Monday, October 14, 2019

HGN not admissible in dwi case STATE v O'NEILL


What is Nystagmus?
Nystagmus is a term that describes a "bouncing" eye motion that is seen in two ways -- pendular nystagmus, where the eye wavers equally in two directions (like a pendulum), and jerk nystagmus, where the eye moves slowly away from a fixation point and then is rapidly corrected through a fast movement. Horizontal gaze nystagmus is a type of jerk nystagmus and is an involuntary motion, meaning that the person showing it cannot control it, and in fact, is unaware that it is happening. When impaired, a person's nervous system displays a breakdown in the smooth and accurate control of eye movements, resulting in a number of observable changes.
It is these observable changes that prompted NHTSA to research and standardize HGN for field sobriety tests in the 1970s. The Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs) are used across the country whenever a law enforcement officer has reason to believe a motorist is driving impaired.
HGN in the Courtroom
Despite the proven correlation between alcohol consumption and HGN, many trial courts across the country still do not admit the results of the HGN test into evidence. Prosecutors and law enforcement have lacked either the knowledge or the https://one.nhtsa.gov/About-NHTSA/Traffic-Techs/current/ci.A-Resource-Guide-Describes-The-Science-And-The-Law-About-Horizontal-Gaze-Nystagmus.printresources, or both, to lay an adequate foundation for the admissibility of HGN.

HGN not admissible in dwi case STATE v O'NEILL


What is Nystagmus?
Nystagmus is a term that describes a "bouncing" eye motion that is seen in two ways -- pendular nystagmus, where the eye wavers equally in two directions (like a pendulum), and jerk nystagmus, where the eye moves slowly away from a fixation point and then is rapidly corrected through a fast movement. Horizontal gaze nystagmus is a type of jerk nystagmus and is an involuntary motion, meaning that the person showing it cannot control it, and in fact, is unaware that it is happening. When impaired, a person's nervous system displays a breakdown in the smooth and accurate control of eye movements, resulting in a number of observable changes.
It is these observable changes that prompted NHTSA to research and standardize HGN for field sobriety tests in the 1970s. The Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs) are used across the country whenever a law enforcement officer has reason to believe a motorist is driving impaired.
HGN in the Courtroom
Despite the proven correlation between alcohol consumption and HGN, many trial courts across the country still do not admit the results of the HGN test into evidence. Prosecutors and law enforcement have lacked either the knowledge or the https://one.nhtsa.gov/About-NHTSA/Traffic-Techs/current/ci.A-Resource-Guide-Describes-The-Science-And-The-Law-About-Horizontal-Gaze-Nystagmus.printresources, or both, to lay an adequate foundation for the admissibility of HGN.

39:5D-4If you have a moving violation/ traffic ticket out of state, the MVC will impose 2 points. However, an out of state DWI prior to December 1 will usually result in a minimum 7 month NJ license suspension Effect of conviction


39:5D-4If you have a moving violation/ traffic ticket  out of state, the MVC will impose 2 points.  However, an out of state DWI prior to December 1 will  usually result in a minimum 7 month NJ license suspension Effect of conviction    (a) The licensing authority in the home State, for the purposes of suspension, revocation or limitation of the license to operate a motor vehicle,  shall give the same effect to the conduct reported, pursuant to Article III of  this compact, as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home State, shall  apply the penalties of the home State or of the State in which the violation  occurred, in the case of convictions for:

    (1) Manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle;

    (2) Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor  or a narcotic drug, or under the influence of any other drug to a degree, which  renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle;

    (3) Any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used;

     (4) Failure to stop and render aid in the event of a motor vehicle accident  resulting in the death or personal injury of another.

     (b) As to other convictions, reported pursuant to Article III, the licensing  authority in the home State shall give such effect to the conduct as is  provided by the laws of the home State.

    (c) If the laws of a party State do not provide for offenses or violations denominated or described in precisely the words employed in subdivision (a) of this article, such party State shall construe the denominations and descriptions appearing in subdivision (a) hereof as being applicable to and identifying those offenses or violations of a substantially similar nature and the laws of such party State shall contain such provisions as may be necessary to ensure that full force and effect is given to this article.

Thursday, October 10, 2019

Here if DWI plea vacated with PCR, no criminal DWS State v Faison


Here if DWI plea vacated with PCR, no criminal DWS
State v Faison452 NJ Super. 390 (App Div. 2017)
In this case, the court reversed defendant's conviction for operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended for a second or subsequent driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b). While defendant's license was suspended for a second DWI conviction when the police stopped him, before trial he successfully petitioned for post-conviction relief (PCR). The order granting PCR vacated his prior DWI convictions and remanded both matters to the municipal court for new trials. On remand, the municipal court dismissed one DWI charge, and defendant pled guilty to the other. 
As a result of defendant's PCR and remand proceedings, at the time of his trial for violating N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b), he had only one prior DWI conviction. Accordingly, the State could not prove an element of the crime charged — a second DWI conviction — a prerequisite to the mandatory 180-day incarceration period imposed by N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) and (c). 

Here if DWI plea vacated with PCR, no criminal DWS State v Faison



Here if DWI plea vacated with PCR, no criminal DWS
State v Faison452 NJ Super. 390 (App Div. 2017)
In this case, the court reversed defendant's conviction for operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended for a second or subsequent driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b). While defendant's license was suspended for a second DWI conviction when the police stopped him, before trial he successfully petitioned for post-conviction relief (PCR). The order granting PCR vacated his prior DWI convictions and remanded both matters to the municipal court for new trials. On remand, the municipal court dismissed one DWI charge, and defendant pled guilty to the other. 
As a result of defendant's PCR and remand proceedings, at the time of his trial for violating N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b), he had only one prior DWI conviction. Accordingly, the State could not prove an element of the crime charged — a second DWI conviction — a prerequisite to the mandatory 180-day incarceration period imposed by N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) and (c). 

Wednesday, October 09, 2019

39 :4-105 . Color system Traffic signals or signal devices shall conform strictly with the provisions of this article. Failure to stop for traffic light Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both, fines $50- $200 2 MVC points plus court costs, plus 2 car insurance points and possible non renewal by insurance company

39 :4-105 . Color system    Traffic signals or signal devices shall conform strictly with the provisions  of this article. Failure to stop for traffic light Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both, fines $50- $200 2 MVC points plus court costs, plus 2 car insurance points and possible non renewal by insurance company Penalties set forth at 39:4-203

    A three-color system shall be used;  red, amber and green.  Green means permission for traffic to go, subject to the safety of others or the specific directions of an officer, official sign or special signal.  Red means traffic to stop before entering the intersection or crosswalk and remain standing until  green is shown alone, unless otherwise specifically directed to go by an  officer, official sign or special signal.  Amber, or yellow, when shown alone  following green means traffic to stop before entering the intersection or  nearest crosswalk, unless when the amber appears the vehicle or street car is  so close to the intersection that with suitable brakes it cannot be stopped in  safety.  A distance of fifty feet from the intersection is considered a safe  stopping distance for a speed of twenty miles per hour, and vehicles and street  cars if within that distance when the amber appears alone, and which cannot be  stopped with safety, may proceed across the intersection or make a right or  left turn unless the turning movement is specifically limited.

    All other uses of green, red, amber or yellow lights so located as to be confused with traffic signals shall be discontinued.

39:4-203. General penalty for violations of Motor Vehicle violations
For a violation of a provision of [Motor Vehicle violations[for which no specific penalty is provided, the offender shall be liable to a penalty of not more than $50.00 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 15 days, or both; except that for a violation of a section of article 11, 13, 14 or 17 of this chapter or any supplement thereto for which no specific penalty is provided, the offender shall be liable to a penalty of not less than $50.00 or more than $200.00 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 15 days, or both jail and fines



Saturday, October 05, 2019

39:4-125 U-Turn on curve or grade where view obstructed or "No-U-Turn" sign

39:4-125 U-Turn on curve or grade where view obstructed or
"No-U-Turn" sign
      Fine or imprisonment not exceeding 15 days, or both fines $50 -$200 plus court costs  3 NJ MVC and possible non-renewal by insurance company Plus 3 car insurance points  Penalties set forth at 39:4-203

39:4-125Turning on curve, grade or place where view obstructed or State highway marked with "no U turn" sign 
    Turning on curve, grade or place where view obstructed or State highway marked with "no U turn" sign.  The driver of a vehicle shall not turn such vehicle around so as to proceed in the opposite direction upon any curve or upon the approach to or near the crest of a grade or at any place upon a highway as defined in R.S. 39 :1-1 where the view of such vehicle is obstructed within a distance of five hundred feet along the highway in either direction; and no such vehicle shall be turned around so as to proceed in the opposite direction on a highway which shall be conspicuously marked with signs stating "no U turn".

  Amended by L. 1987, c. 81, s. 1. 

Friday, October 04, 2019

13:19-10.2 Point accumulation; period of suspension

13:19-10.2 Point accumulation; period of suspension
(a)  The Chief Administrator shall, except for good cause, suspend a person's license to operate a motor vehicle and/or motorized bicycle in accordance with the following schedule:


Points Accumulated
Period of Suspension
1.
12 to 15 points in a period of
30 days

two years or less

2.
16 to 18 points in a period of
60 days

two years or less

3.
19 to 21 points in a period of
90 days

two years or less

4.
22 to 24 points in a period of
120 days

two years or less

5.
25 to 27 points in a period of
150 days

two years or less

6.
28 or more points in a period of
not less than 180 days

two years or less

7.
15 to 18 points in a period
30 days

greater than two years

8.
19 to 22 points in a period
60 days

greater than two years

9.
23 to 26 points in a period
90 days

greater than two years

10.
27 to 30 points in a period
120 days

greater than two years

11.
31 to 35 points in a period
150 days

greater than two years

12.
36 points in a period greater
not less than 180 days

than two years

13.
12 to 14 points in a period
30 days

greater than two years





(b)  For good cause shown, the Chief Administrator may in his or her discretion permit a person to attend a driver improvement program of the Motor Vehicle Commission in total or partial satisfaction of a period of suspension imposed under (a) above. In exercising his or her discretion, the Chief Administrator shall consider the person's driving record, prior warnings or driver improvement program attendance, maturity and any other aggravating or mitigating factor.


History

HISTORY: 

As amended, R.1983 d.360, effective September 6, 1983.
See: 15 N.J.R. 1004(a), 15 N.J.R. 1481(b).
Deleted old text and added new text.
Amended by R.2005 d.47, effective February 7, 2005.
See: 36 N.J.R. 4005(a), 37 N.J.R. 505(a).
In (a), substituted "Chief Administrator" for "Director" in the introductory paragraph; rewrote (b).


IconBannerClose.pngAnnotations


Case Notes
Arrest; operating motor vehicle when license was suspended; Fourth Amendment. State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 642 A.2d 947 (1994).
Holder of a NJ driver's license had shown "good cause" for a special exception to the usual suspension of her license, resulting in a 20-day suspension being imposed. The holder believed she had satisfied her obligation when she paid the restoration fee in 2015, reacted immediately to resolve the suspension, and had a commendable driving record. Moreover, the holder's job required her to drive to locations for which mass transit was unavailable, and the holder, as the sole caretaker, drove her child to school each day. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Fauntleroy, OAL DKT. No. MVH 11021-18, 2018 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 668, Initial Decision (December 13, 2018).
Driver whose license was subject to 150-day suspension due to his having committed traffic violations while on probation carried his burden to prove "good cause" for a special exception to the usual suspension. The driver demonstrated that he had devoted himself to becoming a responsible member of his community, a dedicated student and a financially self-sufficient young adult and that he had a demonstrated need to drive to satisfy school, work, volunteer and family obligations. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Petrou, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 11433-18, 2018 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 627, Initial Decision (November 30, 2018).
Driver's privileges were suspended for 210 days despite his claims that the motor vehicle violations of which he had been convicted were the result of police harassment. Not only was the instant forum not the proper place to raise such claims, but the driver's mere belief that the violations resulted from police harassment did not constitute a good cause supporting relief from the imposition of the usual penalty. Nor were mitigating factors proven. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Collison, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 09843-18, 2018 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 540, Initial Decision (October 15, 2018).


N. J. licensed driver was properly suspended for 15 days on account of his having accumulated an excessive number of points in a period less than two years and in connection with two separate proposed "point suspension" notices, as recommended by an ALJ. However, the Motor Vehicle Commission modified the ALJ's findings relative to the separate issue of the driver's passenger endorsement on his CDL, concluding that the driver's endorsement was properly suspended for an indefinite period and that the driver could seek restoration of that endorsement when his point total was less than 12 points. In re Koo, OAL DOCKET NUMBER:
MVH 14205-17, 2018 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 142, Final Agency Determination (March 9, 2018).
Driver who was scheduled for a 30-day license suspension based on his accrual of 12 points within two years won a reduction, to ten days, of the suspension because his record prior to the two-year period at issue was spotless; he showed that his poor driving resulted in part from anxiety and depression due to stressful circumstances involving his family; he completed a defensive driving course; and he was seeking professional help for his emotional issues. Based on these facts, good cause was shown for a reduction in the length of the suspension. N. J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Cox, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 08413-2017, 2017 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 841, Initial Decision (October 30, 2017).
Given the details of a driver's record, including the length of time that had passed since she had received points prior to the incident that took her over the 12-point ceiling, and given her need to possess a valid driver's license for employment purposes, a proposed 30-day suspension was properly reduced to 10 days. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n. v. Polhill, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 03790-17, 2017 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 364, Initial Decision (May 31, 2017).
Though the Motor Vehicle Commission agreed with the conclusion of an ALJ that the holder of a NJ driver's license had shown "good cause" for a special exception to suspension of his license and that a 30-day suspension was properly imposed, the Commission also concluded that the driver should be required to complete a Commission Driver Improvement Program class to address the "points" suspension. The driver also would be required to serve a one-year probationary period. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Corporan, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 06425-16, N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Corporan, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 06425-16, 2016 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1212, Final Administrative Determination (October 24, 2016).
Driver who testified that at the time at issue he was going through a divorce, had relocated and was dealing with a child who had serious mental health issues won reduction of 180-day suspension imposed on account of his conduct in driving during a period of suspension on a showing of "good cause" within the meaning of governing regulations. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Gorokhovich, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 11158-16, 2016 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 763, Initial Decision (September 15, 2016).
Holder of a NJ driver's license showed "good cause" for a special exception to suspension of his license because suspension was now premised on a citation that he had received nearly two years earlier in a different jurisdiction, which citation was not addressed by the driver because the state where the violation allegedly had occurred took more than ten months to post it so that it could be addressed in an original suspension proceeding. That being so, his license would be suspended for 30 days, not the 180 day penalty that usually was imposed. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Corporan, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 06425-16, 2016 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 650, Initial Decision (July 21, 2016).
Driver who was working full time, needed a driver's license to retain his position (and could not reach his workplace by public transportation) and had both family and medical needs that required that he be able to drive demonstrated "good cause" for a variance from the standard 90-day suspension that was called for where, as here, a driver was cited for a moving violation during a one-year probationary period. Since good cause was shown, the suspension was properly reduced to 30 days. Motor Vehicle Comm. v Bansal, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 01915-16 (ON REMAND OAL DKT. NO. MVH 9786-15), 2016 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 275, Initial Decision (May 13, 2016).
Driver's efforts and progress towards improvement of his driving record and his personal background and employment situation were shown to be such that he was properly afforded some leniency on his request for relief from the 60-day license suspension that was otherwise properly imposed on account of his having accumulated points in excess of those permitted under governing law. That being so, a 10 day suspension was more appropriate. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Karl, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 20290-15, 2016 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 178, Initial Decision (April 7, 2016).
Six-month suspension was appropriately imposed on a driver based on his conduct in making misstatements on his application for a license to the effect that he did not have a driver's license in any other state when in fact he possessed a New York Class D driver license with a motorcycle endorsement which was valid on the date on which he signed his application for a New Jersey license. Though the agency did establish that the statements made on the application were untrue, the driver had a fairly unremarkable driving records with few noted violations and no suspensions in the lengthy period beginning in 1977 so a suspension that was less than the two-year suspension imposed by the agency was proper. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Kuhlman, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 11953-15, 2016 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 23, Initial Decision (January 14, 2016).
One year suspension of a driver's license was appropriately imposed on a driver based on his conduct in making misstatements on his application for a license regarding the existence of required automobile insurance. Not only did the agency establish that the statements regarding auto insurance as made on the application were untrue but the driver had an extremely lengthy, negative driving record including 20 orders of suspension, so a one-year suspension was appropriate. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. McIntosh, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 11965-2015, 2016 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 24, Initial Decision (January 13, 2016).
Driving privileges of a licensee were properly suspended for 180 days because she admitted to having driven while under a period of suspension. That suspension was imposed because she persistently failed to appear and/or pay fines in three municipal courts. The licensee did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances justifying a reduction or waiver of the administrative suspension because her argument that her family members required her attention and that she could not provide that attention if her license was suspended was unconvincing. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Bowser, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 05823-15, 2015 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 518, Initial Decision (August 26, 2015).
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended that the determination by the Motor Vehicle Commission (MNC) that a driver's license was properly suspended for 30 days on account of the driver having accumulated more than 12 points in six months was properly modified to a 10-day suspension. Factors on which the ALJ relied in so modifying the length of the suspension was that the driver was the father of two children who was solely responsible for the care of a 9-year old daughter, needed his license to remain employed as a tractor-trailer driver, and exhibited both a positive attitude and a satisfactory maturity level. The ALJ also took into account that the driver had attended a driver improvement program and had remained violation free for some period of time. All of these circumstances provided adequate good cause for a deviation from the 30-day suspension indicated in the regulations. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Baum, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 3447-15, 2015 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 322, Initial Decision (June 8, 2015).
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended that a Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC) order suspending a motorist's driver's license for a combined period of 1300 days be reduced to a suspension of 240 days in total. The motorist failed to establish a right to relief due to what he characterized as an unfair delay in the imposition of any suspension because he had unclean hands and demonstrated no actual prejudice from the delay, but the motorist did show good cause for a reduction in the period of suspension based on his rehabilitation, which included his successful completion of a drug court program, his maintenance of steady employment and the extent to which he had demonstrated that both his children and his aged parent rely on him to transport them. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Johnson, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 3605-14, 2015 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 302, Initial Decision (May 26, 2015).
Licensee who was cited for operating a motor vehicle while under suspension was properly subjected to a 60-day suspension of driving privileges rather than the 180-day suspension that had been imposed by the N.J. Motor Vehicle Commission. It was true that the licensee had been cited for driving while under suspension, which suspension had been imposed when she failed to pay fines imposed by a municipal court based on unpaid parking tickets. That said, the licensee demonstrated good cause for a reduction in the suspension based on proof showing that she had family members who suffered from considerable health and medical/educational issues and that she was the sole support of such family members. Moreover, the vast majority of the incidents on her driving abstract were administrative actions rather than moving violations. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Lloyd, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 10729-14, 2015 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 239, Initial Decision (May 4, 2015).
Administrative law judge modified the Motor Vehicle Commission's action suspending a driver's New Jersey license from 90 days to 45 days pursuant to N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.2(b). While the driver's record was less than stellar, the majority of posts on his driving abstract were for failure to pay fines and surcharges, not for moving violations. He had virtually no points on his license and had seven moving violations in approximately six years. Although his need for his vehicle did not go beyond the need of most people for his ability to earn a living and perform his normal duties, it was significant that he lived alone and had no one else to rely upon for rides to work. Thus, the driver met his burden of proving "good cause" for a special exception to the usual suspension imposed in similar cases. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. David P. Trojan, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 11921-14, 2014 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 794, Initial Decision (December 31, 2014).
Administrative law judge modified the Motor Vehicle Commission's action suspending a driver's New Jersey license from 90 days to seven days pursuant to N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.2(b). The majority of posts on his driving abstract were for failure to pay surcharges, not for moving violations. He had virtually no points on his license other than the one that caused the current proposed suspension. The driver showed that his need for his vehicle went beyond the usual daily tasks of living. He drove for a living rather than just driving to get to a job. In addition to being out of a job without a license, he would be incarcerated under the Intensive Supervision Program if he did not maintain employment. Thus, the driver met his burden of proving "good cause" for a special exception to the usual suspension imposed in similar cases. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Nicholas A. Merola, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 13387-14, 2014 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 795, Initial Decision (December 31, 2014).
Driver was properly designated as a "persistent violator" based on an extensive record of driving infractions and based on a finding that she committed a moving violation within the first six months of a prior one-year probationary period. Given the circumstances, however, the driver was properly permit to avoid suspension by satisfactorily completing an approved Driver Improvement Program in lieu of having her license suspended for another 90 days. In re Dekleine, OAL DOCKET NUMBER: M.V.H. 08120-14, 2014 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1314, Final Administrative Determination (November 13, 2014).
Circumstances warranted a reduction for good cause in scheduled two 90-day suspensions to a period of 30 days for each violation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.8 and N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.2(a). The driver showed some improvement in his driving record. Further, it would be a hardship for him to lose his driving privileges because he worked as an automotive mechanic and needed his income from employment to support himself and his children. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Justin J. Alterio, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 06930-14, 2014 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 707, Initial Decision (October 16, 2014).
Motorist did not establish "good cause" for a special exception from the provisions in N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.1, N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.2, and N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.8 requiring the suspension of his driving privileges because he had 12 or more points on his record and because he had operated a motor vehicle during a period when his license in fact was suspended. Though the motorist sought leniency based on various factors including that he had lost his house in foreclosure, had to go on welfare, and had encountered various other difficulties, his driving record was less than stellar and he had failed to demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances that would justify a reduction or waiver. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Marut, OAL DKT. NO. MVH 3603-14, AGENCY DKT. NO. 05652, 2014 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 366, Initial Decision (June 20, 2014).
Driving privileges were properly suspended for a period of 18 months where the driver failed to exercise due care for the safety of a pedestrian upon a roadway and failed to use due caution and circumspection in operating her motor vehicle, resulting in the pedestrian's death; nothing relieved the driver from the duty to exercise due care for the safety of any pedestrian upon a roadway, even one who failed to exercise due care on his own behalf (adopting with modification 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 537).In re Patel, OAL Dkt. No. MVH 5549-05, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1327, Final Decision (November 7, 2005).
License suspension was warranted where fatal collision resulted from careless lane change. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Hunt, 96 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 42.
Motorist involved in fatal collision would face 12-month license suspension where motorist was driving erratically just prior to collision. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Paynter, 96 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 34.
License suspension was warranted for motorist who fatally struck pedestrian while making left turn, even though pedestrian was crossing street against red traffic light. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Condosta, 96 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 31.
License suspension was appropriate penalty for driver of group home minibus who backed over mentally disabled passenger just after passenger had exited bus. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Adams, 96 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 24.
18-month suspension of driving privileges was appropriate penalty for motorist whose careless driving at excessive speeds contributed to death of another driver. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Nolan, 96 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 12.
Flawed testimony of eyewitness required remand of suspension case for review of evidence with respect to collision without reference to testimony. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Vann, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 97.
Carelessness in operation of school bus that led to fatal collision with motorcyclist warranted 360 day suspension of driving privileges. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Cornwell, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 88.
Reckless driving prior to collision that resulted in fatal collision with decedent's vehicle warranted 29 month suspension of licensee's driving privileges. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Hunt, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 85.
Leaving scene of accident after striking pedestrian and inflicting fatal injuries warranted 14 month suspension of driving privileges. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Horn, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 78.
Inattention that led to fatal accident and careless driving violation warranted suspension of driving privileges for 12 months. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Harris, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 71, affirmed 96 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 1.
Involvement in fatal intersectional collision, when licensee otherwise exercised due care and was neither wilful nor reckless, was not a basis for suspending driving privileges. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Hall, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 66.
Carelessness in respect to fatal collision warranted 36 month suspension of driving privileges. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Cream, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 59.
Altering driver's license to enable purchase of alcoholic beverages while underage warranted 15-day license suspension. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Longworth, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 55.
Moving violations in connection with licensee's involvement in fatal collision demonstrated carelessness warranting license suspension for actions substantially contributing to accident. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Schiavone, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 46.
Mere contributory fault with respect to intersectional collision that resulted in death of another was insufficient on which to base 15 month suspension of licensee's driving privileges. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Hantsoulis, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 42.
License suspension was not warranted when driver was not culpable because pedestrian was already dead when vehicle came into contact with her. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Scheps, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 34.
Suspension of driving privileges for 55 months was warranted by reason of involvement in fatal hit and run. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Slavkovsky, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 25.
Reckless operation of bus prior to fatal accident was a proper basis on which to suspend driving privileges for a period of 62 months notwithstanding any inconvenience to licensee. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Vann, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 15.
Careless driving leading to fatal collision was sufficient basis for suspension of driver's license for 120 days. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Stroinski, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 12, affirmed 96 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 1, certification denied 144 N.J. 378, 676 A.2d 1093.
Fatal accident for which licensee was clearly culpable justified suspension of license to drive for three months for careless driving. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Parise, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 7.
License suspension upheld against challenge that point accumulation scheme under statute and regulation was an ex post facto law as applied against licensee. Div. of Motor Vehicles v. Katz, 5 N.J.A.R. 1 (1981).

Petitioner's employment as surgical sales representative found not to be in nature of an essential service so as to qualify for driver improvement course as an alternative to license suspension due to penalty point accumulation; hospital supply needs in emergency may be otherwise met by petitioner's employer. Div. of Motor Vehicles v. Morton, 4 N.J.A.R. 95 (1982). source New Jersey Office of Administrative Law

39 :4-138 Places where parking prohibited, exceptions; moving vehicle not under one's control into prohibited area.


39 :4-138  Places where parking prohibited, exceptions; moving vehicle not under one's control into prohibited area.
     39 :4-138.  Except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the directions of a traffic or police officer or traffic sign or signal, no operator of a vehicle shall stand or park the vehicle in any of the following places:

   a.   Within an intersection;

   b.   On a crosswalk;

   c.   Between a safety zone and the adjacent curb or within at least 20 feet of a point on the curb immediately opposite the end of a safety zone;

   d.   In front of a public or private driveway;

   e. (1) Within 25 feet of the nearest crosswalk or side line of a street or intersecting highway, except at alleys and as provided in section 2 of P.L.2009, c.257 (C.39:4-138.6); or

   (2)   Within 10 feet of the nearest crosswalk or side line of a street or intersecting highway, if a curb extension or bulbout has been constructed at that crosswalk;

   f.   On a sidewalk;

   g.   In any appropriately marked "No Parking" space established pursuant to the duly promulgated regulations of the Commissioner of Transportation;

   h.   Within 50 feet of a "stop" sign except as provided in section 2 of P.L.2009, c.257 (C.39:4-138.6);

   i.   Within 10 feet of a fire hydrant;

   j.   Within 50 feet of the nearest rail of a railroad crossing;

   k.   Within 20 feet of the driveway entrance to any fire station and on the side of a street opposite the entrance to any fire station within 75 feet of said entrance, when properly signposted;

   l.   Alongside or opposite any street excavation or obstruction when stopping, standing, or parking would obstruct traffic, when properly signposted;

   m.   
On the roadway side of any vehicle stopped or parked at the edge or curb of a street;

   n.   Upon any bridge or other elevated structure upon a highway, or within a highway tunnel or underpass, or on the immediate approaches thereto except where space for parking is provided;

   o.   In any space on public or private property appropriately marked for vehicles for persons with disabilities pursuant to P.L.1977, c.202 (C.39:4-197.5), P.L.1975, c.217 (C.52:27D-119 et seq.) or any other applicable law unless the vehicle is authorized by law to be parked therein and a person with a disability is either the driver or a passenger in that vehicle. State, county, or municipal law enforcement officers or parking enforcement authority officers shall enforce the parking restrictions on spaces appropriately marked for vehicles for persons with disabilities on both public and private property.

   No person shall move a vehicle not lawfully under the person's control into any such prohibited area or away from a curb such distance as is unlawful.