Hina K. Patel v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (A-86-08) Entire case.....
Argued September 15, 2009 -- Decided November 10, 2009
LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
This appeal involves the assessment of motor vehicle penalty points for a third or subsequent offense in
violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2, driving in an unsafe manner likely to endanger a person or property. The issue is
whether, based on the timing of her offenses, plaintiff is entitled to relief under N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(e), which
provides that an offense that occurs more than five years after “the prior offense” shall not be considered a
“subsequent offense” for the purpose of assessing points.
Plaintiff Hina K. Patel is a repeat violator of the unsafe driving statute. In March 2002, she committed a
driving offense and pled guilty to unsafe driving in May 2002. She committed another offense in August 2002, and
pled guilty to unsafe driving on September 17, 2002. She pled guilty to a third unsafe driving violation in June
2006, for an offense that occurred in April 2006. Then, on September 5, 2007, she received citations for speeding
and failing to have her vehicle timely inspected, for which she entered a guilty plea to unsafe driving in November
2007.
Patel was assessed fines for each of her violations and four penalty points for her third offense. When she
was assessed four additional points for her fourth conviction in 2007, Patel wrote to the New Jersey Motor Vehicle
Commission (MVC), objecting because her fourth conviction had occurred more than five years after both her first
and second offenses. Because only her third offense had occurred within five years of the 2007 offense, Patel
argued that the 2007 offense must be treated as a “second offense,” for which points are not authorized. The MVC
informed her that “a third and subsequent violation” of the unsafe driving statute “within a five year period will be
issued 4 points,” and because this was her fourth violation since 2002, her “Driver History record will remain the
same.”
Patel appealed. The Appellate Division upheld the MVC’s determination to assess points for her fourth
unsafe driving conviction. Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 403 N.J. Super. 373 (App. Div. 2008). The panel
observed that N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(e) exempts an individual from points when more than five years have elapsed
between a subsequent offense and the prior offense. The panel concluded that the assessment of points on Patel’s
“subsequent” fourth conviction was proper because her third offense had occurred within five years of her fourth.
The panel discerned a legislative intent to apply the exemption from points when the “subsequent” offense occurs
more than five years after “the prior offense,” that is, the most recent prior offense, not “any prior offense.” In
Patel’s case, “the prior offense” was her third offense, which was within five years of her fourth offense.
The Supreme Court granted Patel’s petition for certification. 198 N.J. 474 (2009).
HELD: Under N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(e), the exemption provision for assessing motor vehicle penalty points for an
unsafe driving offense that occurs more than five years after “the prior offense,” “the prior offense” refers only to
the most recent preceding offense based on both a plain reading of the statute and a review of the legislative history.
Thus, the MVC correctly imposed motor vehicle points on Patel for having a fourth unsafe driving conviction in
2007, only one year after the date of her prior, third, unsafe driving offense.
1. When interpreting a statute, courts start with the plain language and apply the generally accepted meaning of the
words used. If the plain language leads to a clear result, the interpretive process is over. If there is ambiguity that
leads to more than one plausible interpretation, a court may turn to extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history, for
assistance with its interpretive task. (pp. 5-6)
2
2. The unsafe driving statute provides that for first and second offenses, motor vehicle penalty points shall not be
assessed. Subsection d. states that a person convicted of “a third or subsequent offense” shall be assessed points.
Subsection e. states that an offense “that occurs more than five years after the prior offense shall not be considered a
subsequent offense for the purpose of assessing motor vehicle penalty points under subsection d.” The MVC
interpreted the statute to require that Patel’s fourth violation subjected her to the imposition of points. It explained
that points are assessed if the third “and” subsequent offense occurred during a five-year period; that is, points must
be assessed if five or fewer years had elapsed between her third and her subsequent fourth offense. (pp. 6-7)
3. Generally, courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it is charged with enforcing. Here, the MVC
committed no grievous error in interpreting the unsafe driving statute, and the Appellate Division was entirely
correct in affirming the MVC’s action in Patel’s points challenge. (p. 8)
4. A plain reading of subsection e. supports the construction that “the prior offense” refers only to the most recent
preceding offense. “The” when used before a noun generally emphasizes one of a group as the most prominent.
Thus, “the” indicates that the Legislature was contemplating only one prior offense, not each or any prior offense.
The “prior offense” contemplates only one offense. Use of “the” signifies that the noun to which it attaches is the
most prominent, and the natural assumption from the plain language is that the Legislature contemplated the most
recent prior offense. However, because that is not explicitly stated, the meaning of “the prior offense” could
arguably be found to contain some ambiguity. Accordingly, the Court examines the legislative history. (pp. 9-10)
5. Before enactment, the unsafe driving statute underwent several revisions. The precursor to the present subsection
d. allowed for the discretionary assessment of points for third and subsequent convictions. A substitute bill made it
mandatory to assess points for third and subsequent convictions and also created the five-year exception now found
in subsection e. As the Assembly Judiciary Committee explained, an offense “which occurs more than five years
after the prior offense would not be considered a subsequent offense” for the purpose of assessing points. On
signing the bill, the Governor issued a news release explaining that a “person convicted of a third or subsequent
offense” may be assessed points “if the offense occurs within five years of the prior offense.” (pp. 10-12)
6. Based on that history, the Court concludes that the Legislature meant the words “the prior offense” in subsection
e. to refer to the offense immediately preceding a “subsequent” offense. The statutory scheme demonstrates a
legislative desire to impose increasing penalties for repetitive violations, and to show leniency by including an
exemption from points for violations that occur after more than a five-year hiatus in unsafe driving violations.
Those legislative policies are harmonized by applying the phrase “the prior offense” to fourth offenders exactly as
did the MVC in Patel’s case, by looking at the date of her immediately preceding third offense and, because it was
not more than five years before her fourth offense in 2007, imposing points for her fourth violation. The MVC’s
interpretation is a reasonable construction of the language used by the Legislature, gives meaning to every word
used, and advances the overall legislative intent to punish drivers with motor vehicle points for multiple unsafe
driving offenses that are close in time. The MVC correctly imposed motor vehicle points on Patel for having a
fourth unsafe driving conviction in 2007, only one year after the date of her prior, third, unsafe driving offense. (pp.
13-16)
7. Although not necessary to the disposition of the appeal, the Appellate Division further expressed approval of the
MVC’s interpretation that the five-year exception did not apply to “third” offenses, but only to a “subsequent”
offense; that is, the five-year exception applied only to fourth and further offenses. Absent a more explicit direction
from the Legislature, the Court rejects the suggestion that the exemption is denied to third offenders. (pp. 16-17)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LONG, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and
HOENS join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-86 September Term 2008
HINA K. PATEL,
Appellant-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE
COMMISSION,
Respondent-Respondent.
Argued September 15, 2009 – Decided November 10, 2009
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is
reported at 403 N.J. Super. 373 (2008).
Michelle M. Tullio argued the cause for
appellant (Lanfrit and Tullio, attorneys;
Darren D. Dapas on the brief).
Nicole T. Minutoli, Deputy Attorney
General, argued the cause for respondent
(Anne Milgram, Attorney General of
New Jersey, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
Mala Narayanan, Deputy Attorney General,
on the brief).
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2 makes it unlawful for any person to
drive a motor vehicle in an unsafe manner likely to endanger a
person or property. The law imposes only fines for the first
two violations, but it authorizes the New Jersey Motor Vehicle
2
Commission (MVC) to assess motor vehicle penalty points, in
addition to fines, for “a third or subsequent offense.”
N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(d). An assessment of points may be avoided,
however, based on the timing of one’s offenses. Subsection e.
provides that
[a]n offense committed under this section
that occurs more than five years after the
prior offense shall not be considered a
subsequent offense for the purpose of
assessing motor vehicle penalty points under
subsection d. of this section.
[N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(e).]
This appeal requires us to construe that exemption provision.
Appellant, Hina Patel, is a repeat violator of the unsafe
driving statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2. Based on the timing of her
violations she contested the MVC’s determination to assess motor
vehicle penalty points for her fourth offense. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm the MVC’s imposition of points for
Patel’s fourth unsafe driving violation.
I.
Patel’s relevant driving history may be summarized as
follows. On March 12, 2002, she committed a driving offense and
pled guilty to unsafe driving on May 3, 2002. She committed
another offense on August 7, 2002, and on September 17, 2002,
again pled guilty to unsafe driving. On April 4, 2006, Patel
received a citation for unsafe lane changing, for which she pled
3
to a third unsafe driving violation on June 9, 2006. Then, on
September 5, 2007, she received citations for speeding and
failing to have her vehicle timely inspected, in exchange for
which she entered a guilty plea to unsafe driving on November
19, 2007.
Patel was fined in accordance with the statute’s
progressive fine structure for each of her four unsafe driving
convictions. She also was assessed four motor vehicle penalty
points for her third offense. The instant controversy arose
over the assessment of four additional motor vehicle points for
her fourth unsafe driving conviction in 2007. Patel wrote to
the Chief Administrator of the MVC, objecting because her fourth
conviction had occurred more than five years after both her
first and second offenses. Because only her third offense had
occurred within five years of the 2007 offense (the fourth
unsafe driving conviction), Patel argued that the 2007 offense
must be treated as a “second offense” under the statute.
According to Patel, because N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(c) does not
authorize points for second offenses, she should not be
subjected to motor vehicle penalty points for the 2007
violation.
4
Patel received a response1 informing her that “a third and
subsequent violation for [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-97.2 (Unsafe Operation
Of A Motor Vehicle) within a five year period will be issued 4
points. Our records indicate this is your . . . 4th violation
since March 12, 2002. Therefore your . . . Driver History
record will remain the same.”
Patel appealed from that final determination of the MVC,
see R. 2:2-3(a)(2), and asserted the same arguments that she had
presented to the MVC. The Appellate Division’s decision upheld
the MVC’s interpretation of the statute and its application to
Patel that resulted in the points assessment for her fourth
unsafe driving conviction. Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n,
403 N.J. Super. 373, 378 (App. Div. 2008). The panel observed
that subsection e. of the statute exempts an individual from
points when more than five years have elapsed between a
subsequent offense and the prior offense. Id. at 377. The
panel concluded that the assessment of points on Patel’s
“subsequent” fourth conviction was proper because her third
offense had occurred within five years of her fourth. Ibid.
Relying on the Legislature’s language in subsection e., the
panel discerned a legislative intent to apply the exemption from
1 The Chief Administrator of the MVC referred Patel’s
correspondence to the Driver Management Bureau, a subdivision of
the MVC, for response. We refer to the MVC and the Bureau
collectively as MVC.
5
points when the “subsequent” offense occurs more than five years
after “the prior offense,” not “any prior offense.” Ibid. The
panel regarded the statutory reference to “the prior offense” in
subsection e. as meaning the most recent prior offense. Ibid.
In Patel’s case, “the prior offense” was her third conviction,
which was within five years of her fourth conviction. Ibid.
II.
As this appeal involves the interpretation of a statute,
“our goal is to discern and effectuate the Legislature’s
intent.” State v. Brannon, 178 N.J. 500, 505 (2004). The plain
language of the statute is our starting point. See State v.
Lewis, 185 N.J. 363, 369 (2005) (citing State v. Ivory, 124 N.J.
582, 585 (1991)). We apply to the statutory terms the generally
accepted meaning of the words used by the Legislature, see
D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192 N.J. 110, 119
(2007) (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)),
and strive “to give effect to every word.” Med. Soc’y of N.J.
v. N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 120 N.J. 18, 26 (1990).
Because we do not assume that the Legislature used any
unnecessary or meaningless language, see id. at 26-27, we read a
statute in its entirety and construe “each part or section . . .
in connection with every other part or section to provide a
harmonious whole.” Bedford v. Riello, 195 N.J. 210, 224 (2008)
6
(citing In re Distrib. of Liquid Assets, 168 N.J. 1, 17-18
(2001); State v. Brown, 22 N.J. 405, 415-16 (1956)).
With those general principles in mind we turn to the
statute in issue. As the panel below appropriately noted,
“‘[i]f the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous
result, then our interpretive process is over.’” Patel, supra,
403 N.J. Super. at 376 (quoting Richardson v. Bd. of Trs.,
Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 195 (2007)). However
“if there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to
more than one plausible interpretation, we may turn to extrinsic
evidence, including legislative history, committee reports, and
contemporaneous construction,” for further assistance in our
interpretative task. DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492-93
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
III.
A.
The unsafe driving statute provides as follows:
a. Notwithstanding any other provision of
law to the contrary, it shall be unlawful
for any person to drive or operate a motor
vehicle in an unsafe manner likely to
endanger a person or property.
b. A person convicted of a first offense
under subsection a. shall be subject to a
fine of not less than $50.00 or more than
$150.00 and shall not be assessed any motor
vehicle penalty points pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
39:5-30.5].
7
c. A person convicted of a second offense
under subsection a. shall be subject to a
fine of not less than $100.00 or more than
$250.00 and shall not be assessed any motor
vehicle penalty points pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
39:5-30.5].
d. A person convicted of a third or
subsequent offense under subsection a. shall
be subject to a fine of not less than
$200.00 or more than $500.00 and shall be
assessed motor vehicle penalty points
pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.5].
e. An offense committed under this section
that occurs more than five years after the
prior offense shall not be considered a
subsequent offense for the purpose of
assessing motor vehicle penalty points under
subsection d. of this section.
f. In addition to any fine, fee or other
charge imposed pursuant to law, the court
shall assess a person convicted of an
offense under subsection a. of this section
a surcharge of $250 which shall be collected
by the court and distributed to the Division
of Revenue in the Department of the Treasury
as a New Jersey Merit Rating Plan surcharge
pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)(2)(a)].
[N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2.]
The MVC interpreted the statute to require that Patel’s
fourth violation subjected her to the imposition of motor
vehicle penalty points under subsection d. Its letter
disposition of Patel’s points challenge explained that points
are assessed if the third “and” the subsequent offense occurred
during a five-year period. In other words, the MVC found that
8
points must be assessed if five or fewer years had elapsed
between Patel’s third and her subsequent fourth offense.
“Generally, courts afford substantial deference to an
agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged
with enforcing.” Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 196 (citing R&R
Mktg., L.L.C. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 158 N.J. 170, 175 (1999)).
However, we are not bound by an agency’s construction of a
statute just as we are not bound by its other, strictly legal
determinations. Ibid. An agency’s determination must be
reversed if “it is ‘plainly unreasonable.’" T.H. v. Div. of
Development Disabilities, 189 N.J. 478, 490 (2007) (quoting In
re N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun.
Employees, 150 N.J. 331, 351 (1997)). An agency’s final
decision is plainly unreasonable and violates express or implied
legislative direction if it gives “a statute any greater effect
than is permitted by the statutory language[,] . . . alter[s]
the terms of a legislative enactment[,] . . . frustrate[s] the
policy embodied in the statute . . . [or] is plainly at odds
with the statute.” Id. at 491 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Here it is clear to us that the MVC committed
no such grievous error in respect of its interpretation of the
unsafe driving statute that led to Patel’s points assessment;
the Appellate Division was entirely correct in affirming the
MVC’s action in Patel’s points challenge.
9
B.
A plain-language reading of subsection e. of the unsafe
driving statute supports the construction that “the prior
offense” refers only to the most recent preceding offense.
“The” when used “before a noun, and generally stressed,
emphasiz[es] one of a group or type as the most outstanding or
prominent.” Webster’s II New College Dictionary 1143 (rev. ed.
1999). Consequently, “the” indicates that the Legislature was
contemplating only one prior offense, not each or any prior
offense. See Villa v. Short, 195 N.J. 15, 26 (2008) (quoting
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stamp, 588 A.2d 363, 365 (N.H. 1991)
(noting, in interpreting insurance policy with multiple
insureds, that “‘the indefinite article ‘an,’ rather than the
definite ‘the,’ before ‘insured’ is a clear reference to any
insured’”)).
In our view, the phrase “prior offense” in subsection e.
contemplates only one offense. Moreover, the use of the article
“the” signifies that the noun to which it attaches is the one
most prominent and, in light of the absence of an explicit
reference to a specific offense, the natural assumption to be
made from the plain language is that the Legislature
contemplated the most recent prior offense. However, because
that is not explicitly stated, the meaning of “the prior
offense” could arguably be found to contain some ambiguity.
10
Accordingly, we may examine whether extrinsic aids are of any
assistance in our effort to discern the legislative intent. See
DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492-93. In this instance, such
assistance can be found in the legislative history of the unsafe
driving statute.
C.
Before enactment, the unsafe driving statute underwent
several revisions and substitutions. A bill first was
introduced in the Senate and, although the substantive offense
was the same, the punishment scheme was substantially different
from the statute eventually enacted. A first offense carried
the penalty of a fine between $50 and $200 and/or no more than
fifteen days of imprisonment. S. 1236, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000).
However, no points were to be assessed for the first offense.
Ibid. For a second or subsequent offense, a fine between $100
and $500 was required and/or imprisonment for no more than
thirty days. Ibid. Additionally, the assessment of motor
vehicle points was optional. Ibid. That bill substantially
mirrored the reckless driving statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96, which
imposes similar but more severe penalties and requires a
reckless mental state.
Senate Bill 1236 was replaced by identical bills introduced
in both houses of the Legislature (Senate Bill 1410 and Assembly
Bill 2465). The new bills removed the penalty of imprisonment.
11
See S. 1410, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000); Assemb. 2465, 209th Leg.
(N.J. 2000). The maximum fees to be imposed for a first and
second offense were reduced to $150 and $250 respectively and
points could no longer be assessed for a second offense. S.
1410, supra; Assemb. 2465, supra. Importantly, a new section
was added, the precursor to the present subsection d. It
allowed for the discretionary assessment of motor vehicle points
for third and subsequent convictions. S. 1410, supra; Assemb.
2465, supra. Also, the fee for a third and subsequent offense
was set between $200 and $500. S. 1410, supra; Assemb. 2465,
supra. Eventually, the substantive provisions from another
pending bill, Assembly Bill 2466, were incorporated, clarifying
a prosecutor’s authority to accept a plea to unsafe driving for
any other offense even if it was not a lesser-included offense.2
See Assemb. 2466, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000).
The Assembly Judiciary Committee made further substantive
revisions. The substitute bill rendered mandatory the
assessment of points for third and subsequent convictions.
Assemb. Judiciary Comm. Statement to Assemb. Comm. Substitute
for Assemb. Nos. 2465 and 2466, 209th Leg. 1 (N.J. 2000). The
substitute bill also created the five-year exception now found
in subsection e. Ibid. As the Assembly Judiciary Committee
2 The substantive provisions of Assembly Bill 2466 eventually
amended N.J.S.A. 2B:25-1 to -12.
12
explained, “an offense committed under [this statutory]
provision[] which occurs more than five years after the prior
offense would not be considered a subsequent offense within the
meaning of subsection d. of section 1 of the substitute for the
purpose of assessing motor vehicle penalty points.” Ibid. The
Senate adopted the changes made by the Assembly. S. Comm.
Substitute for S. 1236, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000). On signing the
bill, then-Governor Christine Todd Whitman issued a news release
that is noteworthy for its description of subsections d. and e.,
and their interplay in the assessment of points and the fiveyear
exception. News Release, Office of the Governor (July 24,
2000). Governor Whitman’s news release explained that a “person
convicted of a third or subsequent offense would be subject to a
fine of not less than $200.00 or more than $500.00 and may be
assessed motor vehicle penalty points, if the offense occurs
within five years of the prior offense.” Ibid. The unsafe
driving statute took effect on July 24, 2000. L. 2000, c. 75, §
1.3
3 In 2004, it was amended together with the laws governing the
imposition of surcharges on motor vehicle violators as part of a
plan to boost revenue. L. 2004, c. 69, § 1. An early bill
proposed that, in addition to the fines already imposed under
the unsafe driving statute, an unsafe driving conviction also
would subject the driver to a surcharge “in an amount of $200.00
for a first offense, $350.00 for a second offense occurring
within a ten-year period, and $500.00 for a third offense
occurring within a ten-year period of a prior unsafe driving
conviction.” Assemb. 3114, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004); S. 1714,
13
Our review of that legislative history leads us to the
conclusion that the Legislature meant the words “the prior
offense” in subsection e. to refer to the offense immediately
preceding a “subsequent” offense such as Patel committed in
2007. The Governor’s news release pointedly gives the statute’s
wording such an interpretation. Moreover, that interpretation
is consistent with the apparent policy goals of the Legislature
when enacting this new penalty scheme.
The statute plainly intended to punish those who drive “in
an unsafe manner likely to endanger a person or property,”
without reference to the driver’s mental state. N.J.S.A. 39:4-
97.2(a). The statute was created notwithstanding the existence
211th Leg. (N.J. 2004). That proposed amendment was abandoned
in favor of a flat $250 surcharge on all unsafe driving
convictions as the statute currently requires. As the Committee
explained,
[t]he “unsafe driving” offense . . .
provided for fines, but specified that no
motor vehicle points were to be assessed
until a driver committed his third offense.
This new infraction is being used by a
number of motorists to avoid points and
surcharges. A total of 233,000 motorists
did so in calendar year 2003. This bill
sets the Merit Rating Plan Surcharge for
this offense at $250.
[S. Budget & Appropriations Comm. Statement
to S. Comm. Substitute for S. 1714, 211th
Leg. 1 (N.J. 2004).]
The new surcharge framework was estimated to provide the General
Treasury with “$58 million in additional annual revenue.” Ibid.
14
of a reckless driving statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96, as well as a
careless driving statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97. Absent the fiveyear
exception, the scheme demonstrates a legislative desire to
impose increasing penalties for repetitive violations by unsafe
drivers. That scheme operates on the basis of the number of
violations and the amount of time between each violation. The
leavening in that scheme is the Legislature’s evident desire to
show leniency to certain drivers who commit unsafe driving
offenses. That leniency is demonstrated through the inclusion
of the exemption from points for violations that occur after
more than a five-year hiatus in unsafe driving violations. The
legislative history to Bills 2466 and 2465 also reveals the
policy choice to permit prosecutors to use the unsafe driving
statute as a plea device for avoiding the imposition of points,
while still advancing a fiscal plan to increase the State’s
revenue through surcharges assessed on each and every unsafe
driving offense.
We find that the policies of the Legislature are harmonized
and best advanced by applying the phrase “the prior offense” in
subsection e. to fourth offenders exactly as did the MVC in
Patel’s case, namely by looking at the date of her immediately
preceding third offense and, on finding that it was not more
than five years before her fourth offense in 2007, imposing
points for her fourth violation. The agency’s interpretation is
15
a reasonable construction of the exact language used by the
Legislature and gives meaning to each and every word employed in
the statute. It advances the clearly perceptible, overall
legislative intent to punish drivers with motor vehicle points
for multiple unsafe driving offenses that are close in time
(that is, within five years of each other). And, that policy is
given reasonable effect if subsection e.’s reference to “the
prior offense” refers to the immediately preceding offense.
We find additional support for that interpretation from
examination of the differences in the phrasing and punishment
schemes of other statutes, which suggest that the phrase “the
prior offense” in subsection e. should be interpreted to refer
to the most recent preceding offense. Both the surcharge
statute, N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35, and the 2004 proposed amendments to
the unsafe driving statute, supra note 3, exemplify how the
unsafe driving statute could have been phrased if the
Legislature meant for the phrase, “the prior offense,” to
necessarily encompass all prior offenses within a five-year
period.4 Although the phrasing of the surcharge statute and the
2004 proposed amendments is not dispositive, it is persuasive.
4 If the unsafe driving statute had employed phrasing referring
to a five-year “period,” as the Legislature did in the surcharge
statute and as was advanced in the initial 2004 bills proposed
to amend the unsafe driving statute, Patel’s position might be
more persuasive.
16
In conclusion, the Legislature chose to focus the exemption
by referring to an offense that occurs five years or more after
the prior offense. We hold that the MVC correctly imposed motor
vehicle points on Patel for having a fourth unsafe driving
conviction in 2007, only one year after the date of her prior,
third, unsafe driving offense. She was not entitled to the
exemption from points provided by operation of subsection e. of
the statute.
D.
Although not necessary to the disposition of this appeal
from the imposition of points for Patel’s fourth violation, the
Appellate Division opinion further expressed approval of the
MVC’s interpretation that the statute’s five-year exception was
inapplicable to “third” offenses, and that it may only apply to
a “subsequent” offense, which the panel treated as a term of art
in subsection e. Patel, supra, 403 N.J. Super. at 377-78.
According to the panel, because subsection e. referred to only
“a subsequent offense” and not a “third” offense, the five-year
exception applied only to fourth and further offenses. Ibid.
We see no basis for treating the term “subsequent offense” in
subsection e. as a term of art addressing fourth or later
offenses, but excluding third offenses for purposes of the
imposition of points under subsection d. Although technical
terms or terms of art “‘having a special or accepted meaning in
17
the law, shall be construed in accordance with [that] . . .
meaning,’” Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251, 269
(2008) (alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 1:1-1), we see
no evidence in the plain language, structure, or legislative
history of the unsafe driving statute to support a conclusion
that the Legislature intended any such specialized, restrictive
meaning by its use of the word “subsequent.”
An equally sound, if not better understanding of the
Legislature’s use of “subsequent” in subsection e. is that it is
descriptive and, thus, would apply to both a third and any
ensuing offense that required examination of “the prior offense”
for purposes of determining eligibility for the points
exemption. At best, an argument might be advanced that the
language contained a shadow of ambiguity. But even if we were
to agree with such a proposition, and we do not, application of
the rule of lenity, see, e.g., State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475,
482 (2008), directs us to a different conclusion, one that
favors a driver’s eligibility for the points exemption. Absent
a more explicit direction from the Legislature to outright deny
subsection e.’s exemption to third offenders,5 we reject the
Appellate Division’s contrary suggestion.
5 Indeed, pending in the Legislature is a bill, sponsored by an
original sponsor of the unsafe driving statute, that clarifies
that it is the legislative intent to require that a third
offense occur within five years of a second offense in order for
18
IV.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LONG, ALBIN, WALLACE,
RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.
motor vehicle points to attach to the third offense. See S.
2439, 213th Leg. (N.J. 2008).
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. A-86 SEPTEMBER TERM 2008
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
HINA K. PATEL,
Appellant-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE
COMMISSION,
Respondent-Respondent.
DECIDED November 10, 2009
Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
CHECKLIST AFFIRM
CHIEF JUSTICE
RABNER X
JUSTICE LONG X
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X
JUSTICE ALBIN X
JUSTICE WALLACE X
JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO X
JUSTICE HOENS X
TOTALS 7
