Monday, February 28, 2011

HANDLING DRUG, DWI & SERIOUS MOTOR VEHICLE CASES IN MUNICIPAL COURT - Introductory DWI

HANDLING DRUG, DWI & SERIOUS MOTOR VEHICLE CASES IN MUNICIPAL COURT - Introductory DWI

Presented in cooperation with the NJSBA Municipal Court Section and the NJSBA Young Lawyers’ Section

Monday, May 23, 2011

5:30 PM to 9:00 PM

Brunswick Hilton, East Brunswick

Learn everything you need to know to successfully handle these cases!

This informative guide to Municipal Court practice and procedure will familiarize you with recent new developments affecting cases that are heard in Municipal Court.

An authoritative panel of experienced attorneys will be joined by a Presiding Municipal Court Judge to explore a wide variety of matters that you are likely to encounter. They will also bring you up to date on recent developments you need to understand in order to effectively represent your clients.

Gain a thorough understanding of Municipal Court practice, procedure, & recent developments...
• Criminal Case Law and Legislative Update

• The Prosecutor’s Perspective: no-insurance cases, recent directives from the Attorney General and Prosecutor, plea agreements in drug cases, double jeopardy issues

• Judicial Perspective: Expert arguments, important court rules, common errors by defense attorneys and prosecutors, how to impress the court and not annoy the court staff

• Recent developments in traffic law, merged traffic tickets and more

Developing issues in DWI cases

• A special Q&A session: Ask the Experts

• What’s new on the Alcotest, Ecto-Hart and HGN

NJ CLE information: This program has been approved by the Board on Continuing Legal Education of the Supreme Court of New Jersey for 4.0 hours of total CLE credit. Of these, 4.0 qualify as hours of credit toward certification in criminal trial law.

Speakers include:

KENNETH A. VERCAMMEN, ESQ.

Past Chair, NJSBA Municipal Court Section

Past GP Solo Section Attorney of the Year

2006 NJSBA Municipal Court Practitioner of the Year

K. Vercammen & Associates (Edison)

(

HON. EDWARD J. HERMAN, PJMC

(New Brunswick)

WILLIAM G. BRIGIANI, ESQ.

Former Municipal Prosecutor (Spotswood, East Brunswick and for the SPCA)

(East Brunswick)

(

JOHN MENZEL, ESQ.

Law Offices of John Menzel (Point Pleasant)

NORMA M. MURGADO, ESQ.

Chief Prosecutor (Elizabeth)

Assistant Prosecutor (Woodbridge)

Murgado & Carroll, Esq. (Elizabeth)

HANDLING DRUG, DWI & SERIOUS MOTOR VEHICLE CASES IN MUNICIPAL COURT S1507-22144

Reg. Fee

Reg. Type

General Tuition (REG)

$189.00

REG

NJICLE Season Tickets (STX)

1 Season Ticket(s)

STX

MEMBERS, CO-SPONSORING SECTION (COS*)

$145.00

COS*

MEMBERS, NJSBA (NJB*)

$155.00

NJB*

MEMBERS, NJSBA YLD (YLD*)

$145.00

YLD*

Recent admittees (past 2 years) (YL)

$165.00

YL

Paralegals (PAR)

$129.00

PAR

Law Students (with Student ID) (STU)

$0.00

STU

Full Time Judges (JUD)

$0.00

JUD

Credit Type

Credit Amount

PAS:

3.0 credits pending

($12 fee for all PA credits)

NYP (t&n/t):

4.0

credits

CrT:

4.0

credits

NEW JERSEY:

This program has been approved for 4.0 credits (50 minute hour)

For information, call ICLE Call Phone: (732)214-8500

DOOR REGISTRATIONS: $209

Advance registration closes at noon of the day preceding the program. After that time you may still register, space permitting, for the Door Registration Fee. PLEASE CALL FIRST to confirm the seminar schedule and space availability.

* NJSBA Member Price – To qualify for this reduced price, you must provide your NJSBA Member# at the time you place your order. If you place your order without providing your NJSBA Member#, you will be charged the regular price.

BRUNSWICK HILTON

Three Tower Center Blvd.

East Brunswick, NJ 08816

http://www.njicle.com/seminar.aspx?sid=1382

Wednesday, February 23, 2011

39:4-81 Traffic signals, observance; rule at nonoperational signals.

39:4-81 Traffic signals, observance; rule at nonoperational signals.
39:4-81. a. The driver of every vehicle, the motorman of every street car and every pedestrian shall obey the instructions of any official traffic control device applicable thereto, placed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, unless otherwise directed by a traffic or police officer.

b.When, by reason of a power failure or other malfunction, a traffic control signal at an intersection is not illuminated, the driver of a vehicle or street car shall, with respect to that intersection, observe the requirement for a stop intersection, as provided in R.S.39:4-144.

39:6B-2.No insurance

39:6B-2.No insurance

2. Any owner or registrant of a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this State who operates or causes to be operated a motor vehicle upon any public road or highway in this State without motor vehicle liability insurance coverage required by this act, and any operator who operates or causes a motor vehicle to be operated and who knows or should know from the attendant circumstances that the motor vehicle is without motor vehicle liability insurance coverage required by this act shall be subject, for the first offense, to a fine of not less than $300 nor more than $1,000 and a period of community service to be determined by the court, and shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of one year from the date of conviction. Upon subsequent conviction, he shall be subject to a fine of up to $5,000 and shall be subject to imprisonment for a term of 14 days and shall be ordered by the court to perform community service for a period of 30 days, which shall be of such form and on such terms as the court shall deem appropriate under the circumstances, and shall forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle for a period of two years from the date of his conviction, and, after the expiration of said period, he may make application to the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles for a license to operate a motor vehicle, which application may be granted at the discretion of the director. The director's discretion shall be based upon an assessment of the likelihood that the individual will operate or cause a motor vehicle to be operated in the future without the insurance coverage required by this act. A complaint for violation of this act may be made to a municipal court at any time within six months after the date of the alleged offense.

Failure to produce at the time of trial an insurance identification card or an insurance policy which was in force for the time of operation for which the offense is charged creates a rebuttable presumption that the person was uninsured when charged with a violation of this section.

Monday, February 21, 2011

DUI arrests

DUI arrests

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. DUI is called DWI in New Jersey. Our office helps people with traffic/municipal court tickets throughout New Jersey, including drivers charged with DUI/DWI and refusal. Driving Under Influence and other Motor vehicle violations can cost you. You will have to pay fines in court, or receive points on your driver's license. A conviction will require you to pay expensive surcharges to the N.J. MVC [Division of Motor Vehicles] and have your license suspended. In New Jersey, the Judge does not have to rule that you were drunk. The prosecutor only needs to prove a driver was under the influence of alcohol. Don't give up! The Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen offers information and can provide experienced attorney representation for Driving Under Influence and other Motor vehicle violations. When your driver's license is in jeopardy, or you are facing thousands of dollars in fines, DMV surcharges and car insurance increases, you need excellent legal representation. The least expensive attorney is not always the answer. Please schedule an appointment if you need experienced legal representation in a traffic/municipal court matter. Our website kennethvercammen.com provides information on traffic offenses of which we can be retained to represent people. Our website also provides details on jail terms for Driving Under Influence and car insurance eligibility points. Car insurance companies increase rates or drop customers based on moving violations.

In New Jersey Driving Under Influence (DUI) and Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) are the same charge. The following is the new DWI law in New Jersey with all of its amendments:

N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 Driving While Intoxicated

39:4-50. (a) Except as provided in subsection (g) of this section, a person who operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood or permits another person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug to operate a motor vehicle owned by him or in his custody or control or permits another to operate a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood shall be subject: (1) For the first offense: (i) if the person's blood alcohol concentration is 0.08% or higher but less than 0.10%, or the person operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or the or more of the following chemical compounds: acetone and acetate, amyl nitrite or amyl nitrate or their isomers, benzene, butyl alcohol, butyl nitrite, butyl nitrate or their isomers, ethyl acetate, ethyl alcohol, ethyl nitrite or ethyl nitrate, ethylene dichloride, isobutyl alcohol or isopropyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, methyl ethyl ketone, nitrous oxide, n-propyl alcohol, pentachlorophenol, petroleum ether, propyl nitrite or propyl nitrate or their isomers, toluene, toluol or xylene or any other chemical substance capable of causing a condition of intoxication, inebriation, excitement, stupefaction or the dulling of the brain or nervous system as a result of the inhalation of the fumes or vapors of such chemical substance. Whenever an operator of a motor vehicle has been involved in an accident resulting in death, bodily injury or property damage, a police officer shall consider that fact along with all other facts and circumstances in determining whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of this section. A conviction of a violation of a law of a substantially similar nature in another jurisdiction, regardless of whether that jurisdiction is a signatory to the Interstate Driver License Compact pursuant to P.L. 1966, c.73 (C. 39: 5D-1 et seq.), shall constitute a prior conviction under this subsection unless the defendant can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the conviction in the other jurisdiction was based exclusively upon a violation of a proscribed blood alcohol concentration of less than 0.08%.

If the driving privilege of any person is under revocation or suspension for a violation of any provision of this Title or Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes at the time of any conviction for a violation of this section, the revocation or suspension period imposed shall commence as of the date of termination of the existing revocation or suspension period. In the case of any person who at the time of the imposition of sentence is less than 17 years of age, the forfeiture, suspension or revocation of the driving privilege imposed by the court under this section shall commence immediately, run through the offender's seventeenth birthday and continue from that date for the period set by the court pursuant to paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection. A court that imposes a term of imprisonment for a first or second offense under this section may sentence the person so convicted to the county jail, to the workhouse of the county wherein the offense was committed, to an inpatient rehabilitation program or to an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center or other facility approved by the chief of the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit in the Department of Health and Senior Services. For a third or subsequent offense a person shall not serve a term of imprisonment at an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center as provided in subsection (f). A person who has been convicted of a previous violation of this section need not be charged as a second or subsequent offender in the complaint made against him in order to render him liable to the punishment imposed by this section on a second or subsequent offender, but if the second offense occurs more than 10 years after the first offense, the court shall treat the second conviction as a first offense for sentencing purposes and if a third offense occurs more than 10 years after the second offense, the court shall treat the third conviction as a second offense for sentencing purposes. (b) A person convicted under this section must satisfy the screening, evaluation, referral, program and fee requirements of the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse's Intoxicated Driving Program Unit, and of the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers and a program of alcohol and drug education and highway safety, as prescribed by the chief administrator. The sentencing court shall inform the person convicted that failure to satisfy such requirements shall result in a mandatory two-day term of imprisonment in a county jail and a driver license revocation or suspension and continuation of revocation or suspension until such requirements are satisfied, unless stayed by court order in accordance with the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, or R.S. 39:5-22. Upon sentencing, the court shall forward to the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse's Intoxicated Driving Program Unit a copy of a person's conviction record. A fee of $100.00 shall be payable to the Alcohol Education, Rehabilitation and Enforcement Fund established pursuant to section 3 of P.L. 1983, c.531 (C. 26: 2B-32) to support the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit. (c) Upon conviction of a violation of this section, the court shall collect forthwith the New Jersey driver's license or licenses of the person so convicted and forward such license or licenses to the chief administrator. The court shall inform the person convicted that if he is convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension imposed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, he shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalties established in R.S. 39:3-40. The person convicted shall be informed orally and in writing. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of that written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S. 39:3-40. In the event that a person convicted under this section is the holder of any out-of-State driver's license, the court shall not collect the license but shall notify forthwith the chief administrator, who shall, in turn, notify appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction. The court shall, however, revoke the nonresident's driving privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State, in accordance with this section. Upon conviction of a violation of this section, the court shall notify the person convicted, orally and in writing, of the penalties for a second, third or subsequent violation of this section. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of that written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of this section. (d) The chief administrator shall promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L. 1968, c.410 (C. 52: 14B-1 et seq.) in order to establish a program of alcohol education and highway safety, as prescribed by this act. (e) Any person accused of a violation of this section who is liable to punishment imposed by this section as a second or subsequent offender shall be entitled to the same rights of discovery as allowed defendants pursuant to the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey. (f) The counties, in cooperation with the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse and the commission, but subject to the approval of the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, shall designate and establish on a county or regional basis Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers. These centers shall have the capability of serving as community treatment referral centers and as court monitors of a person's compliance with the ordered treatment, service alternative or community service. All centers established pursuant to this subsection shall be administered by a counselor certified by the Alcohol and Drug Counselor Certification Board of New Jersey or other professional with a minimum of five years experience in the treatment of alcoholism. All centers shall be required to develop individualized treatment plans for all persons attending the centers; provided that the duration of any ordered treatment or referral shall not exceed one year. It shall be the center's responsibility to establish networks with the community alcohol and drug education, treatment and rehabilitation resources and to receive monthly reports from the referral agencies regarding a person's participation and compliance with the program. Nothing in this subsection shall bar these centers from developing their own education and treatment programs; provided that they are approved by the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse. Upon a person's failure to report to the initial screening or any subsequent ordered referral, the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center shall promptly notify the sentencing court of the person's failure to comply. Required detention periods at the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers shall be determined according to the individual treatment classification assigned by the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit.

Longshoreman Injuries

The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) provides employment-injury and occupational-disease protection to approximately 500,000 workers who are injured or contract occupational diseases occurring on the navigable waters of the United States, or in adjoining areas, and for certain other classes of workers covered by extensions of this Act.

These benefits are paid directly by an authorized self-insured employer; or through an authorized insurance carrier; or, in particular circumstances, by a special fund administered directly by the Division of Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs within the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL).

more info at http://www.njlaws.com/workers_comp.htm

Suspended License in New Jersey NJSA 39:3-40

Suspended License in New Jersey

NJSA 39:3-40

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey.

39:3-40 Driving on a Suspended License in New Jersey.

Thousands of motorists in New Jersey are stopped for routine traffic violations then are surprised to be informed their license is suspended. Where the minimum costs would be over $1,261 in fines, surcharge and costs, motorists should be certain not to allow their license to become suspended. If charged, motorists may need an attorney with knowledge and skill in handling driving while suspended matters.

The violation of Driving While Suspended is set forth at NJSA 39:3-40. This section states, no person to whom a drivers license has been refused or whose drivers license or reciprocity privilege has been suspended or revoked or who has been prohibited from obtaining a drivers license, shall personally operate a motor vehicle during the period of refusal suspension, revocation or prohibition. The statute also prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle whose registration has been revoked.

PENALTIES

Conviction under this statute brings the following penalties. Upon conviction of the first offense of fine of $500.00. The defendant will also be surcharged a mandatory $250.00 per year for 3 years in every DWS by the DMV. Upon conviction for the second offense a fine of $750.00 and imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 5 days. Upon conviction for the third offense a fine of $1000.00 and imprisonment in the county jail for 10 days. Additionally, the statute states, upon the conviction the court shall impose or extend a period of suspension not to exceed 6 months. Also, upon conviction the court shall impose a period of imprisonment for not less than 45 days, if while operating a vehicle in violation of this section a person is involved in an accident resulting in personal injury to another person.

If an individual violates this section while under suspension issued pursuant to 39:4-50, driving while under the influence of liquor or drugs and is convicted, they shall be fined $500.00 extra? and have their license suspended for an additional period not less than one year nor more than two years and may be in the county jail for not more than 90 days. The defendant will also be surcharged a mandatory $250.00 per year for 3 years.

Although most municipal court matters are considered minor by many citizens it is obvious from the possible penalties involved that this is a serious offense carrying the possibility of both stiff fines and incarceration.

There are two types of license suspension :

1. Court imposed suspension

2. Administrative / Division of Motor Vehicles suspension

The most common scenario reflects where that the driver, through a motor vehicle violation, failure to pay surcharge or a accumulated points has been placed on a suspended list maintained by the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles (Division of Motor Vehicles), thereby making them ineligible to operate a motor vehicle for a prescribed period of time in this state.

If the driver is aware that they are on the suspended list and acknowledged they were suspended to the police officer there is little room for defense However, more often than not the driver claims that they were unaware of their placement on the suspension list.

The scenario that will often be presented by the driver is that he/she was stopped by police for an unrelated motor vehicle violation. In the process of the police encounter they were informed by the officer that their license has been suspended and they were issued an additional summons for Driving While Suspended. Over the past decade several New Jersey cases have crafted the current position on the driving while suspended issue that often confronts many municipal courts throughout the state.

THE STATE MUST SHOW DUE PROCESS AND ADEQUATE NOTICE

The first and foremost is that of adequate notice of the suspension. In Parsekian v. Cresse, 75 N.J. Super. 405 (App Div. 1962), the court ruled that it was incumbent upon the Director of the State Division of Motor Vehicles to provide fair and adequate notice to the licensed driver of the proposed suspension of their license. The court recognized that the Director could not arbitrarily suspend the license of a driver without providing both notice and enunciating specific reasons as to why the license was being suspended.

A later case, State v. Wenof, 102 N.J. Super. (Law Div. 1968), both reinforced and advanced the earlier Parsekian decision. Wenof represents the substantive foundation upon which all subsequent cases involving the notice issue have been based. In Wenof, the court again recognized the importance of adequate notice of suspension. The court related, there is always a risk that notice may not reach the intended person, but this is not the test for legal sufficiency. The test is rather, whether the notice was reasonably calculated to reach the intended parties. Id at 375. In Wenof, the Division of Motor Vehicles sent to a written notice of proposed suspension (for failure to satisfy a summons) by regular mail. The Division of Motor Vehicles thereafter sent an order of suspension by ordinary mail. The notices were mailed to the defendants last address. By failing to leave a forwarding address informing the Division of Motor Vehicles where he could be reached by mail, the court stated he should not be heard to complain of lack of due process He had it. The court found the defendant guilty.

In State v. Hammond 116 N.J. Super. 244 (Cty. Ct. 1971) a notice of scheduled suspension and order of suspension for failure to appear for motor vehicle violations was mailed to defendant, but was returned undelivered to Division of Motor Vehicles by postal authorities. The defendant was charged with misstatement of fact in an application for registration of a motor vehicle (39:3-37) and application for a registration certificate during suspension (39:3-34). The defendant thereafter applied for and obtained a New Jersey registration certificate for vehicle.

While in State v. Wenof supra the defendant was found guilty that case was distinguished in Ha mmond. In Hammond there was insufficient evidence of any notice to Hammond of a possible revocation of his registration certificate. Therefore, there is no adequate proof to indicate that due process was satisfied in this case. Hammond, 116 N.J. Super. at 248.

NOTICE BY IN-COURT SUSPENSION

If the driver is on the suspension list because he was suspended in a Courtroom for a prior violation, grounds to defend are very limited. The most common violations which carry mandatory suspensions on first offense by the Municipal Courts are for driving while intoxicated (first offense 6-12 months), driving while suspended (up to 6 months), driving without insurance (1 year), possession of Marijuana or paraphernalia (6 months-2 years). A Municipal Court also has the power to suspend a drivers license for driving while suspended, reckless driving, excessive speeding, leaving the scene of an accident or even where the judge finds a person guilty of such a willful violation of the subtitle as shall in the courts discretion, justify such revocation (39:5-31).

If the drivers license was suspended by a court, the state in a subsequent Driving While Suspended needs to introduce into evidence only a certified abstract from the Division of Motor Vehicles. It is not necessary for the state to demonstrate that notice was received by the defendant. The defense may still challenge the suspension by introducing evidence that the prior in-court suspension was improper. Examples include defendant not notified to be in court and the court then acting without the defendant being present. Possibly, the prior suspension could be attached in the original court as being illegal and/or unconstitutional. This is permitted under State v. Laurick. 120 NJ 1 (1990)

more info at http://www.kennethvercammen.com/driving_on_a_suspended_license.html

Reckless driving NJSA 39:4-96


Reckless driving NJSA 39:4-96

39:4-96. Reckless driving; punishment 39:4-96. A person who drives a vehicle heedlessly, in willful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, in a manner so as to endanger, or be likely to endanger, a person or property, shall be guilty of reckless driving and be punished by imprisonment in the county or municipal jail for a period of not more than 60 days, or by a fine of not less than $50.00 or more than $200.00, or both.

On a second or subsequent conviction he shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three months, or by a fine of not less than $100 or more than $500, or both.

Amended 1955, c.220, s.1; 1982, c.45, s.3; 1995, c.70, s.2. For information on points, fines, jail and suspension for this violation, go to http://www.kennethvercammen.com/traffic_minimum_penalties.htm

Protect your Rights.

Before you pled guilty and face potentially thousands of dollars in fees and surcharges, schedule an "in office" appointment with our attorneys experienced in handling these matters. The Police have an experienced attorney as Prosecutor to represent them. Do not jeopardize your drivers license and ability to drive to work.

more info at http://www.kennethvercammen.com/reckless_driving.html

No Insurance Defenses

No Insurance Defenses

Presumption does not equal guilty

By Kenneth A. Vercammen

The mandatory penalties imposed for driving without insurance are greater than the first-offender penalties for drunk driving or possession of marijuana. Mandatory penalties include automatic loss of license for one year, a $300-$1,000 fine and a period of community service to be determined by the municipal court. N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2. The no-car-insurance statute is one of the few strict liability statutes. There are also court costs and insurance surcharges of $250 per year for three years. Failure to produce at the time of trial an insurance card or insurance policy covering the date of the offense creates a rebuttable presumption that the person was uninsured when charged with the offense. Remember, however, that a presumption does not equal guilty.

In State v. Kopp, 171 N.J. Super. 528 (Law Div. 1980), a law division judge held that knowledge of lack of insurance is not a defense. However, the section, which imposes penalties against an individual who operates a motor vehicle without liability insurance, does not apply to a New Jersey resident who is driving an automobile owned by an out-of-state friend who had been in New Jersey for five weeks. State v. Arslanouk, 67 N.J. Super. 387 (App. Div. 1979).

The most important no-insurance case is State v. Hochman, 188 N.J. Super. 382 (App. Div. 1982). The Appellate Division examined and reversed a conviction for operating without liability insurance where the state failed to carry its burden of proving that automobile liability insurance was lawfully canceled. In this fact-specific case, defendant was charged with operating a vehicle he owned without insurance. It was stipulated that because of long hours defendant worked, he had asked his wife to look after household matters, including insurance matters, and gave her several thousand dollars each month to pay for them. Defendant Hochman’s wife arranged through an insurance broker to have Allstate insure the vehicle. The insurance broker then arranged to finance the insurance premiums through a “Lee Finance” financial service. The defendant’s wife then paid the broker and agreed to pay the balance to the financial service in monthly installments of $48.

Although Allstate claimed it mailed a cancellation notice, it stipulated that it had mailed the cancellation notice to an incorrect address, i.e., mailing it to 313 Park Street rather than 314 Park Street. The Appellate Division noted that in order to convict a defendant-owner of operating a motor vehicle in violation of the insurance provisions, the state did not have to show a culpable mental state, i.e., that defendant knew his vehicle was uninsured. The state simply had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) defendant owned the vehicle, (2) the vehicle was registered in New Jersey, (3) defendant operated the vehicle or caused it to be operated upon any public road or highway in this state, and (4) the vehicle was without liability insurance coverage required by N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1.

The Appellate Division in Hochman held that the first three elements of the offenses were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The pivotal issue was whether the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the fourth element of the defense, that the vehicle was uninsured. The question was thus whether the liability insurance policy had been lawfully and effectively canceled when defendant Hochman was charged for the offense. The court found that Allstate had not properly canceled the insurance policy. The Hochman court held;

A notice of cancellation of a policy of automobile liability insurance is effective in this State only if it is based on one

or more statutorily enumerated reasons, including the nonpayment of premiums. N.J.S.A. 17:29C-7(A)(a). Moreover, prior to March 10, 1981, where, as here, the cancellation was for nonpayment of premiums, the notice of cancellation must have been mailed or delivered by the insurance carrier (here Allstate) to the insured (here either defendant or his wife) at least ten days prior to the effective date of cancellation and must have been accompanied by a statement of the reason given for such cancellation. N.J.S.A. 17:29C-8. Weathers v. Hartford Ins. Group 77 N.J. 228, 234 (1978). Proof of mailing the notice, however, is not conclusive on the issue. The insured may still offer proof that he never received the notice “for the purpose of refuting the hypothesis of mailing.”

The Hochman court noted that although Allstate claimed that a notice of cancellation was sent to the defendant’s wife, this did not establish that the notice satisfied the statutory requirement of N.J.S.A. 17:29C-8. There is no proof that the notice mailed to the named insured (assuming that defendant’s wife was the insured named in the policy) or that it was mailed to the address shown in the policy, or that its contents complied with statutory requirements. The court held “thus, we are constrained to hold that the state failed to sustain its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Allstate automobile liability insurance policy covering defendant’s vehicle was lawfully canceled. The Allstate policy therefore was presumptively in full force and effect... and defendant’s conviction for violating the compulsory insurance provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2 cannot stand.”

Operation is different in no-insurance matters than in drunk-driving cases. A defendant who is seated in the driver’s seat, behind the steering wheel of a vehicle that is under tow and was in physical control of the vehicle did not “operate” the vehicle for the purposes of prohibiting operating the vehicle while suspended, operating an uninsured vehicle and operating an unregistered vehicle, where the vehicle did not have an engine and was incapable of being operated under its own power. Counsel can argue the state must prove the defendant drove the vehicle. State v. Derby 256 N.J. Super. 702 (Law Div. 1992).

In a case involving Personal Injury Protection/No Fault PIP benefits, the Appellate Division ruled that an insurance company did not properly mail a notice of cancellation, thus the policy was not canceled. See Hodges v. Pennsylvania National Insurance Company, 260 N.J. Super. 217, 222-23 (App. Div. 1992).

In order to be effective, notice of cancellation “must be set in strict compliance with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 17:29C-10.” Lopez v. New Jersey Automobile Full Underwriting Association 239 N.J. Super. 13, 20,(App. Div.), certif. den. 122 N.J. 131 (1990) (absence of proof of personal knowledge of mailing by postal employee or insurer employee renders notice ineffective). The court questioned whether the stamped proof of payment of money in postage was proof of mailing. The Appellate Division in Hodges noted that our courts have interpreted the statute to require a precise proof of mailing, usually the official “U.S. Postal Service Certificate of Mailing.”

If a husband and wife, or both, are named in the policy, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Carriere, 170 N.J. Super. 437, 450 (Law Div. 1979), supports the proposition that both husband and wife named in the policy should receive notice.

A bad check will permit an insurer to cancel insurance policy. In Abdel-Rahman v. Ludas, 266 N.J. Super. 46, 48 (App. Div. 1993), the court held an insured’s failure to pay the premium, which occurs when the check is dishonored, entitles the insurer to cancel the policy.

Nonowner-operated Cases

The charge of simple operation without insurance in nonowner-operated cases presents additional viable defenses to the charge of no insurance. There is not a strict liability provision involving mere operators. The state must prove the operator knew or should have known from the attendant circumstances that the motor vehicle was without motor vehicle liability coverage. Such facts can be gathered from the relationship between the parties, whether or not the vehicle had a valid inspection sticker and testimony by the owner, who often is also issued an uninsured motorist charge.

In Matlad v. US Services, 174 N.J. Super. 499 (App. Div. 1980), where the husband cancelled the policy without telling his wife, deletion was void as against public policy and coverage continued for the wife. The defendant/owner must operate or cause the car to be operated. If a driver took the car without permission that day, the owner did not cause the vehicle to be operated.

The state is still required to provide discovery. Occasionally a case is dismissed because the state failed to provide discovery.

When there is no accident and sympathetic facts, a prosecutor should offer a plea bargain so a driver and taxpayer does not suffer a one-year loss of license. The prosecutors and courts should seek justice, not punishment, which would usually mean loss of a job due to no license. It is also time for the Legislature to enact a limited “Drive to work” license. ■

Reprinted with permission from the JANUARY11, 2010 edition of New Jersey Law Journal. © 2010 ALMMedia Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. Vercammen is a trial attorney in Edison. He often lectures for the New Jersey State Bar Association, New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education and Middlesex County College on personal injury, criminal/municipal court law, drunk driving and contested probate estate administration

Red Light Violation 39:4-81

Red Light Violation 39:4-81 Traffic signals, observance; rule at nonoperational signals.
39:4-81 . a. The driver of every vehicle, the motorman of every street car and every pedestrian shall obey the instructions of any official traffic control device applicable thereto, placed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, unless otherwise directed by a traffic or police officer.

b.When, by reason of a power failure or other malfunction, a traffic control signal at an intersection is not illuminated, the driver of a vehicle or street car shall, with respect to that intersection, observe the requirement for a stop intersection, as provided in R.S.39:4-144.

Stop sign NJSA 39:4-144 Failure to Observe Stop or Yield Signs

Stop sign NJSA 39:4-144 Failure to Observe Stop or Yield Signs

39:4-144. Failure to observe stop or yield signs, Stopping or yielding right of way before entering stop or yield intersections No driver of a vehicle or street car shall enter upon or cross an intersecting street marked with a "stop" sign unless he has first brought his vehicle or street car to a complete stop at a point within 5 feet of the nearest crosswalk or stop line marked upon the pavement at the near side of the intersecting street and shall proceed only after yielding the right of way to all traffic on the intersecting street which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. No driver of a vehicle or street car shall enter upon or cross an intersecting street marked with a "yield right of way" sign without first slowing to a reasonable speed for existing conditions and visibility, stopping if necessary, and the driver shall yield the right of way to all traffic on the intersecting street which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard; unless, in either case, he is otherwise directed to proceed by a traffic or police officer or traffic control signal, or as provided in section 39:4-145 of this Title.

more info at http://www.kennethvercammen.com/failure_to_observe_stop_or_yield_signs.html

Speeding and Radar 39:4-98, 39:4-99

Speeding and Radar 39:4-98, 39:4-99





Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents persons charged with speeding more than 15 miles over the speed limit an other serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey.

It is well established that the prosecution of a defendant for a motor vehicle violation is a quasi-criminal proceeding. In such a proceeding the burden of proof is upon the state to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

In every charge of a speeding violation, the complaint or summons must specify (l) the speed at which the defendant is alleged to have driven, (2) the speed which is prima facie unlawful, and (3) the time and place of the alleged violation.

A sign showing a speed limit is merely notice of the law or an ordinance or regulation prohibiting a greater speed. The sign itself does not set the speed limit. There can be no conviction for violation of the edict of a posted sign, but only for violation of the statute, ordinance, or regulation having the force of law. There are many unauthorized signs in the state which may serve as a warning but have no effect in creating an offense. Radar

Speed-measuring radar in various forms has been accepted since State v. Dantonio, l8 N.J. 570 (l955), where the N.J. Supreme Court held it is not essential that the court determine the precise speed at which the vehicle was being operated when the alleged offense occurred, and that the operator of the vehicle must be adjudged guilty if the evidence established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the drive exceeded the statutory speed limit.

It is not necessary for the trial court to make a particular finding as to the precise speed in excess of the speed limit at which the defendant was traveling at the time of the violation. State v. Bookbinder, 82 N.J. Super. l79, l83 (App. Div. l964).

However, if the defendant is found guilty, the trial court should determine the quantum of excess was so many miles per hour in exercising its discretion as to the penalty to be imposed within the statutory limitation. The precise speed a motorist was traveling thus is material only on the question as to the penalty to be imposed, not on the question of guilt or innocence.

State v. Readding, l69 N.J. Super. 238 (Law Div. l978), restated the general rule that in order for the radar speedometer reading to be admissible into evidence, it should be established that: (l) the device is scientifically reliable; (2) the particular speedometer used in the case being tried is accurate; (3) the operator is qualified; and (4) the device was operated properly in the case being tried. How Radar Operates

In State v. Wojtkowiak, l70 N.J. Super. 44 (Law Div. l979), rev'd on other grounds, l74 N.J. Super. 460, Judge Wells examined in detail the K-55 Radar, and his conclusions were incorporated by the Appellate Division. This case should be read and reread for a detailed explanation of Radar by a Court.

The traffic radar method speed detection measurement depends upon the Doppler effect. Simply stated a radio wave which strikes a moving object is reflected from that object at different frequency from that of the incident wave. A radar which transmits waves and receives reflected waves can determine their frequency difference and calculate the speed of the object which produced the reflective wave.

Courts have accepted as scientifically reliable MPH Industries' K-55 Traffic Radar -- the primary system employed for the purpose of measuring the speed of motor vehicles in New Jersey.

In State v. Wojtkowiak, l74 N.J. Super, 460 (App. Div. l980), the appeals court held in all future cases the state should adduce evidence at the municipal court level as to (l) the specific training and extent of experience of the officer operating the radar, (2) the calibration of the machine was checked by at least two external tuning forks both singly and in combination, and (3) the calibration of the speedometer of the patrol car in cases where the K-55 is operating in the moving mode.

MPH Industries, manufacturer and distributor of the K-55, sets forth the following eight points an officer must be able to testify to:

* The officer must establish the time, place and location of the radar device at the time he made the reading. * The officer must be able to identify the vehicle. * The officer must identify the defendant as the operator of the vehicle * The officer must testify that he made a visual observation of the vehicle and that it was going at an excessive rate of speed. * At the time of the radar reading the officer must testify that the vehicle was out front, by itself, nearest to the radar. * The officer must state his qualifications and training in radar use. * The officer must establish that the radar was tested for accuracy both prior and after its use. * If used in the moving mode, that at the time of the radar reading the patrol speed indicated on the unit compared to the speedometer of the police vehicle.

Qualified Operator?

While it appeared to the court in State v. Wojtkowiak, Supra that the K-55 Radar is an accurate and reliable tool for the measurement of speed, its accuracy and reliability in any case are no better than the skill of the person operating the radar. Id. at l74. The court made this emphasis as a warning to all police departments that proper courses of instruction be developed before the K-55 Radar device is employed in any municipality.

A calibration check is accomplished with the use of two tuning forks and their accuracy must be the subject of the documentary proof. Use of the K-55 does not eliminate the need for such proof. State v. Wojtkowiak, l70 N.J. Super. at 50, n.l

In State v. Overton, l35 N.J. Super 443 (Cty. Ct. l975), four external tuning forks were used to test the radar unit l2 times within a period of approximately 90 minutes. The court noted there is authority to the effect that a radar unit should be checked for accuracy each time it is set up at a different location. MPH Industries argues this is not necessary with moving radar.

In State v. Readding, l60 N.J. Super. 238 (Law Div. l978), the court reiterated the decision in State v. Overton, l35 N.J. Super. 443 (Cty. Ct. l975), where the court found there are three universally accepted methods of testing the accurate operation of a radar speed measuring device:

1. By use of the internal tuning fork built into the machine itself (which the court found to be improper). 2. By running the patrol car with a calibrated speedometer through the "zone of influence" of the radar machine. 3. By use of external tuning forks calibrated at set speeds and which emit sound waves or frequencies identical to those which would come from a vehicle traveling through the Radar bearer at the same speed for which the tuning fork has been cut.

It is also important to recognize that in State v. Readding, l60 N.J. Super. 238, the court stated: the proper operation of the device must be proved, usually by detailed reference by the qualified operator to the procedures called for by the manufacturer of the device. Tuning Forks

Before a radar speed reading is admissible, the state must establish the machine was operating properly. MPH Industries' test procedure uses two tuning forks: First, the lower-speed fork is struck on wood or plastic and the ringing fork is held in a fixed position two to three inches in front of the antenna with the harrow edge of the fork facing the antenna front. This will cause the Patrol Monitor Window to display the fork's speed. While continuing to hold this ringing fork in place, the higher-speed fork is struck and held next to the lower-speed fork (both forks must be vibrating while being held an equal distance from the antenna. The target should then display the "speed" difference between the two forks. For example, if the forks used are 35 mph and 65 mph, then the target window will display the difference, which is 30 mph. Admissibility of Evidence

The state must establish through documentary evidence the tuning fork itself was accurate. The state must produce and be able to admit into evidence certificates as proof of the accuracy of the devices used for testing the proper operation of the machine.

In State v. Cardone, l46 N.J. Super. 23 (App. Div. l976), the court held that while certificates do not have to satisfy the normal rules of evidence, an Evidence Rule 8 hearing still must be held, at which the court can determine preliminary issues of admissibility of evidence. In such a hearing, the rules of evidence -- except for Rule 4 or a valid claim of privilege -- do not apply. Id. at 28.

The Cardone court found that the certificates of calibration and accuracy of the radar machine -- and for the tuning forks used to test the machine -- were properly admitted in evidence, even though no proof was offered to qualifying the certificates as records made in the regular course of business. The certificates were used solely as evidence of proper operating conditions or as a prerequisite to the admissibility of the radar reading, and the defendant made no effort to prove the internal calibrating device or the tuning forks were inaccurate.

Previously, in State v. Overton, l35 N.J. Super. 443 (Cty. Ct. l975), it was held the municipal court judge improperly admitted certificates issued by the manufacturer of the tuning forks and the radar unit itself. The court also held the certificates were not properly authenticated, as required by Evidence Rule 67, nor was there sufficient testimony to support their admissibility as either business records under Evidence Rule 63(l3) or as reports of finding of a public official under Evidence Rule 63(l5).

In State v. Readding, supra, the Superior Court exonerated the defendant, stating:

It is entirely possible for a particular RADAR device to function properly and record accurately a 50 m.p.h. but inaccurately at higher speeds......

Accuracy of the particular speedometer should be established by more than one test. The 'Pace' or 'Clock' Method

A "pace" or "clock" is performed by an officer in a patrol car with a calibrated speedometer for a duration of distance or time wherein the officer accelerated to a speed equivalent to the suspect's, and then keeps a steady distance behind the suspect's vehicle following that vehicle. It is essential that the patrol car's speedometer be calibrated and that the certificates of calibration both before and after, be admitted into evidence.

An officer may also sometimes admit he was unable to get a good "clock" but may say that his vehicle was going 70 mph, for example, and he was still losing ground to the offender. The obvious shortcoming to "clocking" as vehicle is that the officer's objective judgment may be brought into question, the interference by other traffic, or other non-reasonable factors. It is for these reasons that the "clock" method is used less frequently than radar. Conclusion

It is no defense to argue unlawful arrest, selective enforcement, custom and usage, non-ownership of car driven, ignorance or mistake of law, lack of precise speed proved, defective speedometer or cruise control. Obey the law, follow speed limits and you will have no need to know about Radar.

more info at http://www.njlaws.com/speeding_&_radar.htm

Careless Driving Requires the State to Provide the Vehicle was Operated by the Defendant Carelessly or Without Due Caution and Circumspection, in a Ma

Careless Driving Requires the State to Provide the Vehicle was Operated by the Defendant Carelessly or Without Due Caution and Circumspection, in a Manner so as to Endanger, or be Likely to Endanger, a Person or Property

The NJ Supreme Court held in State v Lutz 309 N.J. Super. 317 (App. Div. 1998) that merely because an accident took place a driver is not guilty of careless driving. The court wrote:
"Finally, we find merit in defendant's contention that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of careless driving. We agree that the proofs established essentially that defendant was involved in an accident which happened in the opposite lane of travel. In finding defendant guilty of careless driving, the Law Division judge stated:
"The defendant quite clearly operated his vehicle carelessly, failed to exercise appropiate caution in the prevailing circumstances, and endangered both the persons in the other vehicle. These conclusory remarks, however, were insufficient to establish a careless driving violation. (It appears that both the Municipal Court judge and the Law Division judge applied a res ipsa loquitur analysis in finding defendant guilty of careless driving. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, however, has no application in the determination of careless driving due to the quasi-criminal nature of the proceeding in which the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the offense. See State v. Wenzel, 113 N.J. Super., 215, 216-18 (App. Div. 1971)(the mere fact of an "otherwise unexplained jackknifing" where a tractor-trailer entering a construction area had jackknifed on the wet roadway, crossed into the opposite lane and broadsided another truck fatally injuring the truck's driver, did not establish that the defendant had been driving carelessly. The careless driving statute provides: [a] person who drives a vehicle on a highway carelessly, or without due caution and circumspection, in a manner so as to endanger, or be likely to endanger, a person or property, shall be guilty of careless driving.
[N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.]
Here, other than the accident itself, the State only presented defendant's statement that his vehicle began to slide on the wet highway and continued to do so when he tapped his brakes. Moreover, his apology was not an admission to driving carelessly, but merely a statement that his car had slid on the wet pavement. The State presented no evidence indicating that defendant had been speeding, driving too fast for the wet road conditions, distracted or otherwise driving without due caution and circumspection. Consequently, there was insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for careless driving, and we reverse that conviction." State v Lutz , supra

In State v. Wenzel, 113 N.J. Super. 215 (App. Div. 1971) defendant was charged with careless driving when his tractor trailer jackknifed and struck another trailer. The State's only witness did not see the accident. There was no evidence defendant was speeding or that he drove without due caution or circumspection. However, both the municipal and county courts determined that an otherwise unexplained jackknifing was indicative of careless driving. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the res ipsa doctrine employed by the lower courts had no place in a quasi-criminal action for careless driving. The rationale of the Wenzel decision applies to this case.

See also State v Roenicke 174 N.J. Super. 513 (Law Div 1980)
Defendant was involved in a one-car accident which was not observed by the trooper or any other witness. The State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he drove in a reckless manner. Defendant cannot be found guilty of reckless driving, and his conviction is set aside.