 25 New Jersey Register 4599(b).

Amended by R.1994 d.468, effective September 19, 1994.

See: 26 New Jersey Register 2738(a), 26 New Jersey Register 3873(a).

Amended by R.2001 d.357, effective October 1, 2001.

See: 33 New Jersey Register 1340(b), 33 New Jersey Register 3453(b).

Added new 36; recodified old 36 through 53 as 37 through 54.

Administrative correction.

See: 33 New Jersey Register 3907(a).

Amended by R.2005 d.47, effective February 7, 2005.

See: 36 New Jersey Register 4005(a), 37 New Jersey Register 505(a).

Substituted "45" for "30" in Section Number 4 of the table.

Chapter Notes

17:29C-7 Notice of cancellation; reasons.

17:29C-7 Notice of cancellation; reasons.

2. (A) A notice of cancellation of a policy shall be effective only if it is based on one or more of the following reasons:

(a)Nonpayment of premium or nonpayment of a residual market equalization charge imposed pursuant to the provisions of section 20 of P.L.1983, c.65 (C.17:30E-8); or

(b)The driver's license or motor vehicle registration of the named insured or of any other operator who either resides in the same household or customarily operates an automobile insured under the policy has been under suspension or revocation during the policy period or, if the policy is a renewal, during its policy period; or

(c)Knowingly providing materially false or misleading information in connection with any application for insurance, renewal of insurance or claim for benefits under an insurance policy; or

(d)The insurer determines, within 60 days of issuance of the policy, that the named insurer does not meet the approved underwriting rules of the insured then in effect.

(B) (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2003, c.89.)

(C) (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2003, c.89.)

(D) This section shall not apply to nonrenewal.

(E) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to limit the ability of an insurer to void a policy ab initio as otherwise provided by law.

(F) The commissioner shall adopt rules and regulations necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this section.

L.1968,c.158,s.2; amended 1988, c.119, s.27; 2003, c.89, s.61.

17:29C-7.1. Refusal to renew, conditions

26. a. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 3 of P.L.1972, c.70 (C.39:6A-3), a licensed insurer may, in accordance with subsections b. and c. of this section, refuse to renew a policy of private passenger automobile insurance that provides coverage required to be maintained pursuant to P.L.1972, c.70 (C.39:6A-1 et seq.), except that no insurer shall refuse to renew a policy pursuant to subsections b. and c. of this section:

(1) in an amount in excess of 20% of the entire private passenger automobile insurance book of business of any one producer in force with the insurer at the end of the previous calendar year. For purposes of this paragraph, "producer" means a person licensed pursuant to P.L.1987, c.293 (C.17:22A-1 et seq.), who earned $10,000 or more from the insurer in the prior calendar year; and

(2) unless the insured or operator insured under the policy in the five years immediately preceding renewal has had at least two of the following or any combination thereof: (a) an at-fault accident; or (b) a moving violation which was assessed at least four automobile insurance eligibility points; or (c) had been required, but failed, to maintain coverage mandated by section 4 of P.L.1972, c.70 (C.39:6A-4) without lapse.

b. For each calendar year period, an insurer may issue notices of intention not to renew an automobile insurance policy in the voluntary market in an amount not to exceed 2% of the total number of voluntary market automobile insurance policies of the insurer, rounded to the nearest whole number, which are in force at the end of the previous calendar year in each of the insurer's rating territories in use in this State.

c. For every two newly insured automobiles which an insurer voluntarily writes in each territory during each calendar year period, the insurer shall be permitted to refuse to renew insurance on one additional automobile in that territory in excess of the 2% limitation established by subsection b. of this section, subject to a fair and nondiscriminatory formula developed by rule or regulation of the commissioner. The provisions of this subsection shall only apply to an insurer whose aggregate voluntary market share in an automobile insurance urban enterprise zone is reasonably proportionate to the insurer's voluntary Statewide market share as determined by the commissioner by regulation or in a rating territory in which the insurer demonstrates growth in the aggregate number of in-force exposures.

d. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any cancellation made pursuant to subsection (A) of section 2 of P.L.1968, c.158 (C.17:29C-7).

e. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.1997, c.151.)

f. Nothing in this section shall prohibit an insurer from refusing to renew, in addition to nonrenewals permitted in subsections b. and c. of this section, the policy of any insured who has: (1) provided false or misleading information in connection with any application for insurance, renewal of insurance or claim for benefits under an insurance policy; or (2) who has failed to provide, after written request by an insurer, the minimum information necessary to accurately rate the policy under terms and conditions set forth by the commissioner in regulations .

L.1988,c.119,s.26; amended 1997, c.151, s.27..

17:29C-8. Time for notice
No notice of cancellation of a policy to which section 2 applies shall be effective unless mailed or delivered by the insurer to the named insured at least 20 days prior to the effective date of cancellation; provided, however, that where cancellation is for nonpayment of premium at least 15 days' notice of cancellation accompanied by the reason therefor shall be given. Unless the reason accompanies or is included in the notice of cancellation, the notice of cancellation shall state or be accompanied by a statement that upon written request of the named insured, mailed or delivered to the insurer not less than 15 days prior to the effective date of cancellation, the insurer will specify the reason for such cancellation.

This section shall not apply to nonrenewal.

10-27-09 BERKELEY SQUARE ASSOCIATION, INC. v. ZONING

10-27-09 BERKELEY SQUARE ASSOCIATION, INC. v. ZONING
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE CITY OF TRENTON, ET AL.
A-2389-08T1

After property owner satisfies its burden of proving the
existence of a nonconforming use at the time a zoning ordinance
was amended, the objector to issuance of permits for
rehabilitation of building as a nonconforming use has the burden
of going forward on issue of abandonment before property owner
must meet its burden of persuasion as to continuation of the
nonconforming use.


Assistant Editor: Umair Hussain

10-27-09 DARST v. BLAIRSTOWN TOWNSHIP

10-27-09 CARL AND DELLA DARST v. BLAIRSTOWN TOWNSHIP
ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
A-0308-08T3

Although a land use board ordinarily may not impose
aesthetic conditions upon a site plan, we sustain their
imposition in the context of this bifurcated application. We do
so because the use variance the Board of Adjustment had granted
earlier to the applicants was founded upon "special reasons"
that included certain positive aesthetic factors relating to the
placement of self-storage containers on the property. The Board
relied upon the applicants' representations in the use variance
phase that they would install rows of a certain kind of
container near the front of the property, and the Board was
justified in rejecting the applicants' later attempt in the site
plan phase to substitute a different kind of container that
comparatively had visual drawbacks.

We invalidate, however, the Board's attempt to shorten the
two-year period assured to the applicants under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-
52 for completing paving, landscaping and other "conditions
subsequent" to the approved site plan.


Assistant Editor: Umair Hussain

Tuesday, October 27, 2009

17:29A-36 Contents of filing for automotive insurance rate making.

17:29A-36 Contents of filing for automotive insurance rate making.
7. a. Any filing made for the purpose of automobile insurance rate making shall indicate the actual rate needs of the filer; provided, however, that (a) each filer's rate classification definitions, as used by that filer, shall be uniform Statewide; (b) the automobile insurance rate charged an insured shall not exceed two and one-half times the filer's territorial base rate for each coverage, exclusive of driving record surcharges and discounts; and (c) the automobile insurance rate of the base class in any territory for any filer shall not exceed 1.35 times the filer's Statewide average base rate for each coverage, exclusive of driving record surcharges and discounts for any basic policy issued or renewed at any time and for any standard policy issued or renewed before January 1, 2000 or the 180th day following approval of the common territorial rating plan pursuant to section 28 of P.L.1998, c.21 (C.17:29A-50), whichever first occurs.

b.No rating plan or rate filing applicable to any policy issued or renewed on or after January 1, 2000 or the 180th day following the approval of the common territorial rating plan provided for in sections 27 and 28 of P.L.1998, c.21 (C.17:29A-49 and C.17:29A-50), whichever first occurs, shall be approved by the commissioner which creates territorial relativities which are significantly disproportionate to those in effect as of the effective date of P.L.1998, c.21 (C.39:6A-1.1 et al.).

c.The automobile insurance rate of an automobile whose principal operator is 65 years of age or older shall not exceed one and one-quarter times the Statewide average rate for principal operators 65 years of age or older for each coverage, exclusive of driving record surcharges and discounts; provided, however, that no filer shall increase rates for principal operators 65 years of age or older as a result of the implementation of this section unless more than 50% of its insureds are principal operators 65 years of age or older.

d.As a result of the filings made pursuant to sections 26 and 27 of P.L.1998, c.21 (C.17:29A-48 and C.17:29A-49) and subsections a., b. and c. of this section, the filer's aggregate premium for all territories shall not exceed the filer's aggregate premium in effect prior to the date established in subsection b. of this section.

As used in this section, base rate means the automobile insurance rate charged for an automobile that is not used in business and not used in going to and from work, except for the going to and from work distance included in the pleasure use classification of the filer, and where there is no youthful operator, as defined in the filer's classification system. The base rate class shall not include automobiles to which discounts apply under the filer's classification system, including, but not limited to, farmers' and senior citizens' automobiles or any discount from a standard rate provided for in the filer's tier rating system.

The provisions of this section shall be implemented after the implementation of the provisions of subsection a. of section 8 of P.L.1983, c.65 (C. 17:29A-37).

L.1983,c.65,s.7; amended 1998, c.21, s.29; 1998, c.22, s.6.

17:29A-36.1. Seat belt usage study
The Commissioner of Insurance shall, within 365 days from the effective date of this act, study and determine the impact of P.L. 1984, c. 179 (C. 39:3-76.2e et seq.), on the loss experience for personal injury protection and bodily injury liability coverages for private passenger automobile insurance. If the commissioner determines that the personal injury protection premiums and bodily injury liability premiums for private passenger automobile insurance should be reduced as a result of the impact of the adoption of P.L. 1984, c. 179 (C. 39:3-76.2e et seq.) upon the loss experience for these coverages, the commissioner shall issue an order requiring that the rating plans of all insurers writing private passenger automobile insurance in this State be modified accordingly.

L. 1986, c. 133, s. 1, eff. Oct. 20, 1986.

17:29A-36.2. Regulations
a. Within 180 days of the effective date of this section, the commissioner shall promulgate regulations providing the following with regard to private passenger automobile insurance:

(1) Rate filing data and information specifications in a standard format;

(2)(a) A standard ratemaking methodology, and

(b) Uniform standards on ratemaking methodologies, data compilation, data evaluation and data submission;

(3) Standards of efficiency and other standards of measure based upon industrywide aggregate averages and other relevant data and factors to be utilized in the review and evaluation of the loss, expense and financial data contained in a rate filing; and

(4) The format, data specifications and other requirements for any informational filings made pursuant to subsection b. of this section.

b. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, on July 1, 1989 and annually thereafter, every insurer writing private passenger automobile insurance in this State shall make an informational filing on their private passenger automobile insurance with the commissioner regardless of whether they file for an adjustment in their automobile insurance rates.

17:29A-35.1. Surcharge debts of driver extinguished upon death

17:29A-35.1. Surcharge debts of driver extinguished upon death
1.Notwithstanding the provisions or any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, upon the death of a driver on whom surcharges have been levied by the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to section 6 of P.L.1983, c.65 (C.17:29A-35), any debt established by the imposition of those surcharges is extinguished and the division, or any agent or representative thereof, shall cease to seek payment of that debt.

Whenever the division is unable to obtain a death certificate from a person representing the estate of any driver on whom surcharges have been levied and who was a resident of the State, the division shall obtain a copy of the death certificate by contacting the State registrar of vital statistics in the Department of Health and Senior Services and, in these cases, the division shall not require the estate of the driver to furnish a death certificate.

17:29A-35 Motor Vehicle Violations Surcharge System.

17:29A-35 Motor Vehicle Violations Surcharge System.

6. a. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.1997, c.151.)

b.There is created a Motor Vehicle Violations Surcharge System which shall apply to all drivers and shall include, but not be limited to, the following provisions:

(1) (a) Surcharges shall be levied, beginning on or after January 1, 1984, by the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (hereinafter the "commission") established by section 4 of P.L.2003, c.13 (C.39:2A-4) on any driver who, in the preceding 36-month period, has accumulated six or more motor vehicle points, as provided in Title 39 of the Revised Statutes; except that the allowance for a reduction of points in Title 39 of the Revised Statutes shall not apply for the purpose of determining surcharges under this paragraph. The accumulation of points shall be calculated as of the date the point violation is posted to the driver history record and shall be levied pursuant to rules promulgated by the commission. Surcharges assessed pursuant to this paragraph shall be $150.00 for six points, and $25.00 for each additional point. No offense shall be selected for billing which occurred prior to February 10, 1983. No offense shall be considered for billing in more than three annual assessments.

(b)(Deleted by amendment, P.L.1984, c.1.)

(2) (a) Surcharges shall be levied pursuant to subsection f. of section 1 of P.L.2000, c.75 (C.39:4-97.2) for each offense of unsafe driving under subsection a. of that section.

(b)Surcharges shall be levied for convictions (i) under R.S.39:4-50 for violations occurring on or after February 10, 1983, and (ii) under section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), or for offenses committed in other jurisdictions of a substantially similar nature to those under R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), for violations occurring on or after January 26, 1984. Except as hereinafter provided, surcharges under this subparagraph (b) shall be levied annually for a three-year period, and shall be $1,000.00 per year for each of the first two convictions, for a total surcharge of $3,000 for each conviction, and $1,500.00 per year for the third conviction occurring within a three-year period, for a total surcharge of $4,500 for the third conviction. If a driver is convicted under both R.S.39:4-50 and section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) for offenses arising out of the same incident, the driver shall be assessed only one surcharge for the two offenses.

If, upon written notification from the commission or its designee, mailed to the last address of record with the commission, a driver fails to pay a surcharge levied under this section and collectible by the commission, the driving privilege of the driver shall be suspended forthwith until at least five percent of each outstanding surcharge assessment that has resulted in suspension is paid to the commission; except that the commission may authorize payment of the surcharge on an installment basis over a period of 12 months for assessments under $2,300 or 24 months for assessments of $2,300 or more. The commission, for good cause, may authorize payment of any surcharge on an installment basis over a period not to exceed 36 months. If a driver fails to pay the surcharge or any installments on the surcharge, the total surcharge shall become due immediately, except as otherwise prescribed by rule of the commission.

The commission may authorize any person to pay the surcharge levied under this section and collectible by the commission by use of a credit card, debit card or other electronic payment device, and the administrator is authorized to require the person to pay all costs incurred by the commission in connection with the acceptance of the credit card, debit card or other electronic payment device. If a surcharge or related administrative fee is paid by credit or debit cards or any other electronic payment device and the amount is subsequently reversed by the credit card company or bank, the driving privilege of the surcharged driver shall be suspended and the driver shall be subject to the fee imposed for dishonored checks pursuant to section 31 of P.L.1994, c.60 (C.39:5-36.1).

In addition to any other remedy provided by law, the commission is authorized to utilize the provisions of the SOIL (Set off of Individual Liability) program established pursuant to P.L.1981, c.239 (C.54A:9-8.1 et seq.) to collect any surcharge levied under this section and collectible by the commission that is unpaid on or after the effective date of this act. As an additional remedy, the commission may issue a certificate to the Clerk of the Superior Court stating that the person identified in the certificate is indebted under this surcharge law in such amount as shall be stated in the certificate. The certificate shall reference the statute under which the indebtedness arises. Thereupon the clerk to whom such certificate shall have been issued shall immediately enter upon the record of docketed judgments the name of such person as debtor; the State as creditor; the address of such person, if shown in the certificate; the amount of the debt so certified; a reference to the statute under which the surcharge is assessed, and the date of making such entries. The docketing of the entries shall have the same force and effect as a civil judgment docketed in the Superior Court, and the commission shall have all the remedies and may take all of the proceedings for the collection thereof which may be had or taken upon the recovery of a judgment in an action, but without prejudice to any right of appeal. Upon entry by the clerk of the certificate in the record of docketed judgments in accordance with this provision, interest in the amount specified by the court rules for post-judgment interest shall accrue from the date of the docketing of the certificate, however payment of the interest may be waived by the commission or its designee. In the event that the surcharge remains unpaid following the issuance of the certificate of debt and the commission takes any further collection action including referral of the matter to the Attorney General or his designee, the fee imposed, in lieu of the actual cost of collection, may be 20 percent of surcharges of $1,000 or more. The administrator or his designee may establish a sliding scale, not to exceed a maximum amount of $200, for surcharge principal amounts of less than $1,000 at the time the certificate of debt is forwarded to the Superior Court for filing. The commission shall provide written notification to a driver of the proposed filing of the certificate of debt at least 10 days prior to the proposed filing; such notice shall be mailed to the driver's last address of record with the commission. Upon the filing of a certificate of debt with the Clerk of the Superior Court, the surcharged driver shall not be eligible for the restoration of his driving privilege until at least five percent of each outstanding surcharge assessment that has resulted in the suspension, including interest and costs, if any, is paid to the commission. If a certificate of debt is satisfied following a credit card payment, debit card payment or payment by other electronic payment device and that payment is reversed, a new certificate of debt shall be filed against the surcharged driver unless the original is reinstated.

If the administrator or his designee approves a special payment plan, of such duration as the administrator or his designee deems appropriate, for repayment of the certificate of debt, and the driver is complying with the approved plan, the plan may be continued for any new surcharge not part of the certificate of debt.

All moneys collectible by the commission under subparagraph (b) of paragraph (2) of this subsection b. shall be billed and collected by the commission except as provided in P.L.1997, c.280 (C.2B:19-10 et al.) for the collection of unpaid surcharges. Commencing on September 1, 1996, or such earlier time as the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance shall certify to the State Treasurer that amounts on deposit in the New Jersey Automobile Insurance Guaranty Fund are sufficient to satisfy the current and anticipated financial obligations of the New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance Underwriting Association, all surcharges collected by the commission under subparagraph (b) of paragraph (2) of this subsection b. shall be remitted to the Division of Motor Vehicles Surcharge Fund:

(i)for transfer to the Market Transition Facility Revenue Fund, as provided in section 12 of P.L.1994, c.57 (C.34:1B-21.12), for the purposes of section 4 of P.L.1994, c.57 (C.34:1B-21.4) until such a time as all the Market Transition Facility bonds, notes and obligations and all Motor Vehicle Commission bonds, notes and obligations issued pursuant to that section 4 of P.L.1994, c.57 (C.34:1B-21.4) and the costs thereof are discharged and no longer outstanding; and

(ii)from and after the date of certification by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance that the moneys collectible under subparagraph (b) of paragraph (2) of this subsection b. are no longer needed to fund the association or at such time as all Market Transition Facility bonds, notes and obligations and all Motor Vehicle Commission bonds, notes and obligations issued pursuant to section 4 of P.L.1994, c.57 (C.34:1B-21.4) and the costs thereof are discharged and no longer outstanding, for transfer to the Motor Vehicle Surcharges Revenue Fund established pursuant to section 6 of the "Motor Vehicle Surcharges Securitization Act of 2004," P.L.2004, c.70 (C.34:1B-21.28) to be applied as set forth in section 6 that act. From and after such time as all bonds issued under section 4 of the "Motor Vehicle Surcharges Securitization Act of 2004," P.L.2004, c.70 (C.34:1B-21.26) and the costs thereof are discharged and no longer outstanding, all surcharges collected by the commission under subparagraph (b) of paragraph (2) of this subsection b. shall, subject to appropriation, be remitted to the New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association created pursuant to section 6 of P.L.1974, c.17 (C.17:30A-6) to be used for payment of any loans made by that association to the New Jersey Automobile Insurance Guaranty Fund pursuant to paragraph (10) of subsection a. of section 8 of P.L.1974, c.17 (C.17:30A-8); provided that all such payments shall be subject to and dependent upon appropriation by the State Legislature.

All surcharges collected by the courts pursuant to subparagraph (a) of paragraph (2) of this subsection b. shall be forwarded not less frequently than monthly to the Division of Revenue. The Division of Revenue shall transfer: all such surcharges received prior to July 1, 2006, to the General Fund, and commencing July 1, 2006, all such surcharges to the Unsafe Driving Surcharge Revenue Fund established pursuant to section 5 of the "Motor Vehicle Surcharges Securitization Act of 2004," P.L.2004, c.70 (C.34:1B-21.27) to be applied as set forth in section 5 of that act. From and after such time as all bonds (including refunding bonds), notes and other obligations issued under section 4 of the "Motor Vehicle Surcharges Securitization Act of 2004," P.L.2004, c.70 (C.34:1B-21.26), and the costs thereof are discharged and no longer outstanding, all such surcharges collected by the courts pursuant to subparagraph (a) of paragraph (2) of this subsection b. and forwarded to the Division of Revenue shall be transferred to the General Fund.

Upon request, the Administrative Office of the Courts shall provide a monthly report to the Division of Revenue containing information on the number of convictions for the offense of unsafe driving pursuant to section 1 of P.L.2000, c.75 (C.39:4-97.2) that were entered during such month, the amount of the surcharges that were assessed by the courts pursuant to subsection f. of section 1 of P.L.2000, c.75 (C.39:4-97.2) for such month, and the amount of the surcharges collected by the courts pursuant to subsection f. of section 1 of P.L.2000, c.75 (C.39:4-97.2) during such month.

(3)In addition to any other authority provided in P.L.1983, c.65 (C.17:29A-33 et al.), the commissioner, after consultation with the commission, is specifically authorized (a) (Deleted by amendment, P.L.1994, c.64), (b) to impose, in accordance with subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1) of this subsection b., surcharges for motor vehicle violations or convictions for which motor vehicle points are not assessed under Title 39 of the Revised Statutes, or (c) to reduce the number of points for which surcharges may be assessed below the level provided in subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1) of this subsection b., except that the dollar amount of all surcharges levied under the Motor Vehicle Violations Surcharge System shall be uniform on a Statewide basis for each filer, without regard to classification or territory. Surcharges adopted by the commissioner on or after January 1, 1984 for motor vehicle violations or convictions for which motor vehicle points are not assessable under Title 39 of the Revised Statutes shall not be retroactively applied but shall take effect on the date of the New Jersey Register in which notice of adoption appears or the effective date set forth in that notice, whichever is later.

c.No motor vehicle violation surcharges shall be levied on an automobile insurance policy issued or renewed on or after January 1, 1984, except in accordance with the Motor Vehicle Violations Surcharge System, and all surcharges levied thereunder shall be assessed, collected and distributed in accordance with subsection b. of this section.

d.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.1990, c.8.)

e.The Commissioner of Banking and Insurance and the commission as may be appropriate, shall adopt any rules and regulations necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this section.

L.1983, c.65, s.6; amended 1984, c.1, s.2; 1985, c.520, ss.1,2; 1986, c.211, s.8; 1988, c.156, s.9; 1990, c.8, s.35; 1994, c.57, s.20; 1994, c.64, s.1; 1997, c.151, s.30; 1997, c.280, s.5; 2003, c.13, s.31; 2004, c.70, s.10; 2007, c.282.