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Sunday, July 22, 2018
Super Lawyers nomination due by July 24, 2018.
Saturday, July 21, 2018
PNC Arts Center Garden State Arts Center Holmdel 33:1-81. Underage drinking and Misrepresenting age to induce sale or delivery to minor; disorderly person
PNC Arts Center Garden State Arts Center Holmdel
33:1-81. Underage drinking and Misrepresenting age to induce sale or delivery to minor; disorderly person
Our office represents people charged with Underage drinking at PNC Arts Center/ Garden State Arts Center Holmdel, NJ.
Criminal charges can cost you. If convicted, you can face high fines, jail, Probation and other penalties. Don't give up! Our Law Office can provide experienced attorney representation for criminal violations. Our website www.njlaws.com provides information on criminal offenses we can be retained to represent people.
The following is current criminal law plus amendments as of April. 2004 on 33:1-81. Underage drinking and Misrepresenting age to induce sale or delivery to minor
33:1-81. It shall be unlawful for:
(a) A person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages to enter any premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of purchasing, or having served or delivered to him or her, any alcoholic beverage; or
(b) A person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages to consume any alcoholic beverage on premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages, or to purchase, attempt to purchase or have another purchase for him any alcoholic beverage; or
(c) Any person to misrepresent or misstate his age, or the age of any other person for the purpose of inducing any licensee or any employee of any licensee, to sell, serve or deliver any alcoholic beverage to a person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages; or
(d) Any person to enter any premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of purchasing, or to purchase alcoholic beverages, for another person who does not because of his age have the right to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages.
Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed and adjudged to be a disorderly person, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than $500.00. In addition, the court shall suspend or postpone the person's license to operate a motor vehicle for six months.
Upon the conviction of any person under this section, the court shall forward a report to the Division of Motor Vehicles stating the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. If a person at the time of the imposition of a sentence is less than 17 years of age, the period of license postponement, including a suspension or postponement of the privilege of operating a motorized bicycle, shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed and shall run for a period of six months after the person reaches the age of 17 years.
If a person at the time of the imposition of a sentence has a valid driver's license issued by this State, the court shall immediately collect the license and forward it to the division along with the report. If for any reason the license cannot be collected, the court shall include in the report the complete name, address, date of birth, eye color, and sex of the person as well as the first and last date of the license suspension period imposed by the court.
The court shall inform the person orally and in writing that if the person is convicted of operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or postponement, the person shall be subject to the penalties set forth in R.S. 39:3-40. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of the written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S. 39:3-40.
If the person convicted under this section is not a New Jersey resident, the court shall suspend or postpone, as appropriate given the age at the time of sentencing, the non-resident driving privilege of the person and submit to the division the required report. The court shall not collect the license of a non-resident convicted under this section. Upon receipt of a report by the court, the division shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction of the suspension or postponement.
In addition to the general penalties prescribed for an offense, the court may require any person under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages who violates this act to participate in an alcohol education or treatment program authorized by the Department of Health for a period not to exceed the maximum period of confinement prescribed by law for the offense for which the individual has been convicted.
33:1-81.1. Hearing; attendance by parent or guardian; subpoena
In any hearing for a violation of section 33:1-81 of the Revised Statutes the court in its discretion may require the attendance at such hearing of a parent or guardian, if there be no parent, of the minor charged with such violation if such parent or guardian is a resident of the State and may, in its discretion, compel such attendance by subpoena.
33:1-81.1a. Violations by parent, guardian, notification, fine
A parent, guardian or other person having legal custody of a person under 18 years of age found in violation of R.S. 33:1-81 or section 1 of P.L. 1979, c.264 (C. 2C:33-15) shall be notified of the violation in writing. The parent, guardian or other person having legal custody of a person under 18 years of age shall be subject to a fine in the amount of $500.00 upon any subsequent violation of R.S. 33:1-81 or section 1 of P.L. 1979, c.264 (C. 2C:33-15) on the part of such person if it is shown that the parent, guardian or other person having legal custody failed or neglected to exercise reasonable supervision or control over the conduct of the person under 18 years of age.
CONCLUSION
If charged with any criminal offense, immediately schedule an appointment with a criminal trial attorney. Don't rely on a real estate attorney, public defender or a family member who took a law class in school. When your life and job is on the line, hire the best attorney available.
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500
(Fax) 732-572-0030
TRIAL AND LITIGATION EXPERIENCE
In his private practice, he has devoted a substantial portion of his professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters. He appears in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on many personal injury matters, Criminal and Municipal/ traffic Court trials, Probate hearings, and contested administrative law hearings.
Mr. Vercammen served as the Prosecutor for the Township of Cranbury, Middlesex County and was involved in trials on a weekly basis. He also argued all pre-trial motions and post-trial applications on behalf of the State of New Jersey.
He has also served as a Special Acting Prosecutor in Woodbridge, Perth Amboy, Hightstown, Carteret, East Brunswick, Jamesburg, South Brunswick, South River and South Plainfield for conflict cases. Since 1989, he has personally handled hundreds of criminal and motor vehicle matters as a Prosecutor and now as defense counsel and has had substantial success.
Previously, Mr. Vercammen was Public Defender for the Township of Edison and Borough of Metuchen and a Designated Counsel for the Middlesex County Public Defender's Office. He represented indigent individuals facing consequences of magnitude. He was in Court trying cases and making motions in difficult criminal and DWI matters. Every case he personally handled and prepared.
His resume sets forth the numerous bar associations and activities which demonstrate his commitment to the legal profession and providing quality representation to clients.
Since 1985, his primary concentration has been on litigation matters. Mr. Vercammen gained other legal experiences as the Confidential Law Clerk to the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Supreme Court) with the Delaware County, PA District Attorney Office handling Probable Cause Hearings, Middlesex County Probation Department as a Probation Officer, and an Executive Assistant to Scranton District Magistrate, Thomas Hart, in Scranton, PA.
33:1-81. Underage drinking and Misrepresenting age to induce sale or delivery to minor; disorderly person
Our office represents people charged with Underage drinking at PNC Arts Center/ Garden State Arts Center Holmdel, NJ.
Criminal charges can cost you. If convicted, you can face high fines, jail, Probation and other penalties. Don't give up! Our Law Office can provide experienced attorney representation for criminal violations. Our website www.njlaws.com provides information on criminal offenses we can be retained to represent people.
The following is current criminal law plus amendments as of April. 2004 on 33:1-81. Underage drinking and Misrepresenting age to induce sale or delivery to minor
33:1-81. It shall be unlawful for:
(a) A person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages to enter any premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of purchasing, or having served or delivered to him or her, any alcoholic beverage; or
(b) A person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages to consume any alcoholic beverage on premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages, or to purchase, attempt to purchase or have another purchase for him any alcoholic beverage; or
(c) Any person to misrepresent or misstate his age, or the age of any other person for the purpose of inducing any licensee or any employee of any licensee, to sell, serve or deliver any alcoholic beverage to a person under the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages; or
(d) Any person to enter any premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of purchasing, or to purchase alcoholic beverages, for another person who does not because of his age have the right to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages.
Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed and adjudged to be a disorderly person, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than $500.00. In addition, the court shall suspend or postpone the person's license to operate a motor vehicle for six months.
Upon the conviction of any person under this section, the court shall forward a report to the Division of Motor Vehicles stating the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. If a person at the time of the imposition of a sentence is less than 17 years of age, the period of license postponement, including a suspension or postponement of the privilege of operating a motorized bicycle, shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed and shall run for a period of six months after the person reaches the age of 17 years.
If a person at the time of the imposition of a sentence has a valid driver's license issued by this State, the court shall immediately collect the license and forward it to the division along with the report. If for any reason the license cannot be collected, the court shall include in the report the complete name, address, date of birth, eye color, and sex of the person as well as the first and last date of the license suspension period imposed by the court.
The court shall inform the person orally and in writing that if the person is convicted of operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or postponement, the person shall be subject to the penalties set forth in R.S. 39:3-40. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of the written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S. 39:3-40.
If the person convicted under this section is not a New Jersey resident, the court shall suspend or postpone, as appropriate given the age at the time of sentencing, the non-resident driving privilege of the person and submit to the division the required report. The court shall not collect the license of a non-resident convicted under this section. Upon receipt of a report by the court, the division shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction of the suspension or postponement.
In addition to the general penalties prescribed for an offense, the court may require any person under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages who violates this act to participate in an alcohol education or treatment program authorized by the Department of Health for a period not to exceed the maximum period of confinement prescribed by law for the offense for which the individual has been convicted.
33:1-81.1. Hearing; attendance by parent or guardian; subpoena
In any hearing for a violation of section 33:1-81 of the Revised Statutes the court in its discretion may require the attendance at such hearing of a parent or guardian, if there be no parent, of the minor charged with such violation if such parent or guardian is a resident of the State and may, in its discretion, compel such attendance by subpoena.
33:1-81.1a. Violations by parent, guardian, notification, fine
A parent, guardian or other person having legal custody of a person under 18 years of age found in violation of R.S. 33:1-81 or section 1 of P.L. 1979, c.264 (C. 2C:33-15) shall be notified of the violation in writing. The parent, guardian or other person having legal custody of a person under 18 years of age shall be subject to a fine in the amount of $500.00 upon any subsequent violation of R.S. 33:1-81 or section 1 of P.L. 1979, c.264 (C. 2C:33-15) on the part of such person if it is shown that the parent, guardian or other person having legal custody failed or neglected to exercise reasonable supervision or control over the conduct of the person under 18 years of age.
CONCLUSION
If charged with any criminal offense, immediately schedule an appointment with a criminal trial attorney. Don't rely on a real estate attorney, public defender or a family member who took a law class in school. When your life and job is on the line, hire the best attorney available.
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500
(Fax) 732-572-0030
TRIAL AND LITIGATION EXPERIENCE
In his private practice, he has devoted a substantial portion of his professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters. He appears in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on many personal injury matters, Criminal and Municipal/ traffic Court trials, Probate hearings, and contested administrative law hearings.
Mr. Vercammen served as the Prosecutor for the Township of Cranbury, Middlesex County and was involved in trials on a weekly basis. He also argued all pre-trial motions and post-trial applications on behalf of the State of New Jersey.
He has also served as a Special Acting Prosecutor in Woodbridge, Perth Amboy, Hightstown, Carteret, East Brunswick, Jamesburg, South Brunswick, South River and South Plainfield for conflict cases. Since 1989, he has personally handled hundreds of criminal and motor vehicle matters as a Prosecutor and now as defense counsel and has had substantial success.
Previously, Mr. Vercammen was Public Defender for the Township of Edison and Borough of Metuchen and a Designated Counsel for the Middlesex County Public Defender's Office. He represented indigent individuals facing consequences of magnitude. He was in Court trying cases and making motions in difficult criminal and DWI matters. Every case he personally handled and prepared.
His resume sets forth the numerous bar associations and activities which demonstrate his commitment to the legal profession and providing quality representation to clients.
Since 1985, his primary concentration has been on litigation matters. Mr. Vercammen gained other legal experiences as the Confidential Law Clerk to the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Supreme Court) with the Delaware County, PA District Attorney Office handling Probable Cause Hearings, Middlesex County Probation Department as a Probation Officer, and an Executive Assistant to Scranton District Magistrate, Thomas Hart, in Scranton, PA.
Friday, July 20, 2018
2C :35-16 Driver’s license suspension if pleading guilty to any NJ Drug offense Forfeiture or postponement of driving privileges. [Unless attorney is successful with hardship motion]
2C :35-16 Driver’s license suspension if pleading guilty to any NJ Drug offense
Forfeiture or postponement of driving privileges. [Unless attorney is successful with hardship motion]
2C :35-16 . a. In addition to any disposition authorized by this title, the provisions of section 24 of P.L.1982, c.77 (C.2A:4A-43), or any other statute indicating the dispositions that can be ordered for an adjudication of delinquency, and notwithstanding the provisions of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:43-2, a person convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for a violation of any offense defined in this chapter or chapter 36 of this title shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period to be fixed by the court at not less than six months or more than two years which shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed unless the court finds compelling circumstances warranting an exception. For the purposes of this section, compelling circumstances warranting an exception exist if the forfeiture of the person's right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State will result in extremehardship and alternative means of transportation are not available. In the case of a person who at the time of the imposition of sentence is less than 17 years of age, the period of any suspension of driving privileges authorized herein, including a suspension of the privilege of operating a motorized bicycle, shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed and shall run for a period as fixed by the court of not less than six months or more than two years after the day the person reaches the age of 17 years. If the driving privilege of any person is under revocation, suspension, or postponement for a violation of any provision of this title or Title 39 of the Revised Statutes at the time of any conviction or adjudication of delinquency for a violation of any offense defined in this chapter or chapter 36 of this title, any revocation, suspension, or postponement period imposed herein shall commence as of the date of termination of the existing revocation, suspension, or postponement.
b. If forfeiture or postponement of driving privileges is ordered by the court pursuant to subsection a. of this section, the court shall collect forthwith the New Jersey driver's license or licenses of the person and forward such license or licenses to the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission along with a report indicating the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. If the court is for any reason unable to collect the license or licenses of the person, the court shall cause a report of the conviction or adjudication of delinquency to be filed with the Chief Administrator. That report shall include the complete name, address, date of birth, eye color, and sex of the person and shall indicate the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. The court shall inform the person orally and in writing that if the person is convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or postponement imposed pursuant to this section, the person shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalties set forth in R.S.39:3-40. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of the written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S.39:3-40. If the person is the holder of a driver's license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not collect the license but shall notify forthwith the Chief Administrator who shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction. The court shall, however, in accordance with the provisions of this section, revoke the person's non-resident driving privilege in this State.
c. In addition to any other condition imposed, a court may in its discretion suspend, revoke or postpone in accordance with the provisions of this section the driving privileges of a person admitted to supervisory treatment under N.J.S.2C:36A-1 or N.J.S.2C:43-12 without a plea of guilty or finding of guilt.
d. After sentencing and upon notice to the prosecutor, a person subject to suspension or postponement of driving privileges under this section may seek revocation of the remaining portion of any suspension or postponement based on compelling circumstances warranting an exception that were not raised at the time of sentencing. The court may revoke the suspension or postponement if it finds compelling circumstances.
Amended 1988, c.44, s.7; 2005, c.343; 2008, c.84, s.2.
b. If forfeiture or postponement of driving privileges is ordered by the court pursuant to subsection a. of this section, the court shall collect forthwith the New Jersey driver's license or licenses of the person and forward such license or licenses to the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission along with a report indicating the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. If the court is for any reason unable to collect the license or licenses of the person, the court shall cause a report of the conviction or adjudication of delinquency to be filed with the Chief Administrator. That report shall include the complete name, address, date of birth, eye color, and sex of the person and shall indicate the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. The court shall inform the person orally and in writing that if the person is convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or postponement imposed pursuant to this section, the person shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalties set forth in R.S.39:3-40. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of the written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S.39:3-40. If the person is the holder of a driver's license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not collect the license but shall notify forthwith the Chief Administrator who shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction. The court shall, however, in accordance with the provisions of this section, revoke the person's non-resident driving privilege in this State.
c. In addition to any other condition imposed, a court may in its discretion suspend, revoke or postpone in accordance with the provisions of this section the driving privileges of a person admitted to supervisory treatment under N.J.S.2C:36A-1 or N.J.S.2C:43-12 without a plea of guilty or finding of guilt.
d. After sentencing and upon notice to the prosecutor, a person subject to suspension or postponement of driving privileges under this section may seek revocation of the remaining portion of any suspension or postponement based on compelling circumstances warranting an exception that were not raised at the time of sentencing. The court may revoke the suspension or postponement if it finds compelling circumstances.
Amended 1988, c.44, s.7; 2005, c.343; 2008, c.84, s.2.
NJSA 2C:35-16 was amended to provide: "compelling circumstances warranting an exception if the forfeiture of the person's right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this state will result in extreme hardship and alternative means of transportation are not available.
In the case of State v. Bendix396 NJ Super. 91 (App. Div 2007), the Appellate Division held the lower court took too restrictive a view of the court's discretion, under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-16a, to grant defendant a hardship exception from the requirement that his driver's license be suspended due to his conviction for drug offenses.
39:4-49.1 Drug possession by motor vehicle operator
39:4-49.1 Drug possession by motor vehicle operator
No person shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway while knowingly having in his possession or in the motor vehicle any controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedules I, II, III, IV and V of the "New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substances Act," P.L. 1970, c. 226 (C. 24:21-1 et seq.) or any prescription legend drug, unless the person has obtained the substance or drug from, or on a valid written prescription of, a duly licensed physician, veterinarian, dentist or other medical practitioner licensed to write prescriptions intended for the treatment or prevention of disease in man or animals or unless the person possesses a controlled dangerous substance pursuant to a lawful order of a practitioner or lawfully possesses a Schedule V substance.
A person who violates this section shall be fined not less than $50.00 and shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle for a period of two years from the date of his conviction.
This means a mandatory two year license suspension with no ability to drive to work, school, etc. It is important to get this ticket dismissed. It is not subject to Conditional Discharge. The Judge has no discretion to not suspend your license for two years if you plead guilty or are found guilty.
You need to have your attorney either win at trial or negotiate to have this charge dismissed.
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500
39:4-128.1 Passing school bus while picking up
39:4-128.1 Passing school bus while
picking up or discharging
First offense: Fine or
imprisonment not exceeding 15
days or 15 days community
service, or both
fine $100 -$1,000
5 NJ MVC Points 39:4-128.1 Improper passing of school bus
|
5
|
Plus 5 car insurance points
Plus Judge Can Suspend DL for Willful Traffic Offense.
State v. Moran 202 NJ 311 (2010)
The license suspension provision of N.J.S.A.39:5-31, which is published in the Motor Vehicle Code of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated, is not “hidden,” and defendant, like all motorists, is presumed to know the law. To ensure that license suspensions meted out pursuant to N.J.S.A.39:5-31 are imposed in a reasonably fair and uniform manner, so that similarly situated defendants are treated similarly, the Court today defines the term “willful violation” contained in N.J.S.A.39:5-31 and enunciates sentencing standards to guide municipal court and Law Division judges
Subsequent offense: Fine or
imprisonment not exceeding 15
days, or both
$250 -$1,000
www.njlaws.com/passing_school_bus.html?id=913&a=
Kenneth Vercammen'sLaw office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey.
39:4-128.1
School buses stopped for children, certain disabled persons, duty of motorists, bus driver; violations, penalties.
1. On highways having roadways not divided by safety islands or physical traffic separation installations, the driver of a vehicle approaching or overtaking a bus, which is being used for the transportation of children to or from school or a summer day camp or any school connected activity, or which is being used for the transportation of a person who has a developmental disability, and which has stopped for the purpose of receiving or discharging any child or a person who has a developmental disability, shall stop such vehicle not less than 25 feet from such school bus and keep such vehicle stationary until such child or person who has a developmental disability has entered said bus or has alighted and reached the side of such highway and until a flashing red light is no longer exhibited by the bus; provided, such bus is designated as a school bus by one sign on the front and one sign on the rear, with each letter on such signs at least four inches in height.
On highways having dual or multiple roadways separated by safety islands or physical traffic separation installations, the driver of a vehicle overtaking a school bus, which has stopped for the purpose of receiving or discharging any child or any person who has a developmental disability, shall stop such vehicle not less than 25 feet from such school bus and keep such vehicle stationary until such child or person who has a developmental disability has entered said bus or has alighted and reached the side of the highway and until a flashing red light is no longer exhibited by the bus.
On highways having dual or multiple roadways separated by safety islands or physical traffic separation installations, the driver of a vehicle on another roadway approaching a school bus, which has stopped for the purpose of receiving or discharging any child, or any person who has a developmental disability shall reduce the speed of his vehicle to not more than 10 miles per hour and shall not resume normal speed until the vehicle has passed the bus and has passed any child who may have alighted therefrom or be about to enter said bus.
For purposes of this section, "highway" means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way whether publicly or privately maintained when any part thereof is open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel.
Whenever a school bus is parked at the curb for the purpose of receiving children directly from a school or a summer day camp or any school connected activity or discharging children to enter a school, or a summer day camp or any school connected activity, which is located on the same side of the street as that on which the bus is parked, drivers of vehicles shall be permitted to pass said bus without stopping, but at a speed not in excess of 10 miles per hour.
Whenever a school bus is parked at the curb for the purpose of receiving or discharging a person who has a developmental disability on the same side of the street as that on which the bus is parked, drivers of vehicles shall be permitted to pass the bus without stopping, but at a speed not in excess of 10 miles per hour.
The driver of a bus which is being used for the transportation of children to or from school or a summer day camp or any school connected activity, or for the transportation of a person who has a developmental disability shall continue to exhibit a flashing red light and shall not start his bus until every child who may have alighted therefrom shall have reached a place of safety.
Any person who shall violate any provision of this act shall be subject to (1) a fine of not less than $100.00, (2) imprisonment for not more than 15 days or community service for 15 days in such form and on such terms as the court shall deem appropriate, (3) or both for the first offense, and a fine not less than $250.00, imprisonment for not more than 15 days, or both for each subsequent offense. The penalties shall be enforced and recovered pursuant to the provisions of chapter 5 of Title 39 of the Revised Statutes. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the registered owner of the vehicle which was involved in the violation of this section was the person who committed the act. Any person who suppresses, by way of concealment or destruction, any evidence of a violation of this section or who suppresses the identity of the violator shall be subject to a fine of $100.
The Chief Administrator of the Motor Vehicle Commission may also revoke the license to drive a motor vehicle of any person who shall have been guilty of such willful violation of any of the provisions of this act as shall, in the discretion of the chief administrator, justify such revocation, but the chief administrator shall, at all times, have power to validate such a license which has been revoked, or to grant a new license to any person whose license to drive a motor vehicle shall have been revoked pursuant to this act.
L.1942, c.192, s.1; amended 1948, c.132; 1949, c.102, s.1; 1951, c.23, s.71; 1966, c.235, s.1; 1968, c.171, s.1; 1983, c.27; 1989, c.319, s.1; 1992, c.72; 2000, c.85, s.2; 2012, c.20, s.2.
Copyright 2018 Vercammen Law
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
732-572-0500
www.njlaws.com
Wednesday, July 18, 2018
Limitation on Lawsuit Threshold/Verbal Car Accident
What is the Limitation on Lawsuit Threshold/Verbal Car Insurance Law? -It Prohibits Citizens without permanent Injuries From Recovery of Medical Deductibles and Injuries Against Drunk & Careless Drivers
Compiled by Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. from materials supplied by ATLA and other consumer organizations The car insurance laws have changed dramatically. You now have to make an important decision to protect you and your family. The new law requires your insurance company to send you a form where you choose between two types of auto insurance. One is called "No Limitation on Lawsuit option or No Threshold". The other is called "Limitation on lawsuit option or Lawsuit/ Verbal Threshold".
The insurance companies want you to choose the Limitation on lawsuit/ Lawsuit Threshold so they can make more money. What they dont want you to know is that Limitation on lawsuit/ Lawsuit Threshold limits many of your rights. With Limitation on lawsuit/ Lawsuit Threshold if you were injured in an accident caused by a drunk or reckless d river, you would not be compensated unless you suffered such injuries as death, dismemberment, disfigurement, fracture or permanent lifelong injuries.
Under the No Limitation on Lawsuit option or No Threshold, you will retain your Constitutional Rights to a jury trial if you are injured in a car accident. You may bring a claim against a driver who injures you, and be compensated for your pain, lost wages and suffering.
THRESHOLD PROTECTION- PICK NO LIMITATION THRESHOLD PROTECTION UNDER YOUR CAR INSURANCE
What you dont know about your automobile insurance can hurt you. The following important information on automobile insurance law will explain that you may already have given up your right to make a claim or sue for damages. The purpose of the law which affects all New Jersey policy holders and their families, is to change choices. We recommend no threshold and suggest you write to your insurance company immediately.
"Limitation on Lawsuit Option/ Verbal" threshold costs less than no threshold, but the reduction in cost limits your legal right to make a claim or file a lawsuit to recover money for pain and suffering if you or members of your family are injured in an automobile accident.
Q. What is the "limitation on lawsuit option"?
A. The lawsuit limitation option (also known as the verbal threshold) limits your legal rights to make a claim for monetary damages or to file a lawsuit against a careless driver unless you sustain one of the following types of injury.
Type 1 - Death Type 2 - Dismemberment Type 3 - Significant disfigurement or scarring Type 4 - Displaced fracture Type 5 - Loss of a fetus Type 6 - Permanent injury
A permanent injury occurs when a body part has not and will not heal to function normally. WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU DO NOT ELECT THE "LIMITATION ON LAWSUIT OPTION." The injury must be established by objective medical finding such as the doctors observation of the physical injuries, x-ray, CT-scan, myleogram and MRI, and if such objective evidence is not found, then I cannot successfully prosecute a claim for non-economic loss. You must agree to assist your attorney in obtaining medical records and reports in connection with a Limitation/ Lawsuit/ Verbal Threshold case.
Q. What is the "no limitation on lawsuit option"?
A. The no limitation option (also known as "no threshold") permits you to make a claim or to file a lawsuit against a careless driver for any and all personal injuries. WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU ELECT THE "NO LIMITATION ON LAWSUIT OPTION."
Q. What happens if I choose the Lawsuit Threshold and my injuries are not included in one of the 6 types?
A. You are not permitted to make a claim or file a lawsuit to recover money for pain and suffering. For example, if you injure your neck back head, arms or legs, but the injury is not permanent or your use is not significantly limited, you cant sue or even make a claim for an out-of court settlement even though your in jury required medical treatment and caused you pain and suffering.
Q. Who benefits when I am not able to make a claim or sue?
A. Careless drivers who cause accidents have no responsibility for the injuries they cause. Their insurance companies profit because they do not have to pay money to injured persons.
Q. If I choose the Lawsuit Threshold, am I the only one who cant make a claim or sue?
A. No. Lawsuit Threshold coverage applies to your spouse and any children living with you who do not have their own automobile insurance coverage. They also lose the right to sue or even make a claim.
Q. My other coverage choice, No Threshold, what is it?
A. No Limitation/ No Threshold protects your right to recover money for pain and suffering no matter what the injury.
Q. How do I choose the type of coverage I want for myself and my family?
A. When you renew or purchase an automobile insurance policy, your insurance company will provide you with a coverage selection form. You can also contact your insurance company immediately and pick No Threshold. If you need assistance, please schedule an appointment with Ken Vercammen to discuss you rights.
If, at the time of your insurance renewal, if you fail to choose NO LIMITATION/ NO THRESHOLD, you will automatically be given the LIMITATION/ LAWSUIT THRESHOLD. With the LIMITATION/ LAWSUIT THRESHOLD you will not be fully protected against a careless driver who hits you.
If you want to fully protect yourself from a negligent driver who injures you, choose NO THRESHOLD. Dont be fooled into false savings. Know what your rights are before you sign them away.
Please feel free to call Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. to schedule a for free in office consultation.. 732-572-0500
Relevant caselaw and legal argument successfully used in prior cases:
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE INJURIES EXCEED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE VERBAL THRESHOLD __________________________________________________________
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC 2053 Woodbridge Ave. Edison, NJ 08817 732-572-0500 Attorney for Plaintiff,
PLAINTIFFS INJURIES MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE VERBAL THRESHOLD STATUTE.
N.J.S.A. 39:6A 8 requires plaintiff to prove his/her injuries fall into at least one of six categories as set forth in the statute. The plaintiffs injuries fulfill the requirements of #6 of the categories. Specifically enumerated:
Type (6) Permanent Injury. It is plaintiffs contention that a serious and significant injury was indeed suffered as a result of the accident. The Supreme Court case of Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290 (1992) originally set forth that plaintiffs who can show objective evidence of injury and disability that fit the statutory definition of "serious injury" will be considered to have made out a prima facie case of "serious injury". Oswin Supra. at 318. Plaintiffs attached certification also describes plaintiffs subjective complaints and limitations. The Doctor has reviewed this Brief and is incorporating the following by reference. Plaintiff has significant limitations of both the cervical and dorsal ranges of motion as set forth herein above. There is tenderness and spasms in both plaintiffs cervical musculature and lumbar spine upon palpation. The plaintiff will experience recurring episodes of pain and weakness in the future following lifting, bending and stretching for any length of time. As the plaintiffs work and home life require such lifting, bending and stretching, she continues and will in the future continue to suffer pain and weakness in performing these necessary movements.
The Appellate Division in Owens v. Kessler 272 NJ Super. 225 (App. Div. 1994) held that a spasm is an objective manifestation of injury and summary judgment for defendants should not have been granted in this verbal threshold case since plaintiffs medical experts report, showing continued evidence of spasm after cessation of medical treatment, clearly constitutes prima facie objective evidence of permanent injury or at the very least raises a genuine issue of material fact. In Owens the motion judge erred in inferring that not having neurological treatment diminished the veracity of plaintiffs claim in the absence of medical opinion to support that inference; plaintiffs uncontradicted claims that the injuries rendered him unable to continue to participate actively in sports and interfered both with the only jobs he was able to secure and with his pursuit of a high school diploma warranted submission to a jury with respect to whether the claimed disability had a serious impact on his life. The motion judge failed to properly evaluate the medical proofs in accordance with the standard mandated by Rule 4:62-2. In Brown v. Puente, 257 N.J. Super. 203 (App. Div. 1992), the plaintiff was on summer vacation after his junior year in high school when he injured his neck and back in an automobile accident. Two years after the accident, he continued to complain of daily headaches, stiffness and chronic pain. His doctor reported evidence of limitation of motion accompanied by marked tenderness, muscle spasm and pain. He concluded that the injuries were of "a permanent nature especially since they have lasted as long as they have after the accident and course of intensive physical therapy." The Appellate Division found that the report of the plaintiffs doctor supported "an objectively determined substantial limitation of motion." In addition, the court found that the plaintiff established that the injuries had a substantial impact on his life. He certified that he had to give up high school athletics due to severe chronic pain and that he had difficulty managing as a college student since he was unable to sit or study for long periods of time. Accordingly, the court denied the defendants motion to dismiss the complaint. In Dabal v Sodera 260 NJ Super. 397 (App. Div. 1992), the plaintiff sustained injuries to her neck and back. She was treated with a variety of modalities. She was examined by medical expert Dr. Morris Horwitz, a certified disability claim evaluator, two years after the accident. Dr. Horwitz found a derangement of the cervical and lumbar spine with limitation of motion. Dr. Horwitz in Dabal diagnosed a cervical hyper acceleration injury, lumbosacral sprain and diffuse cervical and lumbar myositis. He concluded the injuries were permanent. The Appellate Division in Dabal found that the plaintiff satisfied the objective standard by providing an experts report with credible evidence of objective findings. The court found that the plaintiff also satisfied the subjective standard of "serious impact" on her life. The plaintiff stated that she cannot sit or drive more than 25 minutes and cannot sleep without pain. In addition, she said that dancing had been an important social activity in her life and that she has been unable to dance since the accident. At the outset, the Appellate Division clarified "the perspective from which a trial judge must consider a defendants verbal threshold summary judgment motion" and noted that the "judge is not to make a pre-trial determination of such factual issues." The court in Dabal noted that the plaintiff was unable to participate in a primary social activity as a result of her injuries. The court stated:
"We do not view that assertion as expressing a trivial concern to her, if, indeed, dancing had been important to her and if, her injuries have deprived her of the ability to pursue that activity. Obviously what constitutes a deprivation having only a minimal and inconsequential life-affecting impact on one person may have a serious impact on another person."
As a result, the court held that the plaintiffs injuries had a "serious impact" on her life because she was unable to engage in "social or recreational activity which had been a significant and important component of [her] way of life." In Foti v Johnson 269 NJ Super. 198 (App. Div. 1993), Judge Pressler wrote for the court that the plaintiff met the verbal threshold with production of objective medical evidence that a back injury aggravated a pre-existing condition. When an automobile is struck from the rear, it is abruptly accelerated in a forward direction. The force and suddenness of such an impact upon the occupant of a vehicle so struck, causes the neck to hyper extend beyond its normal range of motion. The occupants head is caused to strike the back of the seat and then almost instantly is jolted in the reverse direction or forward in flexion due to tissue elasticity and the deceleration of the car. This sudden hyperextension occurs within the first one quarter of a second following impact, so rapidly that the normal protective reflex mechanisms cannot function. In rear end collisions, injury results from the relative acceleration of the head and trunk of the occupant, and the degree of injury is independent of the rate of acceleration of the car. Significant discomfort may be delayed for at least 24 hours following the accident. The patients complaints may include neck discomfort, or the pain may be experienced only in the shoulder or in the arms or in the back of the head. Pain may be referred to the interscapular region or to the sub occipital region. Headaches are common. In hyperextension injuries to the neck, there is no prevention of movement until the head hits the chest wall, and this is beyond the physiologically permitted limit. Because the permitted physiological range of extension is very short when the neck is slightly rotated, the posterior joints can soon be pushed beyond the physiological range, and injury results from extension strain. Subsequent pain causes the muscle supporting the injured area to go into spasm in an effort to immobilize the area as a protective mechanism from further aggravation and injury. When ligaments and tendons have been torn, stretched or ruptured, adhesions will develop at the site of attachment. When connective tissue is injured, it is replaced by scar tissue which does not have any elastic properties or the mobility of the previously uninjured tissue. The formation of scar tissue then causes a loss in the normal range of motion which is demonstrated on neurological and orthopedic testing. The patient is subject to episodes of remission and exacerbations caused by various aggravations. Due to the mechanism of trauma induced injury there is a general weakening of the supporting soft tissue structure. A number of long term studies have indicated that pain with no evident physical cause persists in 20% to 45% of patients with significant cervical injuries. X ray studies demonstrate that degenerative problems develop after injury in 39% of patients, whereas by comparison, only 6% of the general population over the age 30 develop degenerative changes over a comparable time. Thus it appears obvious that cervical injuries predispose patients to cervical degenerative osteoarthritis. Additional studies have shown that persistent upper extremity pain, numbness, interscapular pain, cervical curve reversal or one level of localized restricted cervical motion, as early findings, have been associated with long term disability.
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT IN THE INSTANT CASE WHICH CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
In Oswin v. Shaw, Supra. at 307 the Supreme Court stated:
"We choose to follow the N.Y. approach and apply the Summary Judgment model to verbal threshold determinations." The role of the Judge in summary judgment procedure is to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to a material fact, but not to decide the issue if he finds it to exist". Judson, Supra, 17 NJ. at 73 (emphasis added)."
The Oswin Court continued at 307 :
"The verbal threshold determination consists of two questions. (1) Whether under any view of the plaintiffs injuries they can be said to fall within at least one of the nine categories the New Jerseys statutes specifies, and ( 2 ) If so, whether the evidence before the court on Motion for Summary Judgment demonstrates a material dispute of fact regarding the nature and extent of the plaintiffs injuries". In Arencibia v. Rosas 270 N.J. Super 339 (App. Div. 1994), the court wrote that electro-magnetic and nerve-conducting tests, as well as x-rays, may provide the needed objective evidence required under Oswin to satisfy the verbal threshold. On September 21, 1989, plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile owned by Hector Rosas and driven by her then boyfriend, now husband, defendant Julian Rosas, in North Bergen, when it struck the rear of an automobile, owned and operated by defendant Catherine Ulrich, that was stopped at a red light. The arbitrator found Julian Rosas 100 percent liable and Catherine Ulrich 0 percent liable. Plaintiffs damages found to be $17,500.00. Rosas requested a trial de novo. Plaintiffs injuries satisfy category seven: "permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member" or category eight: "significant limitation of use of a body function or system." N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a. The medical evidence shows that plaintiff has satisfied the verbal threshold requirements as delineated in Oswin. Dr. Bravo, a neurologist, found limited range of motion in plaintiffs neck, along with moderate to severe spasm of the thoracic and lumbar areas of spine. Spasm is an objective form of evidence. Id. at 320. However, the record shows much more. Dr. Bravo also noted in his final report of September 27,1990, that plaintiffs "EMG and NCV of the left upper limb and retrocollic area were abnormal, indicating a radiculopathy with involvement of posterior rami." Likewise, Dr. Marsh found objective evidence that plaintiffs ranges of motion "were compromised." He stated that plaintiff had deep and superficial spasm of the cervical, thoracic and lumbosacral sections of the spine. He also reported that x-rays of the cervical spine revealed "reduction of the neutral lateral curve." These x-rays also indicated "marked subluxation with sprain." Under Oswin, x-rays may provide the needed objective evidence, Arencibia v. Rosas, supra. Another neurologist, Dr. Dasika found a 30 percent limitation of movement of the cervical and lumbosacral sections of the spine. Plaintiff continues to take the pain medications that Dr. Dasika prescribed for headaches and pain, Arencibia v. Rosas, supra. All of plaintiffs treating physicians concluded that plaintiffs injuries were sustained in the automobile accident of September 21, 1989, and found permanency or significant limitation caused by plaintiffs injuries, Arencibia v. Rosas, supra. In Cineas v. Mammone, 270 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1994), the plaintiff sustained injuries to his neck and back and was treated by an orthopedist, neurologist, psychologist, and an internist. Each of the doctors found objective evidence of muscle spasm and loss of motion and concluded that the injuries were permanent and disabling. In addition, the plaintiff claimed a significant impact on his life including a limitation of overtime work, household chores and sexual relations. The court found that the plaintiff provided medical reports from four treating doctors that showed decreased range of motion and spasm. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff presented credible, objective medical evidence sufficient to establish a significant limitation of use under type 8. The court noted that the record contained conflicting medical reports because a defense orthopedist and psychiatrist found only minimal residual evidence of a mild soft-tissue injury. Nevertheless, where there is a disputed issue of fact, the plaintiff must be afforded the opportunity to present his or her evidence to the finder of fact. As recognized by the Oswin Court, nature and extent of a plaintiffs injuries are questions of fact properly reserved for the jury.
"We hold that the Court should decide only the legal issue of whether a plaintiffs alleged injuries, if evidence thereof is to be believed, would meet the verbal threshold, and we allocate the determination of the nature and extent of the plaintiffs injuries to the jury when the plaintiff shows by credible, objective medical evidence the existence of a material dispute of fact. Oswin, Supra at 322
The plaintiff was shown that a material dispute of fact indeed exists. Furthermore, it is well settled in this state that "Motions for Summary Judgment are granted only with much caution and where there are genuine disputed issues of fact, they must be resolved at a plenary hearing" Shandel v. Shell Oil Co., 195 N.J. Super. 311 (Law Div. 1984). The conflicting expert reports certainly constitute a genuine disputed issue of fact. "On motion for summary judgment, it is movants burden to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact and all inferences of doubt are drawn against movant in favor of opponent. Only when it is palpably disclosed that there is no genuine issue of fact and that movant is entitled to judgment as matter of law should such motion be granted" Selzer v. Isaacson, 147 N. J. Super 308 (App. Div. 1977). If all inferences of doubt are to be drawn against the moving party, then defendants motion for summary judgment must be denied. In Moreno v. Greenfield, 272 NJ Super 456 (App. Div. 1994), the Appellate Division noted that "we have not lost sight of the fact that this evidence was presented at a Summary Judgment motion when all favored inferences must be granted to the plaintiff." Rule 4:46-2, Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67,75 (1954). The Court in Brill v Guardian Life 142 NJ 520 (1995) still requires the Court to review all evidence, not to just dismiss cases as the defense suggests. In Moreno the court noted that, "We will, however, independently examine plaintiffs proofs and pass on this issue. In doing so, we must view plaintiffs activities as she participated in them prior to the accident. We do not treat plaintiffs as fungible commodities." The plaintiff Moreno was an active twenty-two year old who set forth in her certification certain things that she cannot perform including dancing and aerobics. The court noted that each of these difficulties in themselves appear relatively minor, especially when viewed by judges of a different generation. Yet we can appreciate that in the aggregate plaintiff has described loss of a segment of her youth. The total picture is more of a person of middle age rather than a young woman of twenty-four. Her continuing efforts to continue as close to a normal life style as she can, even in the face of back pain associated with her proven physical injuries, should not disqualify her claim. A jury should find that the totality of the disability from the accident has a "serious impact on the plaintiffs life," quoting Oswin v. Shaw, 192 N.J. at 319, Moreno Slip Op at 9-10. In Cavanaugh v. Morris, 273 NJ Super 38 (App. Div. 1994), the court noted in sum, a complaint alleging a permanent soft tissue injury survives a defense motion for summary judgment if the four propositions are met. The court in Cavanaugh noted that the report of continuing spasm long after the accident meets Oswins objective medical-evidence requirements. The court noted the legislatures verbal threshold scheme patently did not intend to excluded all soft tissue injuries. The trial courts must carefully scrutinize plaintiffs proofs offered in opposition to a summary judgment in the light of Oswin and subsequently developing jurisprudence fairly to determine whether the claim for non-economic loss may continue. The court again reversed and remanded the granting of summary judgment.
___________________________ write in name of patient Plaintiff,
v.
Defendants. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION: _________ COUNTY
DOCKET NO.
Civil Action
AFFIDAVIT of Merit Under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8.a. THAT INJURIES EXCEED THE LAWSUIT/VERBAL THRESHOLD
I ______________________________ (physician) certify that: 1. I am a permanent resident of this State and a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State of New Jersey. I am and have been in the actual practice of ___________________ since __________, which includes my residency training. I graduated from _______________________ and have been licensed in New Jersey for ______ years. 2. I am a licensed physician as defined in N.J.S.A. 45:9-5.1. 3. I am the licensed treating physician to the Plaintiff or a board certified licensed physician to whom the Plaintiff was referred by the treating physician. Any opinions set forth herein are within a reasonable degree of medical probability. 4. The Plaintiff, as a result of a motor vehicle accident on _____________ sustained the following injury: (give diagnosis) ______________________________________________.
5 I am not a relative either through blood or marriage of the patient/plaintiff. 4. My opinion is based upon the circumstances and examination of the patient, plus a history of the condition. 5. I last examined the patient on _____________ and determined the following clinical conditions: __________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________
6 Such injury has resulted in permanent injury. Permanent injury which means a body part or organ or both has not healed to function normally and to medical probability will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment. 7. This certification is based upon the following objective clinical evidence: ____________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________ _ 8 Any testing referred to above is not experimental in nature or dependent entirely upon subjective patient response.
I hereby certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true. I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.
Date: _______________________ ___________________________________ (physicians signature)
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX SS.:
I CERTIFY that on ___________________________, 2004 the doctor personally came before me and acknowledged under oath, to my satisfaction, that this person (or if more than one, each person): (a) is named in and personally signed this document; and (b) signed, sealed and delivered this document as his or her act and deed.
------------------------------------------------------ Notary Seal
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC ATTORNEY AT LAW 2053 Woodbridge Ave. Edison, NJ 08817 (Phone) 732-572-0500 (Fax) 732-572-0030
Compiled by Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. from materials supplied by ATLA and other consumer organizations The car insurance laws have changed dramatically. You now have to make an important decision to protect you and your family. The new law requires your insurance company to send you a form where you choose between two types of auto insurance. One is called "No Limitation on Lawsuit option or No Threshold". The other is called "Limitation on lawsuit option or Lawsuit/ Verbal Threshold".
The insurance companies want you to choose the Limitation on lawsuit/ Lawsuit Threshold so they can make more money. What they dont want you to know is that Limitation on lawsuit/ Lawsuit Threshold limits many of your rights. With Limitation on lawsuit/ Lawsuit Threshold if you were injured in an accident caused by a drunk or reckless d river, you would not be compensated unless you suffered such injuries as death, dismemberment, disfigurement, fracture or permanent lifelong injuries.
Under the No Limitation on Lawsuit option or No Threshold, you will retain your Constitutional Rights to a jury trial if you are injured in a car accident. You may bring a claim against a driver who injures you, and be compensated for your pain, lost wages and suffering.
THRESHOLD PROTECTION- PICK NO LIMITATION THRESHOLD PROTECTION UNDER YOUR CAR INSURANCE
What you dont know about your automobile insurance can hurt you. The following important information on automobile insurance law will explain that you may already have given up your right to make a claim or sue for damages. The purpose of the law which affects all New Jersey policy holders and their families, is to change choices. We recommend no threshold and suggest you write to your insurance company immediately.
"Limitation on Lawsuit Option/ Verbal" threshold costs less than no threshold, but the reduction in cost limits your legal right to make a claim or file a lawsuit to recover money for pain and suffering if you or members of your family are injured in an automobile accident.
Q. What is the "limitation on lawsuit option"?
A. The lawsuit limitation option (also known as the verbal threshold) limits your legal rights to make a claim for monetary damages or to file a lawsuit against a careless driver unless you sustain one of the following types of injury.
Type 1 - Death Type 2 - Dismemberment Type 3 - Significant disfigurement or scarring Type 4 - Displaced fracture Type 5 - Loss of a fetus Type 6 - Permanent injury
A permanent injury occurs when a body part has not and will not heal to function normally. WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU DO NOT ELECT THE "LIMITATION ON LAWSUIT OPTION." The injury must be established by objective medical finding such as the doctors observation of the physical injuries, x-ray, CT-scan, myleogram and MRI, and if such objective evidence is not found, then I cannot successfully prosecute a claim for non-economic loss. You must agree to assist your attorney in obtaining medical records and reports in connection with a Limitation/ Lawsuit/ Verbal Threshold case.
Q. What is the "no limitation on lawsuit option"?
A. The no limitation option (also known as "no threshold") permits you to make a claim or to file a lawsuit against a careless driver for any and all personal injuries. WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU ELECT THE "NO LIMITATION ON LAWSUIT OPTION."
Q. What happens if I choose the Lawsuit Threshold and my injuries are not included in one of the 6 types?
A. You are not permitted to make a claim or file a lawsuit to recover money for pain and suffering. For example, if you injure your neck back head, arms or legs, but the injury is not permanent or your use is not significantly limited, you cant sue or even make a claim for an out-of court settlement even though your in jury required medical treatment and caused you pain and suffering.
Q. Who benefits when I am not able to make a claim or sue?
A. Careless drivers who cause accidents have no responsibility for the injuries they cause. Their insurance companies profit because they do not have to pay money to injured persons.
Q. If I choose the Lawsuit Threshold, am I the only one who cant make a claim or sue?
A. No. Lawsuit Threshold coverage applies to your spouse and any children living with you who do not have their own automobile insurance coverage. They also lose the right to sue or even make a claim.
Q. My other coverage choice, No Threshold, what is it?
A. No Limitation/ No Threshold protects your right to recover money for pain and suffering no matter what the injury.
Q. How do I choose the type of coverage I want for myself and my family?
A. When you renew or purchase an automobile insurance policy, your insurance company will provide you with a coverage selection form. You can also contact your insurance company immediately and pick No Threshold. If you need assistance, please schedule an appointment with Ken Vercammen to discuss you rights.
If, at the time of your insurance renewal, if you fail to choose NO LIMITATION/ NO THRESHOLD, you will automatically be given the LIMITATION/ LAWSUIT THRESHOLD. With the LIMITATION/ LAWSUIT THRESHOLD you will not be fully protected against a careless driver who hits you.
If you want to fully protect yourself from a negligent driver who injures you, choose NO THRESHOLD. Dont be fooled into false savings. Know what your rights are before you sign them away.
Please feel free to call Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. to schedule a for free in office consultation.. 732-572-0500
Relevant caselaw and legal argument successfully used in prior cases:
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE INJURIES EXCEED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE VERBAL THRESHOLD __________________________________________________________
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC 2053 Woodbridge Ave. Edison, NJ 08817 732-572-0500 Attorney for Plaintiff,
PLAINTIFFS INJURIES MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE VERBAL THRESHOLD STATUTE.
N.J.S.A. 39:6A 8 requires plaintiff to prove his/her injuries fall into at least one of six categories as set forth in the statute. The plaintiffs injuries fulfill the requirements of #6 of the categories. Specifically enumerated:
Type (6) Permanent Injury. It is plaintiffs contention that a serious and significant injury was indeed suffered as a result of the accident. The Supreme Court case of Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290 (1992) originally set forth that plaintiffs who can show objective evidence of injury and disability that fit the statutory definition of "serious injury" will be considered to have made out a prima facie case of "serious injury". Oswin Supra. at 318. Plaintiffs attached certification also describes plaintiffs subjective complaints and limitations. The Doctor has reviewed this Brief and is incorporating the following by reference. Plaintiff has significant limitations of both the cervical and dorsal ranges of motion as set forth herein above. There is tenderness and spasms in both plaintiffs cervical musculature and lumbar spine upon palpation. The plaintiff will experience recurring episodes of pain and weakness in the future following lifting, bending and stretching for any length of time. As the plaintiffs work and home life require such lifting, bending and stretching, she continues and will in the future continue to suffer pain and weakness in performing these necessary movements.
The Appellate Division in Owens v. Kessler 272 NJ Super. 225 (App. Div. 1994) held that a spasm is an objective manifestation of injury and summary judgment for defendants should not have been granted in this verbal threshold case since plaintiffs medical experts report, showing continued evidence of spasm after cessation of medical treatment, clearly constitutes prima facie objective evidence of permanent injury or at the very least raises a genuine issue of material fact. In Owens the motion judge erred in inferring that not having neurological treatment diminished the veracity of plaintiffs claim in the absence of medical opinion to support that inference; plaintiffs uncontradicted claims that the injuries rendered him unable to continue to participate actively in sports and interfered both with the only jobs he was able to secure and with his pursuit of a high school diploma warranted submission to a jury with respect to whether the claimed disability had a serious impact on his life. The motion judge failed to properly evaluate the medical proofs in accordance with the standard mandated by Rule 4:62-2. In Brown v. Puente, 257 N.J. Super. 203 (App. Div. 1992), the plaintiff was on summer vacation after his junior year in high school when he injured his neck and back in an automobile accident. Two years after the accident, he continued to complain of daily headaches, stiffness and chronic pain. His doctor reported evidence of limitation of motion accompanied by marked tenderness, muscle spasm and pain. He concluded that the injuries were of "a permanent nature especially since they have lasted as long as they have after the accident and course of intensive physical therapy." The Appellate Division found that the report of the plaintiffs doctor supported "an objectively determined substantial limitation of motion." In addition, the court found that the plaintiff established that the injuries had a substantial impact on his life. He certified that he had to give up high school athletics due to severe chronic pain and that he had difficulty managing as a college student since he was unable to sit or study for long periods of time. Accordingly, the court denied the defendants motion to dismiss the complaint. In Dabal v Sodera 260 NJ Super. 397 (App. Div. 1992), the plaintiff sustained injuries to her neck and back. She was treated with a variety of modalities. She was examined by medical expert Dr. Morris Horwitz, a certified disability claim evaluator, two years after the accident. Dr. Horwitz found a derangement of the cervical and lumbar spine with limitation of motion. Dr. Horwitz in Dabal diagnosed a cervical hyper acceleration injury, lumbosacral sprain and diffuse cervical and lumbar myositis. He concluded the injuries were permanent. The Appellate Division in Dabal found that the plaintiff satisfied the objective standard by providing an experts report with credible evidence of objective findings. The court found that the plaintiff also satisfied the subjective standard of "serious impact" on her life. The plaintiff stated that she cannot sit or drive more than 25 minutes and cannot sleep without pain. In addition, she said that dancing had been an important social activity in her life and that she has been unable to dance since the accident. At the outset, the Appellate Division clarified "the perspective from which a trial judge must consider a defendants verbal threshold summary judgment motion" and noted that the "judge is not to make a pre-trial determination of such factual issues." The court in Dabal noted that the plaintiff was unable to participate in a primary social activity as a result of her injuries. The court stated:
"We do not view that assertion as expressing a trivial concern to her, if, indeed, dancing had been important to her and if, her injuries have deprived her of the ability to pursue that activity. Obviously what constitutes a deprivation having only a minimal and inconsequential life-affecting impact on one person may have a serious impact on another person."
As a result, the court held that the plaintiffs injuries had a "serious impact" on her life because she was unable to engage in "social or recreational activity which had been a significant and important component of [her] way of life." In Foti v Johnson 269 NJ Super. 198 (App. Div. 1993), Judge Pressler wrote for the court that the plaintiff met the verbal threshold with production of objective medical evidence that a back injury aggravated a pre-existing condition. When an automobile is struck from the rear, it is abruptly accelerated in a forward direction. The force and suddenness of such an impact upon the occupant of a vehicle so struck, causes the neck to hyper extend beyond its normal range of motion. The occupants head is caused to strike the back of the seat and then almost instantly is jolted in the reverse direction or forward in flexion due to tissue elasticity and the deceleration of the car. This sudden hyperextension occurs within the first one quarter of a second following impact, so rapidly that the normal protective reflex mechanisms cannot function. In rear end collisions, injury results from the relative acceleration of the head and trunk of the occupant, and the degree of injury is independent of the rate of acceleration of the car. Significant discomfort may be delayed for at least 24 hours following the accident. The patients complaints may include neck discomfort, or the pain may be experienced only in the shoulder or in the arms or in the back of the head. Pain may be referred to the interscapular region or to the sub occipital region. Headaches are common. In hyperextension injuries to the neck, there is no prevention of movement until the head hits the chest wall, and this is beyond the physiologically permitted limit. Because the permitted physiological range of extension is very short when the neck is slightly rotated, the posterior joints can soon be pushed beyond the physiological range, and injury results from extension strain. Subsequent pain causes the muscle supporting the injured area to go into spasm in an effort to immobilize the area as a protective mechanism from further aggravation and injury. When ligaments and tendons have been torn, stretched or ruptured, adhesions will develop at the site of attachment. When connective tissue is injured, it is replaced by scar tissue which does not have any elastic properties or the mobility of the previously uninjured tissue. The formation of scar tissue then causes a loss in the normal range of motion which is demonstrated on neurological and orthopedic testing. The patient is subject to episodes of remission and exacerbations caused by various aggravations. Due to the mechanism of trauma induced injury there is a general weakening of the supporting soft tissue structure. A number of long term studies have indicated that pain with no evident physical cause persists in 20% to 45% of patients with significant cervical injuries. X ray studies demonstrate that degenerative problems develop after injury in 39% of patients, whereas by comparison, only 6% of the general population over the age 30 develop degenerative changes over a comparable time. Thus it appears obvious that cervical injuries predispose patients to cervical degenerative osteoarthritis. Additional studies have shown that persistent upper extremity pain, numbness, interscapular pain, cervical curve reversal or one level of localized restricted cervical motion, as early findings, have been associated with long term disability.
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT IN THE INSTANT CASE WHICH CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
In Oswin v. Shaw, Supra. at 307 the Supreme Court stated:
"We choose to follow the N.Y. approach and apply the Summary Judgment model to verbal threshold determinations." The role of the Judge in summary judgment procedure is to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to a material fact, but not to decide the issue if he finds it to exist". Judson, Supra, 17 NJ. at 73 (emphasis added)."
The Oswin Court continued at 307 :
"The verbal threshold determination consists of two questions. (1) Whether under any view of the plaintiffs injuries they can be said to fall within at least one of the nine categories the New Jerseys statutes specifies, and ( 2 ) If so, whether the evidence before the court on Motion for Summary Judgment demonstrates a material dispute of fact regarding the nature and extent of the plaintiffs injuries". In Arencibia v. Rosas 270 N.J. Super 339 (App. Div. 1994), the court wrote that electro-magnetic and nerve-conducting tests, as well as x-rays, may provide the needed objective evidence required under Oswin to satisfy the verbal threshold. On September 21, 1989, plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile owned by Hector Rosas and driven by her then boyfriend, now husband, defendant Julian Rosas, in North Bergen, when it struck the rear of an automobile, owned and operated by defendant Catherine Ulrich, that was stopped at a red light. The arbitrator found Julian Rosas 100 percent liable and Catherine Ulrich 0 percent liable. Plaintiffs damages found to be $17,500.00. Rosas requested a trial de novo. Plaintiffs injuries satisfy category seven: "permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member" or category eight: "significant limitation of use of a body function or system." N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a. The medical evidence shows that plaintiff has satisfied the verbal threshold requirements as delineated in Oswin. Dr. Bravo, a neurologist, found limited range of motion in plaintiffs neck, along with moderate to severe spasm of the thoracic and lumbar areas of spine. Spasm is an objective form of evidence. Id. at 320. However, the record shows much more. Dr. Bravo also noted in his final report of September 27,1990, that plaintiffs "EMG and NCV of the left upper limb and retrocollic area were abnormal, indicating a radiculopathy with involvement of posterior rami." Likewise, Dr. Marsh found objective evidence that plaintiffs ranges of motion "were compromised." He stated that plaintiff had deep and superficial spasm of the cervical, thoracic and lumbosacral sections of the spine. He also reported that x-rays of the cervical spine revealed "reduction of the neutral lateral curve." These x-rays also indicated "marked subluxation with sprain." Under Oswin, x-rays may provide the needed objective evidence, Arencibia v. Rosas, supra. Another neurologist, Dr. Dasika found a 30 percent limitation of movement of the cervical and lumbosacral sections of the spine. Plaintiff continues to take the pain medications that Dr. Dasika prescribed for headaches and pain, Arencibia v. Rosas, supra. All of plaintiffs treating physicians concluded that plaintiffs injuries were sustained in the automobile accident of September 21, 1989, and found permanency or significant limitation caused by plaintiffs injuries, Arencibia v. Rosas, supra. In Cineas v. Mammone, 270 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 1994), the plaintiff sustained injuries to his neck and back and was treated by an orthopedist, neurologist, psychologist, and an internist. Each of the doctors found objective evidence of muscle spasm and loss of motion and concluded that the injuries were permanent and disabling. In addition, the plaintiff claimed a significant impact on his life including a limitation of overtime work, household chores and sexual relations. The court found that the plaintiff provided medical reports from four treating doctors that showed decreased range of motion and spasm. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff presented credible, objective medical evidence sufficient to establish a significant limitation of use under type 8. The court noted that the record contained conflicting medical reports because a defense orthopedist and psychiatrist found only minimal residual evidence of a mild soft-tissue injury. Nevertheless, where there is a disputed issue of fact, the plaintiff must be afforded the opportunity to present his or her evidence to the finder of fact. As recognized by the Oswin Court, nature and extent of a plaintiffs injuries are questions of fact properly reserved for the jury.
"We hold that the Court should decide only the legal issue of whether a plaintiffs alleged injuries, if evidence thereof is to be believed, would meet the verbal threshold, and we allocate the determination of the nature and extent of the plaintiffs injuries to the jury when the plaintiff shows by credible, objective medical evidence the existence of a material dispute of fact. Oswin, Supra at 322
The plaintiff was shown that a material dispute of fact indeed exists. Furthermore, it is well settled in this state that "Motions for Summary Judgment are granted only with much caution and where there are genuine disputed issues of fact, they must be resolved at a plenary hearing" Shandel v. Shell Oil Co., 195 N.J. Super. 311 (Law Div. 1984). The conflicting expert reports certainly constitute a genuine disputed issue of fact. "On motion for summary judgment, it is movants burden to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact and all inferences of doubt are drawn against movant in favor of opponent. Only when it is palpably disclosed that there is no genuine issue of fact and that movant is entitled to judgment as matter of law should such motion be granted" Selzer v. Isaacson, 147 N. J. Super 308 (App. Div. 1977). If all inferences of doubt are to be drawn against the moving party, then defendants motion for summary judgment must be denied. In Moreno v. Greenfield, 272 NJ Super 456 (App. Div. 1994), the Appellate Division noted that "we have not lost sight of the fact that this evidence was presented at a Summary Judgment motion when all favored inferences must be granted to the plaintiff." Rule 4:46-2, Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67,75 (1954). The Court in Brill v Guardian Life 142 NJ 520 (1995) still requires the Court to review all evidence, not to just dismiss cases as the defense suggests. In Moreno the court noted that, "We will, however, independently examine plaintiffs proofs and pass on this issue. In doing so, we must view plaintiffs activities as she participated in them prior to the accident. We do not treat plaintiffs as fungible commodities." The plaintiff Moreno was an active twenty-two year old who set forth in her certification certain things that she cannot perform including dancing and aerobics. The court noted that each of these difficulties in themselves appear relatively minor, especially when viewed by judges of a different generation. Yet we can appreciate that in the aggregate plaintiff has described loss of a segment of her youth. The total picture is more of a person of middle age rather than a young woman of twenty-four. Her continuing efforts to continue as close to a normal life style as she can, even in the face of back pain associated with her proven physical injuries, should not disqualify her claim. A jury should find that the totality of the disability from the accident has a "serious impact on the plaintiffs life," quoting Oswin v. Shaw, 192 N.J. at 319, Moreno Slip Op at 9-10. In Cavanaugh v. Morris, 273 NJ Super 38 (App. Div. 1994), the court noted in sum, a complaint alleging a permanent soft tissue injury survives a defense motion for summary judgment if the four propositions are met. The court in Cavanaugh noted that the report of continuing spasm long after the accident meets Oswins objective medical-evidence requirements. The court noted the legislatures verbal threshold scheme patently did not intend to excluded all soft tissue injuries. The trial courts must carefully scrutinize plaintiffs proofs offered in opposition to a summary judgment in the light of Oswin and subsequently developing jurisprudence fairly to determine whether the claim for non-economic loss may continue. The court again reversed and remanded the granting of summary judgment.
___________________________ write in name of patient Plaintiff,
v.
Defendants. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION: _________ COUNTY
DOCKET NO.
Civil Action
AFFIDAVIT of Merit Under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8.a. THAT INJURIES EXCEED THE LAWSUIT/VERBAL THRESHOLD
I ______________________________ (physician) certify that: 1. I am a permanent resident of this State and a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State of New Jersey. I am and have been in the actual practice of ___________________ since __________, which includes my residency training. I graduated from _______________________ and have been licensed in New Jersey for ______ years. 2. I am a licensed physician as defined in N.J.S.A. 45:9-5.1. 3. I am the licensed treating physician to the Plaintiff or a board certified licensed physician to whom the Plaintiff was referred by the treating physician. Any opinions set forth herein are within a reasonable degree of medical probability. 4. The Plaintiff, as a result of a motor vehicle accident on _____________ sustained the following injury: (give diagnosis) ______________________________________________.
5 I am not a relative either through blood or marriage of the patient/plaintiff. 4. My opinion is based upon the circumstances and examination of the patient, plus a history of the condition. 5. I last examined the patient on _____________ and determined the following clinical conditions: __________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________
6 Such injury has resulted in permanent injury. Permanent injury which means a body part or organ or both has not healed to function normally and to medical probability will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment. 7. This certification is based upon the following objective clinical evidence: ____________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________ _ 8 Any testing referred to above is not experimental in nature or dependent entirely upon subjective patient response.
I hereby certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true. I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.
Date: _______________________ ___________________________________ (physicians signature)
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX SS.:
I CERTIFY that on ___________________________, 2004 the doctor personally came before me and acknowledged under oath, to my satisfaction, that this person (or if more than one, each person): (a) is named in and personally signed this document; and (b) signed, sealed and delivered this document as his or her act and deed.
------------------------------------------------------ Notary Seal
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC ATTORNEY AT LAW 2053 Woodbridge Ave. Edison, NJ 08817 (Phone) 732-572-0500 (Fax) 732-572-0030
Tuesday, July 17, 2018
License Revocation
By Kenneth Vercammen
If a driver in New Jersey receives too many points after traffic violations or commits a moving violation while suspended, the Motor Vehicle Commission or MVC [formerly the Division of Motor Vehicles or DMV], will mail the driver a Scheduled Suspension Notice. The MVC/DMV notice will set forth the date the suspension is scheduled to start as well as the length of suspension. In addition, if you received a moving violation ticket while your drivers license was suspended, the MVC/DMV usually also schedules a suspension. If you receive a Scheduled Suspension Notice, it is important to immediately retain an experienced Criminal/Traffic Attorney to discuss possible ways to reduce the suspension.
A written request for hearing must be served on the MVC/DMV. If the written request for hearing is not received prior to the scheduled suspension, the MVC/DMV will automatically suspend your driver's license for the maximum period permitted.
Hearings are generally held in Trenton, Eatontown, Mahwah, and Deptford. Hiring an attorney to reduce license suspension often ranges in costs between $1,000.00-$1,500.00. There is no Public Defender or free attorney in MVC/DMV hearings. Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Our office helps people with traffic/ municipal court tickets including drivers charged with driving while intoxicated, refusal and on driving while suspended.
After you retain an attorney, they will usually serve a written Opposition to Suspension AND REQUEST FOR ALJ HEARING. Your attorney will request a hearing on any proposed suspensions or other administrative actions.
Demand will be made that the Motor Vehicle Commission/Division of Motor Vehicles provide your attorney with discovery pursuant to the New Jersey Administrative Code, NJAC 1:1-1 et seq. and NJAC 1:13-10. Your attorney¹s letter needs to set forth legal issues and defenses he or she intends on raising at the hearing.
DEFENSES
A valid suspension of a driver's license cannot be effectuated in the absence of a written notice to the licensee at his or her last known address. This notice must recite the fact that the suspension will take place and provide the date of commencement of the suspension. State v. Kindler 191 N.J. Super. 358,360 (Law Div 1983). Failure to appear for a summons is not a substitute for the written notice required by the statute, Id at 361.
The MVC/DMV, prior to suspending a license or taking specific action against a driver, must mail a notice to the driver informing them of the proposed suspension or any other action. The proposed action to be taken against any licensee by the MVC/DMV becomes effective on the date set forth on the notice except when otherwise specified. Such is the case unless the licensee or his/her attorney makes a request, in writing, for a hearing within 25 days from the date of notice. New Jersey Administrative Code (NJAC)13:19-1.2.
Under NJAC 13:19-1.2, the MVC/DMV should require a prehearing conference with a MVC/DMV employee, or transmit the matter to the Office of Administrative Law for a hearing pursuant to NJAC 1:1. An Opportunity Hearing is held in Trenton, Eatontown or another regional center. The hearing is often 7 months after the request for hearing. If the parties cannot reach a resolution, the matter will be submitted to the Office of Administrative Law for a hearing. NJAC 13:19-1.8(d).
The motor vehicle statute, NJSA 39:3-40, is quasi-criminal and penal in nature, and must be strictly construed against the State. State vs. Churchdale-Leasing Inc., 115 N.J. 83, 102, 557 A. 2d 277 (1989). The word conviction, as it is used in NJSA 39:3-40, refers only to a plea or a finding of guilt in a court of competent jurisdiction and not to an order of suspension entered by the MVC/DMV as the result of an administrative proceeding. State vs. Conte, 245 NJ Super. 629 (Law Div. 1990).
Generally, an attorney can only reduce the suspension period, not eliminate suspension entirely. However, it is often important to reduce suspension time to save a job or a career. The following details the length of suspensions automatically if no hearing is requested in writing.
N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.2 Point Accumulation; period of suspension
(a) The Director shall, except for good cause, suspend a person's
license to operate a motor vehicle and/or motorized bicycle in accordance with the following schedule:
POINTS ACCUMULATED PERIOD OF SUSPENSION
12 to 15 points in a period of two years or less; 30 days
16 to 18 points in a period of two years or less; 60 days
19 to 21 points in a period of two years or less; 90 days
22 to 24 points in a period of two years or less; 120 days
25 to 27 points in a period of two years or less; 150 days
28 or more points in a period of two years or less; not
less than 180 days
15 to 18 points in a period greater than two years; 30 days
19 to 22 points in a period greater than two years; 60 days
23 to 26 points in a period greater than two years; 90 days
27 to 30 points in a period greater than two years; 120 days
31 to 35 points in a period greater than two years; 150 days
36 or more points in a period greater than two years; no
less than 180 days
12 to 14 points in a period greater than two years; 30 days
Protect your Rights.
Before you accept a drivers license suspension, consult with an attorney who is experienced in handling MVC/DMV matters.
About the Author
Kenneth A. Vercammen is a trial attorney in Edison, Middlesex County, New Jersey. He often lectures for the New Jersey State Bar Association, New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education and Middlesex County College on personal injury, criminal / municipal court law, and drunk driving. He has published 125 articles in national and New Jersey publications on municipal court and litigation topics. He has served as a Special Acting Prosecutor in seven different cities and towns in New Jersey and also successfully defended hundreds of individuals facing Municipal Court and Criminal Court charges.
In his private practice, he has devoted a substantial portion of his professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters. He has appeared in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on many personal injury matters, Municipal Court trials, matrimonial hearings, and contested administrative law hearings.
Since 1985, his primary concentration has been on litigation matters. Mr. Vercammen gained other legal experiences as the Confidential Law Clerk to the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Supreme Court), with the Delaware County, PA District Attorney Office handling Probable Cause Hearings, Middlesex County Probation Dept. as a Probation Officer, and an Executive Assistant to Scranton District Magistrate, Thomas Hart, in Scranton, PA.
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500
(Fax) 732-572-0030
If a driver in New Jersey receives too many points after traffic violations or commits a moving violation while suspended, the Motor Vehicle Commission or MVC [formerly the Division of Motor Vehicles or DMV], will mail the driver a Scheduled Suspension Notice. The MVC/DMV notice will set forth the date the suspension is scheduled to start as well as the length of suspension. In addition, if you received a moving violation ticket while your drivers license was suspended, the MVC/DMV usually also schedules a suspension. If you receive a Scheduled Suspension Notice, it is important to immediately retain an experienced Criminal/Traffic Attorney to discuss possible ways to reduce the suspension.
A written request for hearing must be served on the MVC/DMV. If the written request for hearing is not received prior to the scheduled suspension, the MVC/DMV will automatically suspend your driver's license for the maximum period permitted.
Hearings are generally held in Trenton, Eatontown, Mahwah, and Deptford. Hiring an attorney to reduce license suspension often ranges in costs between $1,000.00-$1,500.00. There is no Public Defender or free attorney in MVC/DMV hearings. Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Our office helps people with traffic/ municipal court tickets including drivers charged with driving while intoxicated, refusal and on driving while suspended.
After you retain an attorney, they will usually serve a written Opposition to Suspension AND REQUEST FOR ALJ HEARING. Your attorney will request a hearing on any proposed suspensions or other administrative actions.
Demand will be made that the Motor Vehicle Commission/Division of Motor Vehicles provide your attorney with discovery pursuant to the New Jersey Administrative Code, NJAC 1:1-1 et seq. and NJAC 1:13-10. Your attorney¹s letter needs to set forth legal issues and defenses he or she intends on raising at the hearing.
DEFENSES
A valid suspension of a driver's license cannot be effectuated in the absence of a written notice to the licensee at his or her last known address. This notice must recite the fact that the suspension will take place and provide the date of commencement of the suspension. State v. Kindler 191 N.J. Super. 358,360 (Law Div 1983). Failure to appear for a summons is not a substitute for the written notice required by the statute, Id at 361.
The MVC/DMV, prior to suspending a license or taking specific action against a driver, must mail a notice to the driver informing them of the proposed suspension or any other action. The proposed action to be taken against any licensee by the MVC/DMV becomes effective on the date set forth on the notice except when otherwise specified. Such is the case unless the licensee or his/her attorney makes a request, in writing, for a hearing within 25 days from the date of notice. New Jersey Administrative Code (NJAC)13:19-1.2.
Under NJAC 13:19-1.2, the MVC/DMV should require a prehearing conference with a MVC/DMV employee, or transmit the matter to the Office of Administrative Law for a hearing pursuant to NJAC 1:1. An Opportunity Hearing is held in Trenton, Eatontown or another regional center. The hearing is often 7 months after the request for hearing. If the parties cannot reach a resolution, the matter will be submitted to the Office of Administrative Law for a hearing. NJAC 13:19-1.8(d).
The motor vehicle statute, NJSA 39:3-40, is quasi-criminal and penal in nature, and must be strictly construed against the State. State vs. Churchdale-Leasing Inc., 115 N.J. 83, 102, 557 A. 2d 277 (1989). The word conviction, as it is used in NJSA 39:3-40, refers only to a plea or a finding of guilt in a court of competent jurisdiction and not to an order of suspension entered by the MVC/DMV as the result of an administrative proceeding. State vs. Conte, 245 NJ Super. 629 (Law Div. 1990).
Generally, an attorney can only reduce the suspension period, not eliminate suspension entirely. However, it is often important to reduce suspension time to save a job or a career. The following details the length of suspensions automatically if no hearing is requested in writing.
N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.2 Point Accumulation; period of suspension
(a) The Director shall, except for good cause, suspend a person's
license to operate a motor vehicle and/or motorized bicycle in accordance with the following schedule:
POINTS ACCUMULATED PERIOD OF SUSPENSION
12 to 15 points in a period of two years or less; 30 days
16 to 18 points in a period of two years or less; 60 days
19 to 21 points in a period of two years or less; 90 days
22 to 24 points in a period of two years or less; 120 days
25 to 27 points in a period of two years or less; 150 days
28 or more points in a period of two years or less; not
less than 180 days
15 to 18 points in a period greater than two years; 30 days
19 to 22 points in a period greater than two years; 60 days
23 to 26 points in a period greater than two years; 90 days
27 to 30 points in a period greater than two years; 120 days
31 to 35 points in a period greater than two years; 150 days
36 or more points in a period greater than two years; no
less than 180 days
12 to 14 points in a period greater than two years; 30 days
Protect your Rights.
Before you accept a drivers license suspension, consult with an attorney who is experienced in handling MVC/DMV matters.
About the Author
Kenneth A. Vercammen is a trial attorney in Edison, Middlesex County, New Jersey. He often lectures for the New Jersey State Bar Association, New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education and Middlesex County College on personal injury, criminal / municipal court law, and drunk driving. He has published 125 articles in national and New Jersey publications on municipal court and litigation topics. He has served as a Special Acting Prosecutor in seven different cities and towns in New Jersey and also successfully defended hundreds of individuals facing Municipal Court and Criminal Court charges.
In his private practice, he has devoted a substantial portion of his professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters. He has appeared in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on many personal injury matters, Municipal Court trials, matrimonial hearings, and contested administrative law hearings.
Since 1985, his primary concentration has been on litigation matters. Mr. Vercammen gained other legal experiences as the Confidential Law Clerk to the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Supreme Court), with the Delaware County, PA District Attorney Office handling Probable Cause Hearings, Middlesex County Probation Dept. as a Probation Officer, and an Executive Assistant to Scranton District Magistrate, Thomas Hart, in Scranton, PA.
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500
(Fax) 732-572-0030
Monday, July 16, 2018
NJ Car Insurance Points in addition to Points imposed by NJ MVC.
NJ Car Insurance Points in addition to Points imposed by NJ MVC.
These points are not the same as those on your driving record maintained by the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission. Insurers assign insurance eligibility points to drivers for motor vehicle violations, suspensions and at-fault accidents.
Schedule of Automobile Insurance Eligibility Points
| |||
N.J.S.A.
|
Event Description
|
DMV Event
|
Points
|
Section
|
Identifier(s)
| ||
Number
|
If applicable
| ||
If applicable
| |||
39:4-50
|
Operating a motor vehicle under the
|
0450; 3261
|
9
|
influence of alcohol or drugs
| |||
39:4-50.4
|
Refusal to submit to a chemical test
|
4504
|
9
|
2C:11-2
|
Vehicular homicide
|
C115
|
9
|
39:3-40 a
|
Operating a motor vehicle while driving
|
0340
|
9
|
through h and j
|
privilege is suspended
| ||
39:6B-2
|
Operating a motor vehicle without
|
06B2
|
9
|
liability insurance
| |||
39:6A-15
|
Misrepresentation of insurance coverage
|
6A15
|
9
|
Each at fault accident
|
5
| ||
* For each full year of a court
|
3
| ||
imposed driver's license suspension
| |||
within the preceding 3 years
| |||
* For each full year within the
|
1
| ||
immediately preceding 3 years that a
| |||
person has not held a driver's license
| |||
Involved in a fatal accident
|
EFTL;
|
4
| |
NFTL
|
2
| ||
39:3-37
|
Obtaining a driver's license or
|
0337; 0312;
|
5
|
registration through deception
|
05D5; 1312;
| ||
MSNJ; MSOS
| |||
39:3-38
|
Make or use counterfeit plate or plates
|
0338
|
5
|
other than issued
| |||
39:3-38.1
|
Make, alter or counterfeit driver's
|
3381
|
5
|
license or registration
| |||
Failure to verify insurance involved in
|
FVIA
|
2
| |
an automobile accident
| |||
.....
| |||
* Points for failure to hold a driver's license in the previous three years
| |||
are not cumulative to points for driver's license suspension.
| |||
Schedule 2
| |||||
N.J.S.A. Section
|
Offense
|
Points
| |||
Number
| |||||
27:23-29
|
Moving against traffic--New Jersey Turnpike, Garden
|
2
| |||
State Parkway, and Atlantic City Expressway
| |||||
27:23-29
|
Improper passing--New Jersey Turnpike, Garden State
|
4
| |||
Parkway, and Atlantic City Expressway
| |||||
27:23-29
|
Unlawful use of median strip--New Jersey Turnpike,
|
2
| |||
Garden State Parkway, and Atlantic City Expressway
| |||||
39:3-20
|
Operating constructor vehicle in excess of 30 mph
|
3
| |||
39:4-14.3
|
Operating motorized bicycle on a restricted highway
|
2
| |||
39:4-14.3d
|
More than one person on a motorized bike
|
2
| |||
39:4-35
|
Failure to yield to pedestrian in crosswalk
|
2
| |||
39:4-36
|
Failure to yield to pedestrian in crosswalk; passing
|
2
| |||
a vehicle yielding to pedestrian in crosswalk
| |||||
39:4-41
|
Driving through a safety zone
|
2
| |||
39:4-52 & 39:5C-1
|
Racing on highway
|
5
| |||
39:4-55
|
Improper action or omission on grades and curves
|
2
| |||
39:4-57
|
Failure to observe direction of officer
|
2
| |||
39:4-66
|
Failure to stop vehicle before crossing sidewalk
|
2
| |||
39:4-66.1
|
Failure to yield to pedestrians or vehicles while
|
2
| |||
entering or leaving highway
| |||||
39:4-71
|
Operating a motor vehicle on a sidewalk
|
2
| |||
39:4-80
|
Failure to obey direction of officer
|
2
| |||
39:4-81
|
Failure to observe traffic signals
|
2
| |||
39:4-82
|
Failure to keep right
|
2
| |||
39:4-82.1
|
Improper operating of vehicle on divided highway or
|
2
| |||
divider
| |||||
39:4-83
|
Failure to keep right at intersection
|
2
| |||
39:4-84
|
Failure to pass to right of vehicle proceeding in
|
5
| |||
opposite direction
| |||||
39:4-85
|
Improper passing on right or off roadway
|
4
| |||
39:4-85.1
|
Wrong way on a one-way street
|
2
| |||
39:4-86
|
Improper passing in no passing zone
|
4
| |||
39:4-87
|
Failure to yield to overtaking vehicle
|
2
| |||
39:4-88
|
Failure to observe traffic lanes
|
2
| |||
39:4-89
|
Tailgating
|
5
| |||
39:4-90
|
Failure to yield at intersection
|
2
| |||
39:4-90.1
|
Failure to use proper entrances to limited access
|
2
| |||
highways
| |||||
39:4-91 & 39:4-92
|
Failure to yield to emergency vehicles
|
2
| |||
39:4-96
|
Reckless driving
|
5
| |||
39:4-97
|
Careless driving
|
2
| |||
39:4-97a
|
Destruction of agricultural or recreational property
|
2
| |||
39:4-97.1
|
Slow speed blocking traffic
|
2
| |||
39:4-98 & 39:4-99
|
Exceeding maximum speed 1-14 mph over limit
|
2
| |||
Exceeding maximum speed 15-29 mph over limit
|
4
| ||||
Exceeding maximum speed 30 mph or more over limit
|
5
| ||||
39:4-105
|
Failure to stop for traffic light
|
2
| |||
39:4-115
|
Improper turn at traffic light
|
3
| |||
39:4-119
|
Failure to stop at flashing red signal
|
2
| |||
39:4-122
|
Failure to stop for police whistle
|
2
| |||
39:4-123
|
Improper right or left turn
|
3
| |||
39:4-124
|
Improper turn from approved turning course
|
3
| |||
39:4-125
|
Improper "U" turn
|
3
| |||
39:4-126
|
Failure to give proper signal
|
2
| |||
39:4-127
|
Improper backing or turning in street
|
2
| |||
39:4-127.1
|
Improper crossing of railroad grade crossing
|
2
| |||
39:4-127.2
|
Improper crossing of bridge
|
2
| |||
39:4-128
|
Improper crossing of railroad grade crossing by
|
2
| |||
certain vehicles
| |||||
39:4-128.1
|
Improper passing of school bus
|
5
| |||
39:4-128.4
|
Improper passing of a frozen dessert truck
|
4
| |||
39:4-129
|
Leaving the scene of an accident
| ||||
No personal injury
|
2
| ||||
Personal injury
|
8
| ||||
39:4-144
|
Failure to observe "stop" or "yield" signs
|
2
| |||
39:5D-4
|
Moving violation out-of-state
|
2
| |||
N.J.A.C. 11:3-34.5 (2015)
§ 11:3-34.5 Automobile insurance eligibility points
(a) Automobile insurance eligibility points shall be accumulated as a result of convictions, suspensions, revocations and determinations of responsibility for civil infractions in accordance with the schedule set forth in the Appendix to this subchapter herein incorporated by reference.
(b) Automobile eligibility points are cumulative and accrue for all violations and occurrences set forth on Schedules 1 and 2. Automobile insurance eligibility points shall be deemed to accrue as follows:
1. Points for an at-fault accident shall accrue on the date that total payment by the insurer equals or exceeds $ 1,000 or such other amount as may be prescribed by Order of the Commissioner issued pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:33B-14. The amount under such Order shall be reflected in this paragraph through a notice of administrative change published in the New Jersey Register. An insurer may, at its option, use the date of the accident or date of first payment provided, however, that the insurer shall not underwrite or rate any policy based on the accident until total payment by the insurer equals or exceeds $ 1,000, and further provided that the insurer shall use the optional date consistently in all cases.
2. Points for conviction of motor vehicle violations and other events that are set forth on an abstract of drivers license records available from the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission, or a comparable agency of another state, shall accrue when the event is recorded in the agency's records as evidenced by an abstract.
3. When an eligible person is involved in an at-fault accident and has not accrued any eligibility points during the three-year period immediately preceding the date of that accident, no eligibility points for a two- or three-point violation, as set forth in Schedule 2 of the Appendix, shall accrue along with the points assessed in accordance with Schedule 1 for the at-fault accident, when the violation arises out of the same incident which results in the assessment of points for the at-fault accident. However, violations that arise out of the same incident may be considered by insurers for purposes of tier placement pursuant to N.J.A.C. 11:3-19A.
4. Points for each full year of court-imposed driver's license suspension within the preceding three years and points for each full year within the immediately preceding three years that a person has not held a driver's license shall accrue on the date of application for insurance. However, in accordance with Schedule 1, eligibility points assessed for failure to hold a drivers' license in the previous three years are not cumulative to points assessed for the suspension of a drivers license.
(c) Automobile insurance eligibility points set forth on Schedule 2 of the Appendix represent motor vehicle points established by the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission by rule, N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.1, which is hereby incorporated by reference. Any additions, deletions or modifications to N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.1 shall likewise be incorporated as of the effective date of amendment. Schedule 2 is included in the Appendix for convenience.
(d) The reference in Appendix Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 to provisions of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated is meant for convenience to assist in the quick identification of the nature of the event. If the event takes place in a state or province other than New Jersey, Schedule 1 and 2 should be consulted for identification of the specific misconduct committed and the assessment of the appropriate number of insurance eligibility points to be assessed.
(e) In addition to the motor vehicle violation and insurance eligibility points specifically enumerated on Schedule 2 of the Appendix pertaining to the New Jersey Turnpike, Atlantic City Expressway, and the Garden State Parkway, for any other motor vehicle violations that occur on the New Jersey Turnpike (N.J.A.C. 19:9), the Atlantic City Expressway (N.J.A.C. 19:2-2.1), the Garden State Parkway (N.J.A.C. 19:8) or for any other moving violation at any location, Schedules 1 and 2 shall be consulted for identification of the specific misconduct committed and the determination of the appropriate number of insurance eligibility points to be assessed.
- Each at fault accident 5
- Failure to verify insurance involved in an automobile accident 2
- For each full year of a court imposed driver's license suspension 3
- Involved in a fatal accident 4
Traffic Tickets
Motor Vehicle Points - Will They Be Assessed Against You?
With certain motor vehicle tickets, if you plead guilty or are convicted of certain motor vehicle offenses, DMV or the Division of Motor Vehicles will assess points against your driver's license.
These points can range anywhere from two (2) points for each offense all the way up to eight (8) points. Some examples of common point assessments include the following:
Careless Driving (2 points)
Failure to signal (2 points)
Failure to yield to pedestrian in a cross-walk (2 points) Improper passing (4 points)
Improper passing of school bus (5 points)
Improper passing of a frozen dessert truck (5 points) Improper turn (3 points)
Leaving the scene of an accident with personal injuries (8 points)
Racing on a highway (5 points) Reckless Driving (5 points)
Speeding (anywhere from 2 points to 5 points, depending upon your speed)
Tailgating (5 points)
Q.: What are the ramifications of accumulating motor vehicle points?
A.: First off, losing your driver's privileges. If you accumulate 12 or more points, the Division of Motor Vehicles will suspend your driving privileges for at least thirty (30) days if not more.
Q: How can one reduce the amount of points on their driver's license?
A: Any time you are given a ticket for a motor vehicle offense, simply do not simply do not pay it, consult with an attorney because the penalties and points involved in a guilty plea and/or finding of a guilty plea could have a negative as well as financial impact on your driver's privileges.
There are generally three (3) ways to reduce your motor vehicle points:
1) Based upon the mere passage of time. For every year that a driver can go without receiving a new violation, you will receive a three (3) point credit;
2) A driver may also receive a two (2) point credit by completing an authorized defensive driving course; and
3) You can receive a three (3) point credit if you successfully complete a driver improvement course.
NJ DMV/MVC Points Schedule is below.
NJ 39:4 50
|
Operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs
|
9
|
39:4 50.4
|
Refusal to submit to a chemical test
|
9
|
2C:11 2
|
Vehicular homicide
|
9
|
39:3 40
|
Operating a motor vehicle while driving privilege is suspended
|
9
|
39:6B 2
|
Operating a motor vehicle without liability insurance
|
9
|
39:6A 15
|
Misrepresentation of insurance coverage
|
9
|
39:3 37
|
Obtaining a driver's license or;
registration through deception
|
5
|
39:3 38
|
Make or use counterfeit plate or plates other than issued
|
5
|
39:3 38.1
|
Make, alter or counterfeit driver's license or registration
|
5
|
N.J.S.A.
|
Offense
|
Points
|
27:23-29
|
Moving against traffic - New Jersey Turnpike, Garden State Parkway, and Atlantic City Expressway
|
2
|
27:23-29
|
Improper passing - New Jersey Turnpike, Garden State Parkway, and Atlantic City Expressway
|
4
|
27:23-29
|
Unlawful use of median strip - New Jersey Turnpike, Garden State Parkway, and Atlantic City Expressway
|
2
|
39:3-20
|
Operating constructor vehicle in excess of 30 mph
|
3
|
39:4-14.3
|
Operating motorized bicycle on a restricted highway
|
2
|
39:4-14.3d
|
More than one person on a motorized bicycle
|
2
|
39:4-35
|
Failure to yield to pedestrian in crosswalk
|
2
|
39:4-36
|
Failure to yield to pedestrian in crosswalk
|
2
|
39:4-41
|
Driving through safety zone
|
2
|
39:4-52
39:5C-1
|
Racing on highway
|
5
|
39:4-55
|
Improper action or omission on grades and curves
|
2
|
39:4-57
|
Failure to observe direction of officer
|
2
|
39:4-66
|
Failure to stop vehicle before crossing sidewalk
|
2
|
39:4-66.1
|
Failure to yield to pedestrians or vehicles while entering or leaving highway
|
2
|
39:4-66.2
|
Operating a motor vehicle on public or private property to avoid a traffic control signal or sign
|
2
|
39:4-71
|
Operating a motor vehicle on a sidewalk
|
2
|
39:4-80
|
Failure to obey direction of officer
|
2
|
39:4-81
|
Failure to observe traffic signals
|
2
|
39:4-82
|
Failure to keep right
|
2
|
39:4-82.1
|
Improper operating of vehicle on divided highway or divider
|
2
|
39:4-83
|
Failure to keep right at intersection
|
2
|
39:4-84
|
Failure to pass right of vehicle proceeding in opposite direction
|
5
|
39:4-85
|
Improper passing on right or off roadway
|
4
|
39:4-85.1
|
Wrong way on a one-way street
|
2
|
39:4-86
|
Improper passing in no passing zone
|
4
|
39:4-87
|
Failure to yield to overtaking vehicle
|
2
|
39:4-88
|
Failure to observe traffic lanes
|
2
|
39:4-89
|
Tailgating
|
5
|
39:4-90.
|
Failure to yield at intersection
|
2
|
39:4-90.1
|
Failure to use proper entrances to limited access highways
|
2
|
39:4-91
39:4-92
|
Failure to yield to emergency vehicles
|
2
|
39:4-96
|
Reckless driving
|
5
|
39:4-97
|
Careless driving
|
2
|
39:4-97a
|
Destruction of agricultural or recreational property
|
2
|
39:4-97.1
|
Slow speed blocking traffic
|
2
|
39:4-97.2
|
Driving in an unsafe manner (points only assessed for the third or subsequent violation(s) within a five year period)
|
4
|
39:4-98
39:4_99
|
Exceeding maximum speed 1_14 mph over limit
Exceeding maximum speed 15_29 mph over limit
Exceeding maximum speed 30 mph or more over limit
|
2
4
5
|
39:4_105
|
Failure to stop for traffic light
|
2
|
39:4_115 39.
|
Improper turn at traffic light
|
3
|
39:4_119
|
Failure to stop at flashing red signal
|
2
|
39:4_122
|
Failure to stop for police whistle
|
2
|
39:4_123
|
Improper right or left turn
|
3
|
39:4_124
|
Improper turn from approved turning course
|
3
|
39:4_125
|
Improper "U" turn
|
3
|
39:4_126
|
Failure to give proper signal
|
2
|
39:4_127
|
Improper backing or turning in street
|
2
|
39:4_127.1
|
Improper crossing of railroad grade crossing
|
2
|
9:4_127.2
|
Improper crossing of bridge
|
2
|
39:4_128
|
Improper crossing of railroad grade crossing by certain vehicles
|
2
|
39:4_128.1
|
Improper passing of school bus
|
5
|
39:4_128.4
|
Improper passing of a frozen dessert truck
|
4
|
39:4_129
|
Leaving the scene of an accident
No personal injury
Personal injury
|
2
8
|
39:4_144
|
Failure to observe "stop" or "yield" signs
|
2
|
39:5D_4 54.
|
Moving violation Out-of-State
|
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