NJSA 39:4-128.1 Passing a School Bus - Penalties

NJSA 39:4-128.1 Passing a School Bus - Penalties

www.njlaws.com/passing_school_bus.html?id=913&a=

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. 39:4-128.1

39:4-128.1.  School buses stopped for children; duty of motorists; duty of bus driver; violations; revocation of license
1.On highways having roadways not divided by safety islands or physical traffic separation installations, the driver of a vehicle approaching or overtaking a bus, which is being used solely for the transportation of children to or from school or a summer day camp or any school connected activity and which has stopped for the purpose of receiving or discharging any child, shall stop such vehicle not less than 25 feet from such school bus and keep such vehicle stationary until such child has entered said bus or has alighted and reached the side of such highway and until a flashing red light is no longer exhibited by the bus; provided, such bus is designated as a school bus by one sign on the front and one sign on the rear, with each letter on such signs at least four inches in height.

On highways having dual or multiple roadways separated by safety islands or physical traffic separation installations, the driver of a vehicle overtaking a school bus, which has stopped for the purpose of receiving or discharging any child, shall stop such vehicle not less than 25 feet from such school bus and keep such vehicle stationary until such child has entered said bus or has alighted and reached the side of the highway and until a flashing red light is no longer exhibited by the bus.

On highways having dual or multiple roadways separated by safety islands or physical traffic separation installations, the driver of a vehicle on another roadway approaching a school bus, which has stopped for the purpose of receiving or discharging any child, shall reduce the speed of his vehicle to not more than 10 miles per hour and shall not resume normal speed until the vehicle has passed the bus and has passed any child who may have alighted therefrom or be about to enter said bus.

For purposes of this section, "highway" means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way whether publicly or privately maintained when any part thereof is open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel.

Whenever a school bus is parked at the curb for the purpose of receiving children directly from a school or a summer day camp or any school connected activity or discharging children to enter a school, or a summer day camp or any school connected activity, which is located on the same side of the street as that on which the bus is parked, drivers of vehicles shall be permitted to pass said bus without stopping, but at a speed not in excess of 10 miles per hour.

The driver of a bus which is being used solely for the transportation of children to or from school or a summer day camp or any school connected activity shall continue to exhibit a flashing red light and shall not start his bus until every child who may have alighted therefrom shall have reached a place of safety.

Any person who shall violate any provision of this act shall be subject to (1) a fine of not less than $100.00, (2) imprisonment for not more than 15 days or community service for 15 days in such form and on such terms as the court shall deem appropriate, (3) or both for the first offense, and a fine not less than $250.00, imprisonment for not more than 15 days, or both for each subsequent offense.  The penalties shall be enforced and recovered pursuant to the provisions of chapter 5 of Title 39 of the Revised Statutes. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the registered owner of the vehicle which was involved in the violation of this section was the person who committed the act. Any person who suppresses, by way of concealment or destruction, any evidence of a violation of this section or who suppresses the identity of the violator shall be subject to a fine of $100.

The Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles may also revoke the license to drive a motor vehicle of any person who shall have been guilty of such willful violation of any of the provisions of this act as shall, in the discretion of the director, justify such revocation, but the director shall, at all times, have power to validate such a license which has been revoked, or to grant a new license to any person whose license to drive a motor vehicle shall have been revoked pursuant to this act.

5 points

      A Municipal Court also has the power to suspend a driver's license for reckless driving, excessive speeding, or where the judge finds a person guilty of such a willful violation as shall in the court's discretion, justify such revocation (NJSA 39:5-31).

 State v. Moran  202 NJ 311 (2010)

         The license suspension provision of N.J.S.A. 39:5-31, which is published in the Motor Vehicle Code of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated, is not “hidden,” and defendant, like all motorists, is presumed to know the law. 

KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC

ATTORNEY AT LAW

2053 Woodbridge Ave.

Edison, NJ 08817

732-572-0500

www.njlaws.com

Copyright Vercammen Law 2015

NJSA 39:4-144 Failure to Observe Stop or Yield Signs

NJSA 39:4-144 Failure to Observe Stop or Yield Signs
39:4-144. Failure to observe stop or yield signs, Stopping or yielding right of way before entering stop or yield intersections No driver of a vehicle or street car shall enter upon or cross an intersecting street marked with a "stop" sign unless he has first brought his vehicle or street car to a complete stop at a point within 5 feet of the nearest crosswalk or stop line marked upon the pavement at the near side of the intersecting street and shall proceed only after yielding the right of way to all traffic on the intersecting street which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. No driver of a vehicle or street car shall enter upon or cross an intersecting street marked with a "yield right of way" sign without first slowing to a reasonable speed for existing conditions and visibility, stopping if necessary, and the driver shall yield the right of way to all traffic on the intersecting street which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard; unless, in either case, he is otherwise directed to proceed by a traffic or police officer or traffic control signal, or as provided in section 39:4-145 of this Title.

Cell phone ticket penalties NJ 3rd offense

Cell phone ticket penalties NJ 3rd offense

39:4-127.1. Railroad crossing; stopping

39:4-127.1.  Railroad crossings;  stopping   
(a) Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade crossing under any of the circumstances stated in this section, the driver of such vehicle shall stop within fifty feet but not less than fifteen feet from the nearest rail of such railroad, and shall not proceed until he can do so safely.  The foregoing requirements shall apply when:

    1.  A clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device gives warning of  the immediate approach of a railroad train;

    2.  A crossing gate is lowered or when a human flagman gives or continues to  give a signal of the approach or passage of a railroad train;

    3.  A railroad train approaching within approximately one thousand five hundred feet of the highway crossing emits a signal audible from such distance and such railroad train, by reason of its speed or nearness to such crossing, is an immediate hazard;

    4.  An approaching railroad train is plainly visible and is in hazardous proximity to such crossing.

(b) No person shall drive any vehicle through, around, or under any crossing  gate or barrier at a railroad crossing while such gate or barrier is closed or  is being opened or closed.

     L.1951, c. 23, p. 93, s. 68.

39:4-144. Stopping or yielding right of way before entering stop or yield intersections.

39:4-144  Stopping or yielding right of way before entering stop or yield intersections.
39:4-144.  No driver of a vehicle or street car shall enter upon or cross an intersecting street marked with a "stop" sign unless:

a.The driver has first brought the vehicle or street car to a complete stop at a point within five feet of the nearest crosswalk or stop line marked upon the pavement at the near side of the intersecting street and shall proceed only after yielding the right of way to all vehicular traffic on the intersecting street which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.

b.No driver of a vehicle or street car shall enter upon or cross an intersecting street marked with a "yield right of way" sign without first slowing to a reasonable speed for existing conditions and visibility, stopping if necessary, and the driver shall yield the right of way to all vehicular traffic on the intersecting street which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard; unless, in either case, the driver is otherwise directed to proceed by a traffic or police officer or traffic control signal.

c.No driver of a vehicle or street car shall turn right at an intersecting street marked with a "stop" sign or "yield right of way" sign unless the driver stops and remains stopped for pedestrians crossing the roadway within a marked crosswalk, or at an unmarked crosswalk, into which the driver is turning.

amended 1956, c.107, s.5; 1958, c.114, s.4; 2008, c.9, s.1; 2009, c.319, s.4.

39:4-96. Reckless driving; punishment.

39:4-96.     Reckless driving; punishment     
39:4-96.  A person who drives a vehicle heedlessly, in willful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, in a manner so as to endanger, or be likely to endanger, a person or property, shall be guilty of reckless driving and be punished by imprisonment in the county or municipal jail for a period of not more than 60 days, or by a fine of not less than $50.00 or more than $200.00, or both. 

   On a second or subsequent conviction he shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three months, or by a fine of not less than $100 or more than $500, or both. 

   Amended 1955,c.220,s.1; 1982,c.45,s.3; 1995,c.70,s.2.

39:4-97. Careless driving

39:4-97    Careless driving 
    39:4-97. A person who drives a vehicle carelessly, or without due caution and circumspection, in a manner so as to endanger, or be likely to endanger, a person or property, shall be guilty of careless driving. 

   Amended 1951,c.23,s.54; 1955,c.220,s.2; 1995,c.70,s.3. 

39:4-129, 39:4-130 Leaving Scene of Accident and Failure to Report, Car Accident

Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. There is mandatory 6 month loss of license for leaving the scene. Our goal as the attorney is to negotiate with the prosecutor to reduce down to a violation with no suspension. 39:4-129   Action in case of accident.  39:4-129 . (a) The driver of any vehicle, knowingly involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene until he has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.  Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.  Any person who shall violate this subsection shall be fined not less than $2,500 nor more than $5,000, or be imprisoned for a period of 180 days, or both.  The term of imprisonment required by this subsection shall be imposed only if the accident resulted in death or injury to a person other than the driver convicted of violating this section. In addition, any person convicted under this subsection shall forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of one year from the date of his conviction for the first offense and for a subsequent offense shall thereafter permanently forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State. (b)The driver of any vehicle knowingly involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle, including his own vehicle, or other property which is attended by any person shall immediately stop his vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible, but shall then forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of such accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.  Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.  Any person who shall violate this subsection shall be fined not less than $200 nor more than $400, or be imprisoned for a period of not more than 30 days, or both, for the first offense, and for a subsequent offense, shall be fined not less than $400 nor more than $600, or be imprisoned for a period of not less than 30 days nor more than 90 days or both. In addition, a person who violates this subsection shall, for a first offense, forfeit the right to operate a motor vehicle in this State for a period of six months from the date of conviction, and for a period of one year from the date of conviction for any subsequent offense. (c)The driver of any vehicle knowingly involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to any person or damage to any vehicle or property shall give his name and address and exhibit his operators license and registration certificate of his vehicle to the person injured or whose vehicle or property was damaged and to any police officer or witness of the accident, and to the driver or occupants of the vehicle collided with and render to a person injured in the accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying of that person to a hospital or a physician for medical or surgical treatment, if it is apparent that the treatment is necessary or is requested by the injured person. In the event that none of the persons specified are in condition to receive the information to which they otherwise would be entitled under this subsection, and no police officer is present, the driver of any vehicle involved in such accident after fulfilling all other requirements of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, insofar as possible on his part to be performed, shall forthwith report such accident to the nearest office of the local police department or of the county police of the county or of the State Police and submit thereto the information specified in this subsection. (d)The driver of any vehicle which knowingly collides with or is knowingly involved in an accident with any vehicle or other property which is unattended resulting in any damage to such vehicle or other property shall immediately stop and shall then and there locate and notify the operator or owner of such vehicle or other property of the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle striking the unattended vehicle or other property or, in the event an unattended vehicle is struck and the driver or owner thereof cannot be immediately located, shall attach securely in a conspicuous place in or on such vehicle a written notice giving the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle doing the striking or, in the event other property is struck and the owner thereof cannot be immediately located, shall notify the nearest office of the local police department or of the county police of the county or of the State Police and in addition shall notify the owner of the property as soon as the owner can be identified and located. Any person who violates this subsection shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section. (e)There shall be a permissive inference that the driver of any motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to any person or damage in the amount of $250.00 or more to any vehicle or property has knowledge that he was involved in such accident. For purposes of this section, it shall not be a defense that the operator of the motor vehicle was unaware of the existence or extent of personal injury or property damage caused by the accident as long as the operator was aware that he was involved in an accident. There shall be a permissive inference that the registered owner of the vehicle which was involved in an accident subject to the provisions of this section was the person involved in the accident; provided, however, if that vehicle is owned by a rental car company or is a leased vehicle, there shall be a permissive inference that the renter or authorized driver pursuant to a rental car contract or the lessee, and not the owner of the vehicle, was involved in the accident, and the requirements and penalties imposed pursuant to this section shall be applicable to that renter or authorized driver or lessee and not the owner of the vehicle. Any person who suppresses, by way of concealment or destruction, any evidence of a violation of this section or who suppresses the identity of the violator shall be subject to a fine of not less than $250 or more than $1,000. Amended 1940, c.147; 1967, c.189, s.1; 1977, c.407; 1978, c.180; 1979, c.463, s.1; 1994, c.183, s.1; 2003, c.55, s.1; 2007, c.266, s.1. 39:4-130  Immediate notice of accident; written report.   39:4-130. The driver of a vehicle or street car involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person, or damage to property of any one person in excess of $500.00 shall by the quickest means of communication give notice of such accident to the local police department or to the nearest office of the county police of the county or of the State Police, and in addition shall within 10 days after such accident forward a written report of such accident to the commission on forms furnished by it. Such written reports shall contain sufficiently detailed information with reference to a motor vehicle accident, including the cause, the conditions then existing, the persons and vehicles involved and such information as may be necessary to enable the chief administrator to determine whether the requirements for the deposit of security required by law are inapplicable by reason of the existence of insurance or other circumstances.  The chief administrator may rely upon the accuracy of the information contained in any such report, unless he has reason to believe that the report is erroneous.  The commission may require operators involved in accidents to file supplemental reports of accidents upon forms furnished by it when in the opinion of the commission, the original report is insufficient.  The reports shall be without prejudice, shall be for the information of the commission, and shall not be open to public inspection.  The fact that the reports have been so made shall be admissible in evidence solely to prove a compliance with this section, but no report or any part thereof or statement contained therein shall be admissible in evidence for any other purpose in any proceeding or action arising out of the accident. Whenever the driver of a vehicle is physically incapable of giving immediate notice or making a written report of an accident as required in this section and there was another occupant in the vehicle at the time of the accident capable of giving notice or making a report, such occupant shall make or cause to be made said notice or report not made by the driver. Whenever the driver is physically incapable of making a written report of an accident as required by this section and such driver is not the owner of the vehicle, then the owner of the vehicle involved in such accident shall make such report not made by the driver. In those cases where a driver knowingly violates the provisions of this section by failing to make a written report of an accident, there shall be a permissive inference that the registered owner of the vehicle which was involved in that accident was the person involved in the accident; provided, however, if that vehicle is owned by a rental car company or is a leased vehicle, there shall be a permissive inference that the renter or authorized driver pursuant to a rental car contract or the lessee, and not the owner of the vehicle, was the person involved in the accident, and the requirements and penalties imposed pursuant to this section shall be applicable to that renter or authorized driver or lessee and not the owner of the vehicle. Any person who suppresses, by way of concealment or destruction, any evidence of a violation of this section or who suppresses the identity of the violator shall be subject to a fine of not less than $250 or more than $1,000. A written report of an accident shall not be required by this section if a law enforcement officer submits a written report of the accident to the commission pursuant to R.S.39:4-131. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person who knowingly violates this section shall be fined not less than $30 or more than $100. The chief administrator may revoke or suspend the operators license privilege and registration privilege of a person who violates this section. For purposes of this section, it shall not be a defense that the operator of the motor vehicle was unaware of the existence or extent of personal injury or property damage caused by the accident as long as the operator was aware that he was involved in an accident.

Municipal Court improperly admitted into evidence Drinking Driving Questionnaire (DDQ) and Drinking Driving Report State v. Kuropchak

Municipal Court improperly admitted into evidence Drinking Driving Questionnaire (DDQ) and Drinking Driving Report State v. Kuropchak __ NJ __ (A-41-13 )

The municipal court’s admission of the Alcotest results without the foundational documents required by State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 (2009) was error. Further, because the DDQ and DDR contained inadmissible hearsay, which may have unduly influenced the municipal court’s credibility findings, the matter is remanded for a new trial.

State of New Jersey v. Julie Kuropchak (A-41-13) (072718)

Argued October 21, 2014 -- Decided April 28, 2015

FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

In this appeal, the Court considered the admissibility of evidence in the prosecution of driving while intoxicated (DWI) cases.

On January 25, 2010, at approximately 2:00 p.m., defendant had a sip of a margarita. Later, feeling ill, defendant took Nyquil and a homemade remedy of apple cider vinegar and water. At 8:30 p.m., defendant met with her doctor who prescribed an antibiotic and two pain relievers. Defendant immediately picked up the prescriptions, but did not take either. Driving home from the pharmacy, defendant turned onto a two-lane, two-way road that sloped uphill. When she reached the top of the hill, she saw an approaching vehicle straddling the center line. Defendant hit her brakes, swerved, collided with the oncoming vehicle, and lost consciousness.  

When she woke up, the car was filled with smoke and she tasted blood in her mouth. Officer Dennis Serritella responded to the scene and performed three sobriety tests, two of which defendant failed. He observed that she looked down multiple times, spaced out her steps, slurred her speech, and had bloodshot and watery eyes. Concluding that she was intoxicated, he arrested her.

       Defendant agreed to take an Alocotest (breathalyzer), which certified operator Officer Jose Brito performed. First, he observed her for twenty minutes. At 10:08 p.m., the machine performed a control test. He then administered the first set of tests at 10:11 (tests one through four). On tests two and three, defendant failed to produce the minimum volume of air for the Alcotest to generate a blood-alcohol level. The first and fourth tests yielded results, but they were not within an acceptable tolerance range. At 10:35 p.m., the Alcotest machine self-performed another control test. Officer Brito administered a second set of tests at 10:37 (tests five and six). Both tests yielded results, but they were also not within an acceptable tolerance range. The machine performed a control test at 10:53 p.m., after which Officer Brito administered a third set of tests at 10:54 (tests seven through nine). Defendant failed to produce a minimum volume of air on test seven. Tests eight and nine, however, both generated results of .10% BAC, which were within an acceptable tolerance range.

        At trial, Gary Aramini, an Alcotest expert, and Officer Serritella testified. Aramini said that the tests were done improperly and that the State had failed to enter the right simulator solution Certificate of Analysis and the most recent Calibrating Unit New Standard Solution Report into evidence. He also testified that Officer Brito failed to wait the required twenty minutes between the second and third set of tests and that lip balm, blood in defendant’s mouth, and a cell phone in the testing room may have tainted the results. The court admitted the Drinking Driving Questionnaire (DDQ) and Drinking Driving Report (DDR) into evidence as business records. The court also admitted Officer Brito’s Alcotest Operator Certification, the Alcotest Calibration Certificate, Part I -- Control Tests, the Alcotest Calibration Certificate, Part II -- Linearity Tests, the Calibrating Unit New Standard Solution Report for solution control lot number 08J060, and a Certificate of Analysis 0.10 Percent Breath Alcohol Simulator Solution. This Certificate was admitted without objection; however, the State concedes that it was for lot 09D065 rather than 08J060, which was the simulator solution used in defendant’s control test.

        On August 10, 2010, the municipal court found defendant guilty of DWI. On de novo review, giving due deference to the municipal court’s credibility determinations, the Law Division found defendant guilty of DWI.

The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s conviction. This Court granted defendant’s petition for certification, limited to the admissibility of the documentary evidence, the Alcotest results, and the sufficiency of the observational evidence.   

      HELD: The municipal court’s admission of the Alcotest results without the foundational documents required by State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 (2009) was error. Further, because the DDQ and DDR contained inadmissible hearsay, which may have unduly influenced the municipal court’s credibility findings, the matter is remanded for a new trial.

        1. If a municipal court convicts a defendant of DWI, the defendant must first appeal to the Law Division. The Law Division reviews the municipal court’s decision de novo, but defers to credibility findings of the municipal court.   

Appellate courts should defer to trial courts’ credibility findings. Occasionally, however, a trial court’s findings may be so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.   

        2. A court may convict a defendant of DWI if she registers a blood alcohol level of 0.08% or higher. This finding of guilt is subject to proof of the Alcotest’s reliability. The operator must observe the subject for twenty minutes. After twenty minutes, the Alcotest machine automatically conducts a blank air test to determine if there are any chemical interferents in the room. Additionally, a control test is conducted; if the Alcotest is working properly, that control test will generate a result between 0.095 and 0.105. The State must also admit certain foundational documents: (1) the most recent calibration report prior to a defendant’s test, with part I--control tests, part II--linearity tests, and the credentials of the coordinator who performed the calibration; (2) the most recent new standard solution report prior to a defendant’s test; and (3) the certificate of analysis of the 0.10 simulator solution used in a defendant’s control tests to prove that the Alcotest was in working order.   

        3. Here, the last semi-annual calibration was completed on January 12, 2010, with simulator solution control lot 09D065. The solution control lot for the control test performed prior to and following the three rounds of breath tests performed on defendant was solution control lot 08J060. Under Chun, the State was required to provide the Certificate of Analysis of the 0.10 Simulator Solution used in defendant’s control test. The State, however, mistakenly admitted the Certificate of Analysis for the semi-annual simulator solution control lot 09D065 instead. Additionally, the most recent Calibrating Unit New Standards Solution Report was not admitted into evidence during the State’s case. Given that the foundational documents were not admitted into evidence, the State presented no evidence as to the reliability or accuracy of the Alcotest results and, therefore, defendant’s conviction of per se intoxication was improper.   

        4. Defendant contends that the DDR and the DDQ were admitted into evidence in violation of the Confrontation Clause. A person charged with a criminal offense has the right to confront his accusers. Officer Serritella’s documentation of the incident must be considered the recordation of testimonial statements because his observations were made to establish that defendant was driving while intoxicated. Since the officer testified at trial and was extensively cross-examined, the Confrontation Clause was not violated by the admission of the DDR and DDQ.   

        5. As for defendant’s contention that the DDR and DDQ are hearsay not subject to any exception, the Court observes that hearsay is inadmissible unless it fall into one of certain recognized exceptions. To qualify as a business record, a writing must: (1) be made in the regular course of business, (2) within a short time of the events described in it, and (3) under circumstances that indicate its trustworthiness. Foundational reports for breath testing, with certain qualifications, are admissible under the business record exception to the hearsay rule. Here, however, the DDR contains a narrative account of what the officer saw at the scene and includes factual statements, observations, and the officer’s opinions. Thus, the DDR contains inadmissible hearsay. Although the DDQ also does not appear initially to constitute hearsay, it incorporates by reference the DWI report in the “remarks” section and the DWI report, in turn, contains several inadmissible opinions. The DDQ’s content thus also rises to the level of inadmissible hearsay and must be excluded. Therefore, the DDR and the DDQ were inadmissible hearsay outside the scope of the business records exception.   

        6. Here, the municipal court heard defendant’s testimony concerning the events on the day of the incident, as well as the testimony of Officer Serritella. The court found the Officer’s testimony more credible than defendant’s and therefore found defendant guilty. The court’s credibility determinations, however, were made after the DDR and the DDQ were admitted into evidence, notwithstanding the impermissible hearsay statements they contained, and after the Alcotest results were admitted into evidence despite the lack of requisite foundational documents.  

      The cumulative effect of the inclusion of the DDR, the DDQ, and the Alcotest results may have tilted the municipal court’s credibility findings. Thus, the Court lacks sufficient confidence in the proceedings to sanction the result reached and concludes that the interests of justice require a new trial. It is only because of the unique confluence of events in this case – the inappropriate admission of the Alcotest results as well as the DDR and DDQ – that the Court remands for a new trial. Had the only flaw been the admission of the DDR and DDQ, which contained hearsay, Officer Serritella’s testimony would have alleviated much of that problem. Here, however, the cumulative effect of the errors may have tilted the municipal court’s credibility findings.   

      The judgment of the Appellate Division was REVERSED. The matter was REMANDED for a new trial.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, and SOLOMON; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion.   

 Full opinion at http://www.njlaws.com/Kuropchakcase.htm

Perry Driver is not subject to criminal driving while suspended if DWI s...

Revisions to 39:6B-2 in 2014 Makes driver's license suspension discretionary for first offense of driving without motor vehicle liability insurance

Revisions to 39:6B-2 in 2014 Makes driver's license suspension discretionary for first offense of driving without motor vehicle liability insurance P.L. 2013, c.237 -

Enacted: January 17, 2014

Effective: January 17, 2014

Area of Law: Municipal

On January 17, 2014, Governor Christie signed A-1844 into law as P.L. 2013, c.237. The new law took effect on January 17, 2014. A copy of the law is attached and is available on the Judiciary Infonet under Legal Reference/Legislation Affecting Courts. Below is a summary of the law.

The new law amends N.J.S.A.39:6B-2 to provide that the one-year driver’s license suspension penalty for a first offense of driving without the required motor vehicle liability insurance coverage may be reduced or eliminated by the court if the person provides satisfactory proof of insurance at the time of the hearing. A person who is convicted for a first offense of operating a motor vehicle without the required motor vehicle liability insurance coverage remains subject to a fine of not less than $300 nor more than $1,000 and a period of community service to be determined by the court.