Friday, November 27, 2009

Hina K. Patel v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (A-86-08)

Hina K. Patel v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (A-86-08) Entire case.....

Argued September 15, 2009 -- Decided November 10, 2009
LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
This appeal involves the assessment of motor vehicle penalty points for a third or subsequent offense in
violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2, driving in an unsafe manner likely to endanger a person or property. The issue is
whether, based on the timing of her offenses, plaintiff is entitled to relief under N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(e), which
provides that an offense that occurs more than five years after “the prior offense” shall not be considered a
“subsequent offense” for the purpose of assessing points.
Plaintiff Hina K. Patel is a repeat violator of the unsafe driving statute. In March 2002, she committed a
driving offense and pled guilty to unsafe driving in May 2002. She committed another offense in August 2002, and
pled guilty to unsafe driving on September 17, 2002. She pled guilty to a third unsafe driving violation in June
2006, for an offense that occurred in April 2006. Then, on September 5, 2007, she received citations for speeding
and failing to have her vehicle timely inspected, for which she entered a guilty plea to unsafe driving in November
2007.
Patel was assessed fines for each of her violations and four penalty points for her third offense. When she
was assessed four additional points for her fourth conviction in 2007, Patel wrote to the New Jersey Motor Vehicle
Commission (MVC), objecting because her fourth conviction had occurred more than five years after both her first
and second offenses. Because only her third offense had occurred within five years of the 2007 offense, Patel
argued that the 2007 offense must be treated as a “second offense,” for which points are not authorized. The MVC
informed her that “a third and subsequent violation” of the unsafe driving statute “within a five year period will be
issued 4 points,” and because this was her fourth violation since 2002, her “Driver History record will remain the
same.”
Patel appealed. The Appellate Division upheld the MVC’s determination to assess points for her fourth
unsafe driving conviction. Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 403 N.J. Super. 373 (App. Div. 2008). The panel
observed that N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(e) exempts an individual from points when more than five years have elapsed
between a subsequent offense and the prior offense. The panel concluded that the assessment of points on Patel’s
“subsequent” fourth conviction was proper because her third offense had occurred within five years of her fourth.
The panel discerned a legislative intent to apply the exemption from points when the “subsequent” offense occurs
more than five years after “the prior offense,” that is, the most recent prior offense, not “any prior offense.” In
Patel’s case, “the prior offense” was her third offense, which was within five years of her fourth offense.
The Supreme Court granted Patel’s petition for certification. 198 N.J. 474 (2009).
HELD: Under N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(e), the exemption provision for assessing motor vehicle penalty points for an
unsafe driving offense that occurs more than five years after “the prior offense,” “the prior offense” refers only to
the most recent preceding offense based on both a plain reading of the statute and a review of the legislative history.
Thus, the MVC correctly imposed motor vehicle points on Patel for having a fourth unsafe driving conviction in
2007, only one year after the date of her prior, third, unsafe driving offense.
1. When interpreting a statute, courts start with the plain language and apply the generally accepted meaning of the
words used. If the plain language leads to a clear result, the interpretive process is over. If there is ambiguity that
leads to more than one plausible interpretation, a court may turn to extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history, for
assistance with its interpretive task. (pp. 5-6)
2
2. The unsafe driving statute provides that for first and second offenses, motor vehicle penalty points shall not be
assessed. Subsection d. states that a person convicted of “a third or subsequent offense” shall be assessed points.
Subsection e. states that an offense “that occurs more than five years after the prior offense shall not be considered a
subsequent offense for the purpose of assessing motor vehicle penalty points under subsection d.” The MVC
interpreted the statute to require that Patel’s fourth violation subjected her to the imposition of points. It explained
that points are assessed if the third “and” subsequent offense occurred during a five-year period; that is, points must
be assessed if five or fewer years had elapsed between her third and her subsequent fourth offense. (pp. 6-7)
3. Generally, courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it is charged with enforcing. Here, the MVC
committed no grievous error in interpreting the unsafe driving statute, and the Appellate Division was entirely
correct in affirming the MVC’s action in Patel’s points challenge. (p. 8)
4. A plain reading of subsection e. supports the construction that “the prior offense” refers only to the most recent
preceding offense. “The” when used before a noun generally emphasizes one of a group as the most prominent.
Thus, “the” indicates that the Legislature was contemplating only one prior offense, not each or any prior offense.
The “prior offense” contemplates only one offense. Use of “the” signifies that the noun to which it attaches is the
most prominent, and the natural assumption from the plain language is that the Legislature contemplated the most
recent prior offense. However, because that is not explicitly stated, the meaning of “the prior offense” could
arguably be found to contain some ambiguity. Accordingly, the Court examines the legislative history. (pp. 9-10)
5. Before enactment, the unsafe driving statute underwent several revisions. The precursor to the present subsection
d. allowed for the discretionary assessment of points for third and subsequent convictions. A substitute bill made it
mandatory to assess points for third and subsequent convictions and also created the five-year exception now found
in subsection e. As the Assembly Judiciary Committee explained, an offense “which occurs more than five years
after the prior offense would not be considered a subsequent offense” for the purpose of assessing points. On
signing the bill, the Governor issued a news release explaining that a “person convicted of a third or subsequent
offense” may be assessed points “if the offense occurs within five years of the prior offense.” (pp. 10-12)
6. Based on that history, the Court concludes that the Legislature meant the words “the prior offense” in subsection
e. to refer to the offense immediately preceding a “subsequent” offense. The statutory scheme demonstrates a
legislative desire to impose increasing penalties for repetitive violations, and to show leniency by including an
exemption from points for violations that occur after more than a five-year hiatus in unsafe driving violations.
Those legislative policies are harmonized by applying the phrase “the prior offense” to fourth offenders exactly as
did the MVC in Patel’s case, by looking at the date of her immediately preceding third offense and, because it was
not more than five years before her fourth offense in 2007, imposing points for her fourth violation. The MVC’s
interpretation is a reasonable construction of the language used by the Legislature, gives meaning to every word
used, and advances the overall legislative intent to punish drivers with motor vehicle points for multiple unsafe
driving offenses that are close in time. The MVC correctly imposed motor vehicle points on Patel for having a
fourth unsafe driving conviction in 2007, only one year after the date of her prior, third, unsafe driving offense. (pp.
13-16)
7. Although not necessary to the disposition of the appeal, the Appellate Division further expressed approval of the
MVC’s interpretation that the five-year exception did not apply to “third” offenses, but only to a “subsequent”
offense; that is, the five-year exception applied only to fourth and further offenses. Absent a more explicit direction
from the Legislature, the Court rejects the suggestion that the exemption is denied to third offenders. (pp. 16-17)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LONG, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and
HOENS join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-86 September Term 2008
HINA K. PATEL,
Appellant-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE
COMMISSION,
Respondent-Respondent.
Argued September 15, 2009 – Decided November 10, 2009
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is
reported at 403 N.J. Super. 373 (2008).
Michelle M. Tullio argued the cause for
appellant (Lanfrit and Tullio, attorneys;
Darren D. Dapas on the brief).
Nicole T. Minutoli, Deputy Attorney
General, argued the cause for respondent
(Anne Milgram, Attorney General of
New Jersey, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
Mala Narayanan, Deputy Attorney General,
on the brief).
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2 makes it unlawful for any person to
drive a motor vehicle in an unsafe manner likely to endanger a
person or property. The law imposes only fines for the first
two violations, but it authorizes the New Jersey Motor Vehicle
2
Commission (MVC) to assess motor vehicle penalty points, in
addition to fines, for “a third or subsequent offense.”
N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(d). An assessment of points may be avoided,
however, based on the timing of one’s offenses. Subsection e.
provides that
[a]n offense committed under this section
that occurs more than five years after the
prior offense shall not be considered a
subsequent offense for the purpose of
assessing motor vehicle penalty points under
subsection d. of this section.
[N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(e).]
This appeal requires us to construe that exemption provision.
Appellant, Hina Patel, is a repeat violator of the unsafe
driving statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2. Based on the timing of her
violations she contested the MVC’s determination to assess motor
vehicle penalty points for her fourth offense. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm the MVC’s imposition of points for
Patel’s fourth unsafe driving violation.
I.
Patel’s relevant driving history may be summarized as
follows. On March 12, 2002, she committed a driving offense and
pled guilty to unsafe driving on May 3, 2002. She committed
another offense on August 7, 2002, and on September 17, 2002,
again pled guilty to unsafe driving. On April 4, 2006, Patel
received a citation for unsafe lane changing, for which she pled
3
to a third unsafe driving violation on June 9, 2006. Then, on
September 5, 2007, she received citations for speeding and
failing to have her vehicle timely inspected, in exchange for
which she entered a guilty plea to unsafe driving on November
19, 2007.
Patel was fined in accordance with the statute’s
progressive fine structure for each of her four unsafe driving
convictions. She also was assessed four motor vehicle penalty
points for her third offense. The instant controversy arose
over the assessment of four additional motor vehicle points for
her fourth unsafe driving conviction in 2007. Patel wrote to
the Chief Administrator of the MVC, objecting because her fourth
conviction had occurred more than five years after both her
first and second offenses. Because only her third offense had
occurred within five years of the 2007 offense (the fourth
unsafe driving conviction), Patel argued that the 2007 offense
must be treated as a “second offense” under the statute.
According to Patel, because N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(c) does not
authorize points for second offenses, she should not be
subjected to motor vehicle penalty points for the 2007
violation.
4
Patel received a response1 informing her that “a third and
subsequent violation for [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-97.2 (Unsafe Operation
Of A Motor Vehicle) within a five year period will be issued 4
points. Our records indicate this is your . . . 4th violation
since March 12, 2002. Therefore your . . . Driver History
record will remain the same.”
Patel appealed from that final determination of the MVC,
see R. 2:2-3(a)(2), and asserted the same arguments that she had
presented to the MVC. The Appellate Division’s decision upheld
the MVC’s interpretation of the statute and its application to
Patel that resulted in the points assessment for her fourth
unsafe driving conviction. Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n,
403 N.J. Super. 373, 378 (App. Div. 2008). The panel observed
that subsection e. of the statute exempts an individual from
points when more than five years have elapsed between a
subsequent offense and the prior offense. Id. at 377. The
panel concluded that the assessment of points on Patel’s
“subsequent” fourth conviction was proper because her third
offense had occurred within five years of her fourth. Ibid.
Relying on the Legislature’s language in subsection e., the
panel discerned a legislative intent to apply the exemption from
1 The Chief Administrator of the MVC referred Patel’s
correspondence to the Driver Management Bureau, a subdivision of
the MVC, for response. We refer to the MVC and the Bureau
collectively as MVC.
5
points when the “subsequent” offense occurs more than five years
after “the prior offense,” not “any prior offense.” Ibid. The
panel regarded the statutory reference to “the prior offense” in
subsection e. as meaning the most recent prior offense. Ibid.
In Patel’s case, “the prior offense” was her third conviction,
which was within five years of her fourth conviction. Ibid.
II.
As this appeal involves the interpretation of a statute,
“our goal is to discern and effectuate the Legislature’s
intent.” State v. Brannon, 178 N.J. 500, 505 (2004). The plain
language of the statute is our starting point. See State v.
Lewis, 185 N.J. 363, 369 (2005) (citing State v. Ivory, 124 N.J.
582, 585 (1991)). We apply to the statutory terms the generally
accepted meaning of the words used by the Legislature, see
D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192 N.J. 110, 119
(2007) (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)),
and strive “to give effect to every word.” Med. Soc’y of N.J.
v. N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 120 N.J. 18, 26 (1990).
Because we do not assume that the Legislature used any
unnecessary or meaningless language, see id. at 26-27, we read a
statute in its entirety and construe “each part or section . . .
in connection with every other part or section to provide a
harmonious whole.” Bedford v. Riello, 195 N.J. 210, 224 (2008)
6
(citing In re Distrib. of Liquid Assets, 168 N.J. 1, 17-18
(2001); State v. Brown, 22 N.J. 405, 415-16 (1956)).
With those general principles in mind we turn to the
statute in issue. As the panel below appropriately noted,
“‘[i]f the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous
result, then our interpretive process is over.’” Patel, supra,
403 N.J. Super. at 376 (quoting Richardson v. Bd. of Trs.,
Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 195 (2007)). However
“if there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to
more than one plausible interpretation, we may turn to extrinsic
evidence, including legislative history, committee reports, and
contemporaneous construction,” for further assistance in our
interpretative task. DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492-93
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
III.
A.
The unsafe driving statute provides as follows:
a. Notwithstanding any other provision of
law to the contrary, it shall be unlawful
for any person to drive or operate a motor
vehicle in an unsafe manner likely to
endanger a person or property.
b. A person convicted of a first offense
under subsection a. shall be subject to a
fine of not less than $50.00 or more than
$150.00 and shall not be assessed any motor
vehicle penalty points pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
39:5-30.5].
7
c. A person convicted of a second offense
under subsection a. shall be subject to a
fine of not less than $100.00 or more than
$250.00 and shall not be assessed any motor
vehicle penalty points pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
39:5-30.5].
d. A person convicted of a third or
subsequent offense under subsection a. shall
be subject to a fine of not less than
$200.00 or more than $500.00 and shall be
assessed motor vehicle penalty points
pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.5].
e. An offense committed under this section
that occurs more than five years after the
prior offense shall not be considered a
subsequent offense for the purpose of
assessing motor vehicle penalty points under
subsection d. of this section.
f. In addition to any fine, fee or other
charge imposed pursuant to law, the court
shall assess a person convicted of an
offense under subsection a. of this section
a surcharge of $250 which shall be collected
by the court and distributed to the Division
of Revenue in the Department of the Treasury
as a New Jersey Merit Rating Plan surcharge
pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)(2)(a)].
[N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2.]
The MVC interpreted the statute to require that Patel’s
fourth violation subjected her to the imposition of motor
vehicle penalty points under subsection d. Its letter
disposition of Patel’s points challenge explained that points
are assessed if the third “and” the subsequent offense occurred
during a five-year period. In other words, the MVC found that
8
points must be assessed if five or fewer years had elapsed
between Patel’s third and her subsequent fourth offense.
“Generally, courts afford substantial deference to an
agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged
with enforcing.” Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 196 (citing R&R
Mktg., L.L.C. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 158 N.J. 170, 175 (1999)).
However, we are not bound by an agency’s construction of a
statute just as we are not bound by its other, strictly legal
determinations. Ibid. An agency’s determination must be
reversed if “it is ‘plainly unreasonable.’" T.H. v. Div. of
Development Disabilities, 189 N.J. 478, 490 (2007) (quoting In
re N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun.
Employees, 150 N.J. 331, 351 (1997)). An agency’s final
decision is plainly unreasonable and violates express or implied
legislative direction if it gives “a statute any greater effect
than is permitted by the statutory language[,] . . . alter[s]
the terms of a legislative enactment[,] . . . frustrate[s] the
policy embodied in the statute . . . [or] is plainly at odds
with the statute.” Id. at 491 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Here it is clear to us that the MVC committed
no such grievous error in respect of its interpretation of the
unsafe driving statute that led to Patel’s points assessment;
the Appellate Division was entirely correct in affirming the
MVC’s action in Patel’s points challenge.
9
B.
A plain-language reading of subsection e. of the unsafe
driving statute supports the construction that “the prior
offense” refers only to the most recent preceding offense.
“The” when used “before a noun, and generally stressed,
emphasiz[es] one of a group or type as the most outstanding or
prominent.” Webster’s II New College Dictionary 1143 (rev. ed.
1999). Consequently, “the” indicates that the Legislature was
contemplating only one prior offense, not each or any prior
offense. See Villa v. Short, 195 N.J. 15, 26 (2008) (quoting
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stamp, 588 A.2d 363, 365 (N.H. 1991)
(noting, in interpreting insurance policy with multiple
insureds, that “‘the indefinite article ‘an,’ rather than the
definite ‘the,’ before ‘insured’ is a clear reference to any
insured’”)).
In our view, the phrase “prior offense” in subsection e.
contemplates only one offense. Moreover, the use of the article
“the” signifies that the noun to which it attaches is the one
most prominent and, in light of the absence of an explicit
reference to a specific offense, the natural assumption to be
made from the plain language is that the Legislature
contemplated the most recent prior offense. However, because
that is not explicitly stated, the meaning of “the prior
offense” could arguably be found to contain some ambiguity.
10
Accordingly, we may examine whether extrinsic aids are of any
assistance in our effort to discern the legislative intent. See
DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492-93. In this instance, such
assistance can be found in the legislative history of the unsafe
driving statute.
C.
Before enactment, the unsafe driving statute underwent
several revisions and substitutions. A bill first was
introduced in the Senate and, although the substantive offense
was the same, the punishment scheme was substantially different
from the statute eventually enacted. A first offense carried
the penalty of a fine between $50 and $200 and/or no more than
fifteen days of imprisonment. S. 1236, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000).
However, no points were to be assessed for the first offense.
Ibid. For a second or subsequent offense, a fine between $100
and $500 was required and/or imprisonment for no more than
thirty days. Ibid. Additionally, the assessment of motor
vehicle points was optional. Ibid. That bill substantially
mirrored the reckless driving statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96, which
imposes similar but more severe penalties and requires a
reckless mental state.
Senate Bill 1236 was replaced by identical bills introduced
in both houses of the Legislature (Senate Bill 1410 and Assembly
Bill 2465). The new bills removed the penalty of imprisonment.
11
See S. 1410, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000); Assemb. 2465, 209th Leg.
(N.J. 2000). The maximum fees to be imposed for a first and
second offense were reduced to $150 and $250 respectively and
points could no longer be assessed for a second offense. S.
1410, supra; Assemb. 2465, supra. Importantly, a new section
was added, the precursor to the present subsection d. It
allowed for the discretionary assessment of motor vehicle points
for third and subsequent convictions. S. 1410, supra; Assemb.
2465, supra. Also, the fee for a third and subsequent offense
was set between $200 and $500. S. 1410, supra; Assemb. 2465,
supra. Eventually, the substantive provisions from another
pending bill, Assembly Bill 2466, were incorporated, clarifying
a prosecutor’s authority to accept a plea to unsafe driving for
any other offense even if it was not a lesser-included offense.2
See Assemb. 2466, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000).
The Assembly Judiciary Committee made further substantive
revisions. The substitute bill rendered mandatory the
assessment of points for third and subsequent convictions.
Assemb. Judiciary Comm. Statement to Assemb. Comm. Substitute
for Assemb. Nos. 2465 and 2466, 209th Leg. 1 (N.J. 2000). The
substitute bill also created the five-year exception now found
in subsection e. Ibid. As the Assembly Judiciary Committee
2 The substantive provisions of Assembly Bill 2466 eventually
amended N.J.S.A. 2B:25-1 to -12.
12
explained, “an offense committed under [this statutory]
provision[] which occurs more than five years after the prior
offense would not be considered a subsequent offense within the
meaning of subsection d. of section 1 of the substitute for the
purpose of assessing motor vehicle penalty points.” Ibid. The
Senate adopted the changes made by the Assembly. S. Comm.
Substitute for S. 1236, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000). On signing the
bill, then-Governor Christine Todd Whitman issued a news release
that is noteworthy for its description of subsections d. and e.,
and their interplay in the assessment of points and the fiveyear
exception. News Release, Office of the Governor (July 24,
2000). Governor Whitman’s news release explained that a “person
convicted of a third or subsequent offense would be subject to a
fine of not less than $200.00 or more than $500.00 and may be
assessed motor vehicle penalty points, if the offense occurs
within five years of the prior offense.” Ibid. The unsafe
driving statute took effect on July 24, 2000. L. 2000, c. 75, §
1.3
3 In 2004, it was amended together with the laws governing the
imposition of surcharges on motor vehicle violators as part of a
plan to boost revenue. L. 2004, c. 69, § 1. An early bill
proposed that, in addition to the fines already imposed under
the unsafe driving statute, an unsafe driving conviction also
would subject the driver to a surcharge “in an amount of $200.00
for a first offense, $350.00 for a second offense occurring
within a ten-year period, and $500.00 for a third offense
occurring within a ten-year period of a prior unsafe driving
conviction.” Assemb. 3114, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004); S. 1714,
13
Our review of that legislative history leads us to the
conclusion that the Legislature meant the words “the prior
offense” in subsection e. to refer to the offense immediately
preceding a “subsequent” offense such as Patel committed in
2007. The Governor’s news release pointedly gives the statute’s
wording such an interpretation. Moreover, that interpretation
is consistent with the apparent policy goals of the Legislature
when enacting this new penalty scheme.
The statute plainly intended to punish those who drive “in
an unsafe manner likely to endanger a person or property,”
without reference to the driver’s mental state. N.J.S.A. 39:4-
97.2(a). The statute was created notwithstanding the existence
211th Leg. (N.J. 2004). That proposed amendment was abandoned
in favor of a flat $250 surcharge on all unsafe driving
convictions as the statute currently requires. As the Committee
explained,
[t]he “unsafe driving” offense . . .
provided for fines, but specified that no
motor vehicle points were to be assessed
until a driver committed his third offense.
This new infraction is being used by a
number of motorists to avoid points and
surcharges. A total of 233,000 motorists
did so in calendar year 2003. This bill
sets the Merit Rating Plan Surcharge for
this offense at $250.
[S. Budget & Appropriations Comm. Statement
to S. Comm. Substitute for S. 1714, 211th
Leg. 1 (N.J. 2004).]
The new surcharge framework was estimated to provide the General
Treasury with “$58 million in additional annual revenue.” Ibid.
14
of a reckless driving statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96, as well as a
careless driving statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97. Absent the fiveyear
exception, the scheme demonstrates a legislative desire to
impose increasing penalties for repetitive violations by unsafe
drivers. That scheme operates on the basis of the number of
violations and the amount of time between each violation. The
leavening in that scheme is the Legislature’s evident desire to
show leniency to certain drivers who commit unsafe driving
offenses. That leniency is demonstrated through the inclusion
of the exemption from points for violations that occur after
more than a five-year hiatus in unsafe driving violations. The
legislative history to Bills 2466 and 2465 also reveals the
policy choice to permit prosecutors to use the unsafe driving
statute as a plea device for avoiding the imposition of points,
while still advancing a fiscal plan to increase the State’s
revenue through surcharges assessed on each and every unsafe
driving offense.
We find that the policies of the Legislature are harmonized
and best advanced by applying the phrase “the prior offense” in
subsection e. to fourth offenders exactly as did the MVC in
Patel’s case, namely by looking at the date of her immediately
preceding third offense and, on finding that it was not more
than five years before her fourth offense in 2007, imposing
points for her fourth violation. The agency’s interpretation is
15
a reasonable construction of the exact language used by the
Legislature and gives meaning to each and every word employed in
the statute. It advances the clearly perceptible, overall
legislative intent to punish drivers with motor vehicle points
for multiple unsafe driving offenses that are close in time
(that is, within five years of each other). And, that policy is
given reasonable effect if subsection e.’s reference to “the
prior offense” refers to the immediately preceding offense.
We find additional support for that interpretation from
examination of the differences in the phrasing and punishment
schemes of other statutes, which suggest that the phrase “the
prior offense” in subsection e. should be interpreted to refer
to the most recent preceding offense. Both the surcharge
statute, N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35, and the 2004 proposed amendments to
the unsafe driving statute, supra note 3, exemplify how the
unsafe driving statute could have been phrased if the
Legislature meant for the phrase, “the prior offense,” to
necessarily encompass all prior offenses within a five-year
period.4 Although the phrasing of the surcharge statute and the
2004 proposed amendments is not dispositive, it is persuasive.
4 If the unsafe driving statute had employed phrasing referring
to a five-year “period,” as the Legislature did in the surcharge
statute and as was advanced in the initial 2004 bills proposed
to amend the unsafe driving statute, Patel’s position might be
more persuasive.
16
In conclusion, the Legislature chose to focus the exemption
by referring to an offense that occurs five years or more after
the prior offense. We hold that the MVC correctly imposed motor
vehicle points on Patel for having a fourth unsafe driving
conviction in 2007, only one year after the date of her prior,
third, unsafe driving offense. She was not entitled to the
exemption from points provided by operation of subsection e. of
the statute.
D.
Although not necessary to the disposition of this appeal
from the imposition of points for Patel’s fourth violation, the
Appellate Division opinion further expressed approval of the
MVC’s interpretation that the statute’s five-year exception was
inapplicable to “third” offenses, and that it may only apply to
a “subsequent” offense, which the panel treated as a term of art
in subsection e. Patel, supra, 403 N.J. Super. at 377-78.
According to the panel, because subsection e. referred to only
“a subsequent offense” and not a “third” offense, the five-year
exception applied only to fourth and further offenses. Ibid.
We see no basis for treating the term “subsequent offense” in
subsection e. as a term of art addressing fourth or later
offenses, but excluding third offenses for purposes of the
imposition of points under subsection d. Although technical
terms or terms of art “‘having a special or accepted meaning in
17
the law, shall be construed in accordance with [that] . . .
meaning,’” Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251, 269
(2008) (alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 1:1-1), we see
no evidence in the plain language, structure, or legislative
history of the unsafe driving statute to support a conclusion
that the Legislature intended any such specialized, restrictive
meaning by its use of the word “subsequent.”
An equally sound, if not better understanding of the
Legislature’s use of “subsequent” in subsection e. is that it is
descriptive and, thus, would apply to both a third and any
ensuing offense that required examination of “the prior offense”
for purposes of determining eligibility for the points
exemption. At best, an argument might be advanced that the
language contained a shadow of ambiguity. But even if we were
to agree with such a proposition, and we do not, application of
the rule of lenity, see, e.g., State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475,
482 (2008), directs us to a different conclusion, one that
favors a driver’s eligibility for the points exemption. Absent
a more explicit direction from the Legislature to outright deny
subsection e.’s exemption to third offenders,5 we reject the
Appellate Division’s contrary suggestion.
5 Indeed, pending in the Legislature is a bill, sponsored by an
original sponsor of the unsafe driving statute, that clarifies
that it is the legislative intent to require that a third
offense occur within five years of a second offense in order for
18
IV.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LONG, ALBIN, WALLACE,
RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.
motor vehicle points to attach to the third offense. See S.
2439, 213th Leg. (N.J. 2008).
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. A-86 SEPTEMBER TERM 2008
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
HINA K. PATEL,
Appellant-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE
COMMISSION,
Respondent-Respondent.
DECIDED November 10, 2009
Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
CHECKLIST AFFIRM
CHIEF JUSTICE
RABNER X
JUSTICE LONG X
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X
JUSTICE ALBIN X
JUSTICE WALLACE X
JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO X
JUSTICE HOENS X
TOTALS 7

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

POLICE CHIEFS / PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTORS MIDDLESEX COUNTY 2009

POLICE CHIEFS / PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTORS MIDDLESEX COUNTY 2009

POLICE Dept. Chief or Director PHONE FAX
Carteret Chief John Pieczyski 732-541-4181 732-541-3867

Cranbury Chief Ed Kahler 609-395-0031 609-395-9216

East Brunswick Director Barry Roberson 732-390-6900 732-390-6970

Edison Chief Thomas Bryan 732-248-7400 732-287-0268

Highland Park Chief Stephen Rizco 732-572-3800 732-572-0258
Jamesburg Chief Martin Horvath 732-521-0011 x205 732-521-1927
Metuchen Chief James Keane 732-632-8500 732-632-8573
Middlesex Boro James Benson 732-356-1900 x222 732-356-7218
Milltown Chief Raymond Geipel 732-828-1100 732-249-5695

Monroe Chief John Kraivec 732-521-0222 732-521-2980

New Brunswick Director Anthony Caputo 732-745-5200 732-565-3602

North Brunswick Director Kenneth McCormick 732-545-3200 732-249-2892

Old Bridge Chief Thomas Collow 732-679-3400 732-607-7937

Perth Amboy Director _____ 732-442-4400 732-442-4492

Piscataway __ 732-562-1100 732-562-2312

Plainsboro Director Richard Furda 609-799-2333 609-275-5987

Sayreville Chief Edward Szkodny 732-727-4444 732-727-5189
South Amboy Chief James Wallis 732-525-5945 732-721-1504
South Brunswick Chief Raymond Hayducka 732-329-4000 732-329-4604

South Plainfield Chief John Ferrero 908-755-0700 908-755-0320

South River Chief Wesley Bomba 732-238-1000 732-613-6103

Spotswood Chief Karl Martin 732-251-2121 732-251-5910

Woodbridge Chief William Trenery 732-634-7700 732-602-7366

Nearby:
Franklin Chief Craig Novick 732-873-2300 732-873-8489

[Police Chief phone & fax numbers Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. Past Chair
Municipal Court Section, NJSBA Non Client G3 [revised 10/14/2009]

11-16-09 STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ECKERT

11-16-09 STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOSEPH ECKERT
A-0216-08T4

A conviction for refusal to submit to a breath examination cannot be merged with a DWI conviction. Such a plea agreement
violated applicable merger principles as well as the Court's Guidelines for Operation of Plea Agreements in the Municipal Courts of New Jersey.



Assistant Editor: Umair Hussain

Saturday, November 14, 2009

KENNETH VERCAMMEN – resume and community involvement

KENNETH VERCAMMEN – resume and community involvement
Attorney at Law
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
732-572-0500
www.njlaws.com
Kenneth Vercammen is an Edison, Middlesex County, NJ trial attorney who has published 125 articles in national and New Jersey publications on probate, estate planning, criminal and litigation topics. He often lectures to trial lawyers of the American Bar Association, New Jersey State Bar Association and Middlesex County Bar Association.
Kenneth Vercammen was the NJ State Bar Municipal Court Attorney of the Year and past president of the Middlesex County Municipal Prosecutor's Association.

 He is the past chair of the NJ State Bar Association Municipal Court Section. He is the Deputy chair of the ABA Criminal Law committee, GP Division. Kenneth Vercammen was selected one of only three attorneys as a Super Lawyer 2009 in NJ Monthly in the Criminal - DWI.
He is a highly regarded lecturer on litigation issues for the American Bar Association, ICLE, New Jersey State Bar Association and Middlesex County Bar Association. His articles have been published by New Jersey Law Journal, ABA Law Practice Management Magazine, and New Jersey Lawyer. He is the Editor in Chief of the New Jersey Municipal Court Law Review. Mr. Vercammen is a recipient of the NJSBA- YLD Service to the Bar Award. He has successfully handled over One thousand Municipal Court and Superior Court matters in the past 18 years.


Since 1985, his primary concentration has been on litigation matters. Mr. Vercammen gained other legal experiences as the Confidential Law Clerk to the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Supreme Court),with the Delaware County, PA District Attorney Office handling Probable Cause Hearings, Middlesex County Probation Dept as a Probation Officer, and an Executive Assistant to Scranton District Magistrate, Thomas Hart, in Scranton, PA. He started his career as a trial attorney for Drazin & Warshaw in Hazlet and Red Bank, NJ, and Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl in North Brunswick.


ADMISSIONS: Admitted In NJ, NY, PA, US Supreme Court and Federal District Court

MANAGING ATTORNEY Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, PC March 1990-Present
Full service Law practice with offices in Edison and Cranbury.

PROSECUTOR Township of Cranbury, Middlesex County, NJ 1991-1999
Municipal Prosecutor for criminal and traffic cases involving Township and State Police
-Acting Assoc. Prosecutor: Carteret Municipal Court, Middlesex County, NJ 2000

EDITOR- NJ MUNICIPAL COURT LAW REVIEW 1993- present

Middlesex County Bar Association 2008 Municipal Court Attorney of the Year

NJ State Bar Association- 2005-2006 Municipal Court Attorney of the Year Award

New Jersey Super Lawyers selection 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006

Who's Who in America 2004

NJ State Bar Association- 2002 General Practitioner of the Year Award

1993 AWARD WINNER "Service to the Bar Award"- New Jersey State Bar Association YLD

RELEVANT LITIGATION SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS:
-Criminal, DWI and Drug Cases- NJ State Bar Annual Meeting 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 01, 00, 99
-Civil Trial Practice- Middlesex Bar 2004
-Personal Injury Litigation- NJ Institute for Continuing Legal Education/ NJ State Bar
2001, 2000,1999,1998,1997,1996,1995,1994,1993,1991
-Municipal Court Handling Serious Cases ICLE/NJSBA-2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002,2001,2000,1998,1997,1995,1994
-NJ Association of Municipal Court Administrators 2002
-Edison Police Auxiliary- Search and Seizure 2002
-New Jersey Network TV- Due Process TV show 2000
-Cablevision TV- Law on the Line 2003, 2001
-Elder Law and Probate NJSBA/ ICLE 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 03,02,01,99,98,97,96

PUBLICATIONS:
Published 150 separate Law Review and Legal Periodical articles in legal journals such as New Jersey Law Journal, American Bar Association Barrister, New Jersey Lawyer, ABA Law Practice Management, and New Jersey State Bar Association's Dictum. Listed on www.njlaws.com.

KENNETH VERCAMMEN, ESQ.

RECENT SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS ON WILLS, ELDER LAW, AND PROBATE
East Brunswick Adult School 2009, 2008
Middlesex County Police Chiefs 2009- Living Wills
Middlesex County College- Wills & Probate 2007
Edison Adult School -Wills, Elder Law & Probate- 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002 [inc Edison TV], 2001, 2000,1999,1998,1997
- Nuts & Bolts of Elder Law - NJ Institute for Continuing Legal Education/ NJ State Bar ICLE/NJSBA 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2000, 1999, 1996
-Elder Law and Estate Planning- American Bar Association New York City 2008, Miami 2007
South Plainfield Seniors- New Probate Law 2005, East Brunswick Seniors- New Probate Law 2005
Old Bridge AARP 2002; Guardian Angeles/ Edison 2002; St. Cecilia/ Woodbridge Seniors 2002;
East Brunswick/ Hall's Corner 2002;
-Linden AARP 2002
-Woodbridge Adult School -Wills and Estate Administration -2001, 2000,1999,1998,1997,1996
Woodbridge Housing 2001; Metuchen Seniors & Metuchen TV 2001; Frigidare/ Local 401 Edison 2001; Chelsea/ East Brunswick 2001, Village Court/ Edison 2001; Old Bridge Rotary 2001; Sacred Heart/ South Amboy 2001; Livingston Manor/ New Brunswick 2001; Sunrise East Brunswick 2001; Strawberry Hill/ Woodbridge 2001;
-Wills and Elder Law - Metuchen Adult School 1999,1997,1996,1995,1994,1993
-Clara Barton Senior Citizens- Wills & Elder Law-Edison 2002, 1995
-AARP Participating Attorney in Legal Plan for NJ AARP members 1999-2005
-Senior Legal Points University of Medicine & Dentistry UMDNJ & St. Peter's-2000, 1999,1998
-East Brunswick AARP Wills 2001; -Iselin/ Woodbridge AARP Wills 2000
-Metuchen Reformed Church; Franklin/ Somerset/ Quailbrook Seniors 2001
-North Brunswick Senior Day 2001
-Wills, Elder Law and Probate-South Brunswick Adult School & Channel 28 TV 1999, 1997,1993
-Wills and Estate Planning-Old Bridge Adult School 1998,1997,1995
-Senior Citizen Law-Perth Amboy YMHA 1995; Temple Beth Or 2002;
-Wills, Living Wills and Probate-Spotswood Community School 1995,1994,1993
-Wills and Probate-Sayreville Adult School 1997, 1996,1995,1994
-Living Wills-New Jersey State Bar Foundation and St. Demetrius, Carteret 1994
-Wills and Estate Planning-Edison Elks and Senior Citizens January 1994
-"Legal Questions Clinic" Metuchen Adult School March 1995,1994,1993
-Estate Planning to Protect Families-Metuchen Chamber of Commerce April 1993

SPECIAL ACTING PROSECUTOR: Woodbridge, East Brunswick, Metuchen, South Brunswick, Perth Amboy, Cranbury, South Plainfield, Clark, South River, Hightstown, Carteret, Jamesburg, Berkeley Heights on conflict matters. Past President- Middlesex Municipal Prosecutor's Association. Previous experience with the Delaware County, Pennsylvania District Attorney Office, Middlesex County Probation Department and Scranton District Magistrate Office.

Metuchen Public Defender 2001- present Edison Public Defender 1990-1991

KENNETH VERCAMMEN- Community Service

NON- PROFIT: -Edison Elks-Presiding Justice 1993- Present
-Y.B. CHOI TAE KWON DO (Korean Karate)- 4th degree Black Belt awarded 2008 3rd degree 2004 ; 2nd degree December 1993, 1st degree Black Belt December 2001
-Raritan Valley Road Runners- Comeback of the Year Award 2002 and ranked Master Distance Runner; state champion 20,000 meter team 2005

New Jersey State Age Group Champion Garden State Games 5,000 meter run 1993
-Bishop Ahr/St. Thomas Aquinas H.S. Alumni Society
Elected Vice-President 1989-1990; Class of 1977- 25 year Reunion Chair
-Edison 14th District Committeeman Elected 1988-1994
-St. Francis Cathedral- Church Lector 1990-1994
-University of Scranton, North Jersey Alumni Chapter Co-Chair, Fall Social 1988
-Knights of Columbus-Fourth Degree Knight, Edison Council
Edison NJ Essay Contest Chair 1992,1993
Metuchen Chamber of Commerce, Past member Edison Chamber of Commerce;
RUNNING:
Raritan Valley Road Runners RVRR Rumson HashHouse Harriers
Central Jersey Road Runners CJRR Jersey Shore Triathlon Club JSTC
Freehold Area Running Club FARC Scranton Area Organization Runners SOAR
Jersey Shore Running Club JSRC USATF- US Athletic Track & Field
Sandy Hook Triathlon Club First Place- Bergen Bar 5k Law Day Run May 2001 South Brunswick Running Group- President First Place- CJRR Summer 5K 2002
First Place: Cocoa Beach 2 mile 2008, 2007; Cranford Run for Lupus 4 mile 2006, JSRC Twilight run 2006. Indian Trials Middletown 3m 2005,2004; Stroudsburg 5k 2005, 2004; Wildwood 5k, Ocean Winter 4 mile, Edison Lannie 5k, 2004; Washington DC Run for Justice 5K 2002
CJRR Age group champ 2005,2004, 2002, 1996, 1995
New York Marathon top 100 NJ Finisher

ACTIVITIES: Married 1989, one son born 1991, daughter born 1994
Weekend Road Running Races, Triathlons, Soccer
Tae Kwon Do Karate

SOUTH BRUNSWICK AREA
Summer Blast/Ireland Brook Neighborhood Sponsor
So. Brunswick Soccer Asst. Coach Travel 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999, 98
So. Brunswick Athletic Assoc.-Team Sponsor and helper with son's team
So. Brunswick Viking 5k- volunteer
South Brunswick 5K running Race volunteer
So. Brunswick Bicentennial Volunteer
Neighborhood Picnic Sponsor 1998-2009
So. Brunswick 50 Mile Bike Volunteer and 50 mile Finisher
Holt for Congress Volunteer

CHARITABLE: American Cancer Society-Chairman
Annual Summer Fundraiser Picnic- 1987,88,89,90,91,92
Chairman, Annual Christmas Fundraiser- 1987,88,89,90,911,92
Recipient-Young Professionals Award-Sept. 1988, Sept. 1989
Board of Manager's - 1989-1994 Founder and Chair-Young Professionals Group

KENNETH VERCAMMEN, ESQ. Education & Awards

LEGAL EDUCATION: The Widener/ Delaware Law School, J.D., May 1985
Class Rank: Top Ten Percent
Awards: Honor Grades: Federal Income Tax, Business Organization, Criminal Law, Advanced Advocacy, Family Law, New Jersey Practice, Unfair Trade Practices, Professional Liability.
Outstanding Service Award Recipient in Graduation Ceremony
Delaware Merit Scholarship - 1983, 1984
Provincial Winner - Phi Delta Phi Legal Honor Fraternity Graduate of the Year Award
Who's Who in American Law Schools

ACTIVITIES:
Law Review- Senior Staff-Member
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Senior Editor 1984-1985
Winner - Sixth Annual Trial Advocacy Competition
First Prize - Delaware Law School/ATLA Environmental Law Essay Contest
Delaware Law Forum, Casenote Editor

Working Scholar- Hon. Philip Gruccio, Assignment Judge of Atlantic, Cumberland, Cape May, Salem Counties
Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Delaware Chapter Treasurer
Law School Running Club - President
Research Assistant - Dean Arthur Weeks
Publications- Published in Law Review and wrote more articles than 75% of law faculty members

PRELEGAL EDUCATION: University of Scranton B.S., January 1981
Major: Political Science: Graduated Cum Laude in 3-1/2 years
Honors:
- Cited in Who's Who in American Colleges and Universities;
- Dean's List; Pi Gamma Mu Honor Society; Pi Sigma Alpha Honor Society.
- Varsity Cross- Country - Team Captain and Record Holder of Indoor Half-Mile
- District Magistrate Thomas Hart- Paid Law Clerk/ Executive Assistant
- Pre-Law Society Public Relations Director
- Voter Registration Drive Coordinator
- Internship with Pa. Representative Hon. Fred Belardi
- School Newspaper Staff and Sportswriter
- WYRE radio station sports caster
- 3rd Place Wrestling Tournament
- Campus Bowl Intellectual Competition (Team Captain)
- Trustee Day Volunteer, Red Cross Blood Drive Volunteer
- Senior Class - Hard Rockers Social Committee Chair
-Alumni Society-Estate Planning Council 1997-Present
- Class of 1981 20 year Reunion Executive Committee member 2001 -25 Year Reunion Co-chair


KENNETH VERCAMMEN
Attorney at Law
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
732-572-0500
The American Bar Association is the largest voluntary professional organization in the world with more than 400,000 members

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION - National Appointments:

General Practice Solo & Small Firm Division
-Estate Planning, Probate & Trust Committee- Chair 2008-2009, 2006-2007
-Elder Law Committee Chair 2005- present, Vice Chair 1996-1999
- Criminal Law Committee Deputy Chair 2006-present
- Tort, Personal Injury and Insurance Committee Chair 2005- 2006
-Deputy Chair and Newsletter Editor-GP Marketing Legal Services Committee 1993 -1996
- Probate & Estate Planning Committee- Newsletter Editor & Vice Chair 1997-1999, Vice Chair 2005
-Litigation Committee Member 1993 - present

BUSINESS AND AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS:
-Elder Law, Estate and Probate ABA Chicago Annual Meeting
-Elder Law and Probate New York City 2008 Annual Meeting
- Improving Your Elder Law & Estate Practice San Francisco, CA 2007
-Elder Law and Estate Planning- ABA Miami 2007
-Elder Law Practice, New Ethical Ideas to Improve Your Practice for Clients ABA Hawaii 2006
-Marketing Success Stories ABA Toronto 1998
-Opening a Business-Sayreville Adult School 1997,1996,1995
-Olympians of Marketing- ABA Annual Meeting-Orlando, Florida 1996
-Unique Marketing Techniques & Client Relations III ABA Annual Meeting-Chicago 1995
-Starting a Business-Brooklyn Bar Association 1995,1994
-Personal Marketing & Relations - 1995 Miami ABA meeting LPM Personal Marketing Skills IG
co-sponsored by four Major National Bar Sections and committees
-How to Start a Practice-1994 New Orleans ABA Annual Meeting LPM primary sponsor
-1993 New York Annual Meeting "Marketing for Small Firms"

LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT SECTION ABA- LPM
-Co-Chair with Jay Foonberg-ABA LPM Personal Marketing Skills Group 1998,1997,1996,1995,1994
-Speaker at many ABA Annual Meetings
-National Liaison and ex-officio member of Law Practice Management Section Council 1993 - 1995
-National Chair - Law Practice Management Committee YLD 1992-1993
-Chair and Newsletter Editor-Marketing Legal Services Committee 1996-1997,1999-2000
ABA Attendance at Leadership Conferences and participation at following Annual and Sectional meetings: Chicago 2009, New York 2008, Philadelphia GP 2007, San Francisco 2007, Washington GP 2007, Miami 2007, Hawaii 2006, Philadelphia LPM 2005; Washington DC 2002; Philadelphia 2002; London 2000, New York 2000, Atlanta 1999, Beverly Hills 1999, Cancun LPM 1998, Naples-LPM 1997; Captiva 1996, Orlando 1996, Coronado LPM 1995, Chicago 1995, Miami 1995, Washington D.C. GP 1995, Vancouver LPM 1995, New Orleans 1995, Napa, CA LPM 1994, Colorado LPM 1993, New York 1993, Boston 1993, San Francisco 1992, Cleveland GP 1992, Scottsdale AZ 1991, Los Angeles 1990, Hawaii 1989, Philadelphia 1988, Toronto 1988, New York City 1986, Washington DC 1985


KENNETH VERCAMMEN
Attorney at Law
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
732-572-0500
New Jersey State Bar Association- Municipal Court Section Chair 2003-2004, Vice Chair 1999-2002; Chair of Municipal Court Education Committee 1996-Present
Middlesex County Bar Association Chair Municipal Court Practice Committee 1997-2008
County Bar Board of Trustees 2000- 2006

New Jersey State Bar Association -General Practice Section-Board of Directors 1995- Present

ADJUNCT PROFESSOR Middlesex County College
Edison, NJ February, 2001-April, 2001; Jan. 1990-May, 1991
Instructor of "Criminal Law and Procedure" and Business Law. Taught college students the elements of crime and the criminal procedure system. Explained the incidents before and after trial and analyzed the impact of the Constitution on crimes and criminal procedures.

New Jersey Superior Court - Certified Mediator 1997-

New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Municipal Courts 2000-2005

Other Speaking
-Update of Municipal Court-NJSBA Annual Meeting Atlantic City 1999,1997, 95, 94
- Cranbury Twp Municipal Alliance Against Substance Abuse 2004, 2002
-ATLA-NJ - New Jersey Courts 1991
-Intoxicated Driver Resource Center/IDRC - DUI Law 1999, 1991
-Preventing the Impaired Driver-Coalition Against Impaired Drivers 1992
-Winning Lawsuit Threshold Cases NJSBA 1992
-WCTC Radio Mid-Day Legal Advisor - Criminal and Traffic Laws 1991 and 1990
-Computers in Litigation-NJSBA Law Office Management 1994
-Self Defense Law in New Jersey - Cranbury Police Dept. 1997,1993,1992

Self Defense and Home Protection - Speaker - New Brunswick Crime Watch - 1989
-Wills and Power of Attorney 1991 Edison Democratic Association
Defending Speeding Cases - New Jersey State Bar Association/NJSBA - 1989
-Family Law & Domestic Violence Trial Practice NJ State Bar Association 1995,1994,1993
-Automobile Insurance - Middlesex County College - 1990
-Criminal & Juvenile Courts Piscataway Vo Tech – 1990
-Living Wills-Dean Witter and Nordstroms, Menlo Park Mall October 1992; Trusts and Living Wills-Dean Witter, Metro Park, June 1992; Estate Planning-North Brunswick Republican Club May 1992;

Make a Wish Foundation- Co Chair 19th Annual Summer Blast 1994 in Belmar, NJ
Co Chair Christmas Fundraiser 1993
Jersey Shore Medical Center Chair-18th Annual Summer Blast to Benefit the Jersey Shore Regional
Trauma Center at Bar Anticipation, Belmar 1993
American Red Cross Elected to Board of Directors 1988-1991

Wednesday, November 11, 2009

11-10-09 Hina K. Patel v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission

11-10-09 Hina K. Patel v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission
(A-86-08)

Under N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.2(e), the exemption provision
for assessing motor vehicle penalty points for an
unsafe driving offense that occurs more than five
years after “the prior offense,” “the prior offense”
refers only to the most recent preceding offense
based on both a plain reading of the statute and a
review of the legislative history. Thus, the Motor
Vehicle Commission correctly imposed motor vehicle
points on Patel for having a fourth unsafe driving
conviction in 2007, only one year after the date of
her prior, third, unsafe driving offense.


Assistant Editor: Umair Hussain